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This thesis introduces and defends a vulnerability theory of exploitation and uses that 
theory to explain what is exploitative about international transactions such as commercial 
gestational surrogacy and clinical trials. The vulnerability theory is preferable to a number 
of alternative theories of exploitation that have been defended in the philosophical 
literature. The dominant theories of exploitation tend to be inadequate or incomplete to 
account for different forms of exploitation. These shortcomings stem from the theories’ 
tendency to mistake something that is characteristic of specific forms of exploitation for 
what constitutes exploitation itself. Meanwhile, according to the vulnerability theory, 
exploitation occurs when A derives benefit by taking advantage of the vulnerability and 
dependence of B. This conceptualisation of exploitation as a function of the levels of 
vulnerability and dependence between transactors is analytically advantageous because it 
identifies conditions for exploitation that characterise most forms of exploitation. This 
conception also renders exploitation in the international domain visible by highlighting 
the prevalence of vulnerability and dependence therefore demanding theorisation, which 
until recently has been absent. Lastly, the project argues that exploitation at the 
international domain is distinctively wrong for reasons that do not arise in transactions 






I hereby declare that this thesis is the original work of the author and has not been 
submitted previously to any other academic institution. Where use has been made of the 







My gratitude goes to many people that have contributed to this work and accompanied 
me on this PhD journey. 
My deepest and sincerest thanks to my supervisors - Dr. Andrew Shorten and Dr. Adina 
Preda, who have supervised me for an extended period. I am indebted to them for their 
knowledge and critical rigour in my moments of ignorance and their unyielding patience 
in my moments of ineptitude and stubbornness. Most importantly, their attentive support 
and encouragement in my more fragile moments. 
My sincere gratitude to 
Dr. Rory Costello, Dr. Owen Worth and Dr. Anna Gaul for their thoughtful 
comments and panel reviews along the years. 
The Department of Politics and Public Administration for the opportunity and 
funding, and its staff and students for their engagement and support. 
My colleagues in Philosophy Department at the Chancellor College of the 
University of Malawi for the motivation and encouragement. 
Special thanks to 
The biggest cheerleaders: Karen, Crystal and Skylar for keeping me going. 
My big family for too many things to list but most of all your love and support. 
This may be the first but as we have done before; this is to show how much is 
possible. 
Mwiza Jo Nkhata for the inspiration and The Kunjes for giving me a home. 
This is by no means everyone, but regrettably, there is just not enough space here. My 




Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................. i 
Declaration ............................................................................................................................................ii 
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................. iii 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................. iv 
Chapter 1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 
Thesis Outline ................................................................................................................................ 14 
Chapter 2 Examining Philosophical Theories of Exploitation ........................................................... 22 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 22 
Marx’s Theory of Exploitation ...................................................................................................... 24 
Roemer’s Theory of Exploitation .................................................................................................. 31 
Steiner’s Liberal Theory of Exploitation ....................................................................................... 38 
Miller’s Equilibrium Theory of Exploitation ................................................................................. 43 
Wertheimer’s Account of Exploitation .......................................................................................... 49 
Wolff’s Theory of exploitation ...................................................................................................... 55 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 60 
Chapter 3 Analysing Vulnerability Theories of Exploitation: Goodin and Wood ............................. 63 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 63 
Goodin’s Theory of Exploitation ................................................................................................... 66 
Examining Goodin’s Account.................................................................................................... 71 
Wood’s Theory of Exploitation ..................................................................................................... 81 
Examining Wood’s account of Exploitation .............................................................................. 88 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 95 
Chapter 4 The Concept of Vulnerability: Towards A Revised Vulnerability Theory of Exploitation98 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 98 
What is vulnerability? .................................................................................................................. 101 
Vulnerability and Disadvantage ................................................................................................... 109 
Dependence and its role in exploitation ....................................................................................... 112 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 125 
Chapter 5 International Gestational Surrogacy: Exploiting Women in India .................................. 127 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 127 
v 
 
International gestational surrogacy and its development ............................................................. 129 
The Debate on Surrogacy: An overview ...................................................................................... 132 
Exploitation Arguments against Surrogacy ................................................................................. 134 
Exploitation in International Commercial Surrogacy: A Vulnerability Argument ...................... 141 
Do vulnerable women consent in surrogacy? .............................................................................. 154 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 160 
Chapter 6 Exploitation and Clinical Trials in the Developing Countries ......................................... 162 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 162 
The proliferation and status of clinical trials in developing countries ......................................... 165 
Sources of ethical issues in clinical research ............................................................................... 166 
Examples of exploitative clinical trials in developing countries .................................................. 169 
Exploitation in Clinical Research ................................................................................................ 173 
When are clinical trials exploitative? ........................................................................................... 174 
Exploiting the vulnerability and dependence of research subjects in developing countries ........ 184 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 197 
Chapter 7 What is wrong with exploitation in international commercial gestational surrogacy and 
clinical research trials? ..................................................................................................................... 201 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 201 
Double Standards in International Arrangements ........................................................................ 203 
Hypocrisy ..................................................................................................................................... 210 
Further ethical implications of double standards in international exploitation ............................ 217 
Racial Injustice ........................................................................................................................ 217 
Colonialism .............................................................................................................................. 225 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 230 
Chapter 8 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 232 









 The concept of exploitation remains a source of debate in philosophy and other 
disciplinary fields. The term remains one of the most overused and misused concepts that 
serves to describe a range of practices, interactions or transactions. People use the term 
exploitation, sometimes as a self-explanatory term, to describe diverse harmful, abusive, 
or unjust transactions among other things. Thus, charges of exploitation appear in 
different ways to describe or evaluate specific transactions between individuals, classes, 
corporations or governments. The concept is applied differently sometimes to indicate 
that there is something intuitively wrong about a transaction and other times it is used to 
determine what that wrong is. In short, there is no uniform meaning or consistent use of 
the term exploitation albeit a general agreement that exploitation describes the occurrence 
of unfair use or advantage-taking of a person. The term exploitation is often times 
confused with other concepts such as coercion, commodification and harm both in the 
common usage of the term and sometimes in specified fields. As J.L. Hill (1994: 699) 
observes, exploitation is misused or confused with other concepts because exploitation 
“has been a catchall term with as many meanings as to those who use it”. 
 There are also different views about whether exploitation is a moralized concept 
or not. In different ways, moralised views of exploitation hold that exploitation “is by 
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definition, wrong because unfair” (Wertheimer 1996: 6). For example, according to 
Andrew Reeve, “in social theory, exploitation implies a normative negative evaluation of 
the use of a thing” (Reeve 2010: 481). Moralised views of exploitation intend to highlight 
that exploitation involves some type of treatment of another person that is morally wrong. 
Mathias Risse and Gabriel Wollner concur stating that exploitation occurs when “an 
individual A treats B in a way T giving rise to a distribution or transfer D, and the joint 
occurrence of T and D violates some moral principle” (Risse & Wollner 2014: 20). 
However, there are disagreements about what types of outcomes, distributions or 
transfers, and kinds of treatment of a person indicate the wrongness of exploitation. In 
other instances, exploitation features in arguments against a range of practices presumed 
characteristically exploitative. Exploitation is regularly mentioned in the context of 
prostitution, surrogacy, organ selling and pornography among other presumably tainted 
activities. On the other hand, there are non-moralised views of exploitation arguing, 
“exploitation is not wrong by definition, and it is not obvious why it is wrong in every 
instance” (McLaughlin 2008: 15). 
 Similar diverse meanings and applications of the term exploitation mentioned 
above are manifest among philosophical theories of exploitation. However, despite the 
theoretical differences, exploitation generally refers to benefiting by taking unfair 
advantage of another person. That is, in general terms exploitation occurs when one 
benefits by taking unfair advantage of another (Veneziani & Yoshihara 2010: 2). 
Notwithstanding the intuitive appeal of this general definition, theories of exploitation 
offer different explications on what constitutes the unfairness or the source of the 
unfairness and the structural relationship between the exploiter and the exploited. For the 
rest of this thesis, A represents the exploiter and B represents the exploited.    
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 The theories of exploitation are different because they hold different views about 
what constitutes exploitation. Consequently, each theory only accounts for some specific 
forms of exploitation rather than others. In other words, the meaning of what constitutes 
exploitation in individual theories of exploitation or their approach to exploitation 
determine their capacity to account for different forms of exploitation. The failure to 
account for a range of forms of exploitation by dominant theories of exploitation indicate 
their inadequacy or incompleteness. Marxist and liberal theories dominate the 
contemporary philosophical literature on exploitation, but what one approach says is 
exploitative about a practice or interaction is not necessarily exploitative for the other 
approach. Consequently, practices or interactions that one approach can pronounce as 
exploitative may not be charged as such by the other approach. On the one hand, the 
liberal approach broadly identifies such things as impaired consent and/or unfair price in 
a transaction between individuals to determine the occurrence of exploitation. On the 
other hand, Marxist approaches view exploitation as a product of, and located within, 
social and economic systems and structures of oppression (Deveaux & Panitch 2017: 2).1 
 Each of the approaches has some shortfalls in accounting for exploitation. The 
inadequacy in the liberal approaches lies in their failure to take into account 
institutionalized and severe conditions that make some individuals more exploitable than 
others. For example, conditions that make workers more exploitable than the capitalists. 
In other words, the liberal approach offers a narrow approach to accounting for 
exploitation because it abstracts away from the real conditions such as background 
injustices against which exchanges or transactions are conducted. However, while the 
                                                             
1 Young’s (1990) approach exemplifies this view of exploitation as an inevitable by-product of various 
interlocking systems of social oppression.  
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Marxist approach addresses the shortfall in the liberal approach, it is also inadequate as 
“it can lose sight of the specific agential aspects of exploitation – that is, troubling features 
of certain transactions that are critical to explaining why this particular exchange, in this 
instance but not others, is exploitative” (Deveaux & Panitch 2017: 2). In general, the 
theoretical inadequacy in both approaches is that they in varied ways are either too broad 
or too narrow to account for exploitation.  
 To illustrate the lack of uniform meaning or use of the concept of exploitation, let 
us consider the following putative examples of exploitation that we will be referring 
throughout the thesis:  
1. “A factory owner visits a village in the Pacific Rim country and offers to set up a 
running-shoe factory that would pay each worker $2 per day. The current average 
wage in the village is $1, which is enough to prevent a worker and his/her family 
from starving. The workers will have no benefits other than salary and must work 
eighty hours per week. The workers accept. The running shoes sell for $95 per 
pair in the United States and Western Europe, and half of that price is corporate 
profit” (Sample 2003: 8).2 Some people hold that this is exploitative because 
unlike the workers, the factory owner excessively benefits from this transaction. 
2. A greedy tow truck driver finds a motorist stranded in a ditch during a snowstorm. 
Ordinarily, the tow truck would charge $10 for rendering his services of towing 
the motorist’s car out of the ditch. However, knowing that the motorist is probably 
willing and able to pay substantially more, and knowing that it may be a while 
before another truck comes along, the tow truck driver offers to rescue the 
                                                             
2  The 1994 – 95 Nike case in Indonesia is the famous sweatshop example in the contemporary literature 
on exploitation and has many similar examples. See Korten 2001: 115 
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motorist for $210 (Wertheimer 1996: 218). Most people would agree that the truck 
driver exploits the motorist by making him pay more than the ordinary charge for 
the towing services. 
3. Ms Roy, a lesbian, consulted Dr Renatus S. Hartogs for help with sexual problems 
and depression. After several months of treatment, Dr Hartogs induced Ms Roy 
to have sexual intercourse with him, telling her it was part of her treatment. Ms 
Roy’s condition worsened and she was subsequently committed to a mental 
hospital on two occasions (Wertheimer 1996: 162). Again, most people would 
argue that apart from professional misconduct, Dr Hartogs initiated an 
exploitative relationship with Ms Roy.3 
4. Mary Beth Whitehead agreed to bear a child at a fee for a biochemist named 
William Stern and his wife, a pediatrician named Elizabeth. Whitehead found 
herself unable to part with the child when the child was born, and sought to retain 
custody (Wertheimer 1996: 96 – 97).4 This famous Baby M case in New Jersey 
intensified public debate and opposition to commercial surrogacy from 1985. 
Commercial surrogacy, like human organ sales, meets the charge that such 
transactions would lead to the exploitation of the surrogates and organ donors 
(who are usually poor) who may face undue pressure to hire out their body 
services or sell their body parts to wealthy buyers.   
5. The Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male was a forty-yearlong 
study of untreated syphilis on poor African American men in the United States, 
conducted between 1932 and 1972 to study the natural progression of the disease. 
                                                             
3  Wertheimer (1996) discusses in detail sexual exploitation in Chapter 6 narrating cases of sexual 
relationships between psychotherapists and patients. 
4 See In the matter of Baby M, 1988  
6 
 
The study was conducted without the benefits of patients’ informed consent. The 
subjects were told that they were being treated for “bad blood”, a local term that 
was used to describe several ailments including anaemia and fatigue. For their 
participation, the subjects received free medical examinations, free meals, and 
burial insurance (Centre for Disease Control and Prevention 2015). Most people 
agree that this clinical research was harmful and exploitative. 
 The above examples represent different scenarios of what is widely considered 
exploitation or different scenarios in which the term exploitation is applied. As used in 
the examples, the term exploitation intends to describe the harm, abuse, or injustice 
among other things that occur in transactions or characterise a transaction. The application 
of the term in the scenarios to describe different things reveal the ambiguity of the term 
exploitation. What is exploitative in one scenario is different in the others and what is 
exploitative in the same scenario may not be the same for everyone. For example, some 
can argue that the transaction in the factory example is exploitative because the profit that 
the factory owner makes is excessive or that the distribution of benefits is unequal and 
therefore unfair or unjust. Chris Meyers (2004: 327) argues that employers in sweatshops 
such as in this factory example exploit their employees when they benefit 
disproportionately from their labour and it is wrong because they take advantage of their 
desperate situation. That is, such transactions amount to exploiting the workers because 
the factory owner unfairly profits from the goods produced by the workers in harsh and/or 
dangerous conditions that they can only tolerate because of their distressing situation. 
Meyers (2004: 319) also argues that it is morally objectionable to pay low sweatshop 
wages for very arduous sweatshop labour even if there is no coercion, deception, or direct 
causing of harm. Other theorists such as Alan Wertheimer (1996: 230) employ a 
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hypothetical market principle to determine when the distribution of benefits and burdens 
is lopsided to count as unfair and exploitative. Yet, not all cases of lopsided or 
disproportionate distribution of benefits are necessarily instances of exploitation.  
 A different view may hold that the factory example is exploitative because the 
factory owner benefits by taking advantage of some form of misfortune or background 
injustice that the workers suffer or because the profit derives from the workers’ labour 
that is rendered under circumstances of poverty or need. For example, Sample’s (2003) 
account of exploitation as degradation holds that exploitation occurs when A benefits by 
taking advantage of the unfairness created by injustice. The workers in the factory 
example occupy a weaker bargaining position compared to their transactor perhaps 
because they are victims of socioeconomic injustice, among other factors. This condition 
does not obtain in similar situations. For instance, an exploitation charge is less likely 
where A benefits by selling an item to B who becomes needy because she has lost a 
similar item through something unfortunate or unjust such as theft. The circumstances of 
B are similar to those of the factory workers as being in need or victims of some 
misfortune or injustice, but the exchange does not appeal as a situation of exploitation 
between A and B.   
 Other authors insist that exploitative transactions are tainted by impaired consent 
or are demonstrably harmful to the exploited. Views that require harm to establish the 
occurrence of exploitation present us with some difficulty to adjudicate in the factory 
example because the transaction benefits the workers more than it harms them. However, 
such views may easily declare the psychotherapy and Tuskegee trials examples as 
exploitative. Allen Buchanan holds this view arguing  that “to exploit a person involves 
the harmful, merely instrumental utilization of him or his capacities, for one’s own 
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advantage or for the sake of one’s own ends” (Buchanan 1985: 87). Views like 
Buchanan’s will also struggle to explain the surrogacy example, because it may not 
necessarily involve coercion, harm, or underpayment. On the other hand, other views as 
mentioned earlier hold that practices such as surrogacy, as well as prostitution, are 
inherently exploitative. Such views generally intend to set limits on the permissible scope 
of market exchange activity. For example, according to Richard Arneson (1992: 133), 
some goods or services should not be bought or sold but can be freely transferred to others 
and surrogacy falls in this category. The view is that once money is involved in such 
practices, they are likely exploitative. As Peter Singer and Deane Wells (1984: 125) 
argue, “once money enters the arrangement the possibilities of exploitation are 
everywhere”. 
 The term exploitation also commonly features in ordinary speech about 
international transactions and agreements, suggesting that exploitation is also an 
international phenomenon. However, exploitation remains under theorized at the 
international domain. There is wide use of the term in the discussion of phenomena as 
diverse as the use of migrant labour power, trade agreements between developed and 
developing countries, toxic waste disposal, human trafficking, human organ sales, 
international commercial gestational surrogacy, and international clinical research trials, 
among others. This suggests that there are some widely held intuitions about the 
occurrence of exploitation in the international domain. Some critics specifically argue 
that the current global economic order and its institutions are exploitative or generate and 
maintain conditions that encourage the occurrence of exploitation at the international 
level.  For example, Thomas Pogge’s view that the current global order allows the rich to 
get the poor to accept trading schemes that are unduly favourable to the rich  represents 
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one of the views about the perceived exploitative nature of international transactions 
under the current global arrangement (Pogge 2002).  
 The lack of theorization at the international level indicates some inadequacy in 
the existing theories of exploitation to readily account for exploitation at this level where 
it is rather complex. The lack of theorization may also suggests that the existing theories 
do not recognize exploitation occurring at the international domain. The under 
theorization or lack of theorization at the international domain consequently implies a 
failure to interrogate and address unjust or unfair practices that thrive on conditions of 
vulnerability and dependence prevalent in the international domain creating opportunities 
for exploitation. In other words, lack of or limited theorisation at this level indicates a 
failure to interrogate exploitation as an injustice issue. Avner De-Shalit makes one 
notable attempt to theorize exploitation in the international arena noting that most writers 
reluctantly use the term exploitation to discuss international and transnational exploitation 
and instead write about colonialism, structural hegemony and dependency (De-Shalit 
1998: 693).  
 De-Shalit provides a theory of exploitation to illuminate when it is reasonable to 
talk about international and transnational exploitation. Criticising Marxian and liberal 
views of exploitation, he argues, “Exploitation entails benefiting from an exchange which 
involves treating B without equal concern, or merely as a means rather than also as an 
end, in circumstances of bargaining” (1998: 702).5 In his view, treating another without 
equal concern or the failure to see the intrinsic value of another person is degrading and 
                                                             
5 De-Shalit holds that exploitation occurs when three conditions obtain. First, one agent treats another not 
as an equal. Second, some benefit accrues to the side that does not treat the other as an equal. Lastly, this 
treatment occurs in the circumstances of bargaining, where such an interaction leads into an agreement 
between transactors and potential other parties in the future.  
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is similar to humiliation (De-Shalit 1998: 703). While De-Shalit’s account of exploitation 
is helpful because it provides a view about how we should think about exploitation and 
perhaps why it matters by broadly describing instances of exploitation in the international 
arena, it does not describe what constitutes exploitation. In my view, De-Shalit mistakes 
one among many reasons that make exploitation wrong for a condition for exploitation. 
De-Shalit mistakenly insists that treating another without equal concern or degradation is 
a condition for exploitation when exploitation does not depend on the occurrence of 
degradation even at the international level. Exploitation can occur without a transaction 
being degrading or humiliating even though exploitative transactions can sometimes be 
degrading or humiliating, but this is not necessarily the case. The greedy truck driver and 
the stranded motorist example illustrates the point that exploitation need not involve 
degradation. Most people would agree that the driver exploits the motorist when he pays 
$210 or indeed anything above the ordinary price for the towing services. However, the 
driver does not exploit the motorist because he degrades the motorist, and in fact, the 
driver may not be degraded. Putting degradation as a condition for exploitation would 
also make it difficult to distinguish exploitation from other exchanges such as fraud that 
involve benefit and may sometimes be degrading.  
 De-Shalit’s theory is also mistaken to include degrading as a condition for 
exploitation because degradation is a moral evaluation of an exploitative act not a 
condition for exploitation. In other words, treating others without equal concern perhaps 
spells out what makes an exploitative transaction morally wrong. Yet, this view offers 
one of the reasons why exploitation is or could be wrong which is neither the only reason 
nor the reason in every case of exploitation. In addition, having degradation as a condition 
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for exploitation is also problematic because it is not clear what treating another without 
equal concern means or when one treats another without equal concern.  
 This thesis therefore proposes a vulnerability account of exploitation as a better 
conception of exploitation that is analytically adequate to account for various forms of 
exploitation. This vulnerability approach attempts to address the theoretical gap left by 
the dominant theories in accounting for a range of forms of exploitation. That is, the 
theory combines the relevant features of specific transactions and the conditions in which 
such transactions transpire to determine the occurrence of exploitation therefore widening 
the scope of the theory of exploitation. I argue that this vulnerability theory has 
explanatory advantage for accounting for exploitation in its various forms because it 
identifies the conditions that define exploitative relationship compared to the other 
theories of exploitation. In other words, the vulnerability theory explains the nature of 
exploitation and the mechanism by which it takes place. This vulnerability theory holds 
that exploitation occurs when A derives benefit by taking advantage of the vulnerability 
and dependence of B. According to this account of exploitation, an agent is vulnerable 
when his or her welfare interests are threatened. In this formulation, welfare interests are 
basic needs - those things that are vital to a person’s well-being. A threat to a person’s 
welfare interests is ultimately a threat to one’s well-being. Dependence refers to a 
relationship between transactors where the cost of exiting the relationship with A is 
greater for B than remaining in it and the transaction with A represents the best option 
available to secure B’s threatened welfare interests or wellbeing.  
 The threat(s) to one’s welfare interests, lack of options and/or capacity to protect 
the same makes an agent enter into a relationship with others for the protection of the 
threatened welfare interests. In short, in this theory the vulnerability that is relevant to 
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understanding exploitation comes with dependence. It must be noted that although people 
who are vulnerable are also often dependent, and vice versa, this need not be the case. B 
can be vulnerable without being dependent, if not interacting with A is not costly to B 
than continuing with the interaction such as where the interaction represent the best 
available option to secure the threatened welfare interests implying that B has the capacity 
and/or alternatives with which to protect his or her (threatened) welfare interests. 
However, there cannot be dependence without vulnerability. To illustrate this point, I 
borrow Mikhail Valdman’s (2009: 3) antidote case. A hiker bitten by a rare poisonous 
snake treatable by an antidote is on this account vulnerable because the hiker’s wellbeing 
is at risk as the hiker’s death is imminent. However, the hiker is not dependent if exiting 
or refusing to transact with another hiker for the antidote does not cost anything. That is, 
the cost of not transacting is no greater than zero that B can refuse to transact at $20,000 
(the retail price is $10). When the cost of not transacting with A does not risk the chances 
of securing the threatened welfare interests, then B is not dependent on A. For instance 
where B has other alternatives for securing his or her wellbeing thus A is not the best 
option available to the hiker. A relationship of dependence will not exist if the hiker need 
not transact with the other hiker to secure her wellbeing because the hiker carried an 
antidote to use against the snake poison. In this case, there are no costs to the hiker’s 
decision not to transact with the other hiker. The hiker is also not dependent on the other 
hiker if there are other interactors to transact with for the use of an antidote under 
conditions that are better than what the other hiker is offering. Conversely, the hiker 
cannot enter into a relationship of dependence if his or her welfare interests are secure or 
when there exist alternatives for securing his or her wellbeing. That is, when B’s 
wellbeing is not threatened, transacting with A is simply not necessary. Secondly, B need 
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not transact with A if the transaction does not represent the best option available to secure 
B’s wellbeing.  
 By the proposed vulnerability theory, the five examples outlined are exploitative. 
That is, the theory does not face the problem of pronouncing one example rather than 
another as exploitative. In all the examples, A benefits by simultaneously taking 
advantage of the vulnerability and dependence of B. In all the cases of exploitation, there 
is a threat to B’s welfare interests and there is a cost greater than zero if B choses to exit 
the relationship with A because the transaction represents the best option available to 
secure his or her wellbeing. The workers in the factory, the stranded motorist, the 
surrogate mother, the clinical trial subjects and the psychotherapy patient are exploited if 
and only if A benefits by taking advantage of the threats to their wellbeing and that it is 
costly for B to exit the relationship with A. This is the case in the above examples and it 
is what should be clear in any other form of exploitation.   
 Identifying vulnerability and dependence as necessary conditions for exploitation 
also helps the theory to easily and adequately account for exploitation at the international 
domain where vulnerability and dependence are more likely or prevalent creating many 
opportunities for advantage taking. This vulnerability conception of exploitation has the 
explanatory advantage over other theories because it identifies what is characteristic of 
exploitative relationships rather than what is characteristic of specific forms of 
exploitation hence it avoids the limitations of or challenges to the other theories.  
 This vulnerability theory of exploitation also holds that exploitation is primarily 
wrong or unfair insofar as the exploiter fails to adequately protect the welfare interests of 
the exploited.  The failure to protect the welfare interest of vulnerable and dependent 
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others is established counterfactually, by the existence of the possibility to interact with 
the exploited under better terms and conditions that can adequately protect their 
wellbeing.6 However, I also contend that exploitation is morally objectionable for various 
reasons such that the moral beliefs cited by other theories are only some of the reasons 
why exploitation could be wrong. That is, there are a variety of reasons why benefiting 
by taking advantage of others’ vulnerability is morally wrong and why exploitation is 
therefore morally objectionable.  
Lastly, the thesis argues that exploitation at the international level may be 
distinctively wrong for reasons that do not arise in cases of exploitation in domestic 
settings. Here the argument is that exploitation in the international domain is morally 
wrong because it involves unjustified practices of double standards suggesting a 
hypocritical commitment to the idea of equality of persons. Further, this practice of 
double standards constitutes covert arbitrary discrimination (perhaps unintended) against 
vulnerable others in ways that seem to taint these transactions as racist and colonialist.  
Thesis Outline 
 This thesis is organised in two parts. Part I examines some prominent 
philosophical theories of exploitation in two chapters to expose their inadequacies in 
accounting for various forms of exploitation. Chapter Two examines theories of 
exploitation proposed by Karl Marx, John E. Roemer, Hillel Steiner, David Miller, Alan 
Wertheimer, and Jonathan Wolff. The chapter argues that these theories are inadequate 
to account for different forms of exploitation because they mistake what is characteristic 
                                                             
6  This view is similar to John Roemer’s idea that exploitation “involves the possibility of a better 
alternative” (Roemer, 1996 p. 19) and David Miller’s view that exploitation involves the likelihood of an 
alternative close to the relevant benchmark that is available to the exploiter (Miller 1987 p. 161). 
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of specific forms of exploitation for what constitutes exploitation. In other words, the 
meaning of what constitutes exploitation in these individual theories of exploitation limit 
their capacity to only account for specific forms of exploitation rather than others. For 
example, Marx’s view of exploitation described by Richard J. Arneson as “the 
appropriation by a class of non-workers of surplus product of a class of workers” 
(Arneson 1981: 203) only applies to wage-labour relationship as in the case of the factory 
example. Marx’s theory is therefore blind to other forms of exploitation outside the 
necessary wage labour relationship such as exploitation of women’s reproductive and 
domestic labour, as argued by some feminist theorists.7 Similarly, liberal approaches’ 
definitions of what constitutes exploitation as unfair advantage-taking when transactions 
involve things such as impaired consent and/or unfair price are limited. As stated earlier, 
the liberal approaches tend to be too narrow to account for exploitation because they 
abstract away from the real conditions against which exchanges or transactions are 
conducted such as background injustices and therefore cannot successfully account for 
trenchant and institutionalized forms of exploitation. In addition, some quests to describe 
unfair advantage taking often feature some moral belief as a condition for exploitation 
such as in Steiner’s rights violation or Goodin’s violation of a duty to protect the 
vulnerable. Nevertheless, this is not to entirely dismiss such theories. As observed earlier, 
these approaches or theories still contain some insights relevant to building an analytically 
adequate theory of exploitation that avoids the limitations of the other theories. The view 
is that an analytically adequate theory of exploitation should provide a meaning of 
exploitation that does not draw from the characteristic of specific forms of exploitation 
so that it accounts for various forms of exploitation and extend to account for exploitation 
                                                             
7 This is a common feminist critique of Marxist exploitation. See Costa and James (1971)  
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in the international domain.  In addition, the vulnerability view aims at achieving the 
conceptual clarity that helps address the problem of confusing exploitation with other 
concepts. As Deveaux and Panitch (2017: 2) observe, when exploitation is confused with 
other concepts, or “becomes synonymous with them, it risks losing its normative force, 
and theorizing about it loses its normative value”. 
 Chapter Three examines vulnerability theories of exploitation from Allen W. 
Wood and Robert E. Goodin. In this chapter, I argue that their vulnerability approach to 
exploitation provides a more plausible account of exploitation than the other theories of 
exploitation. Yet both theories are still incomplete in significant ways. The two theories 
agree that exploitation consists in benefiting by taking advantage of another’s 
vulnerability. That is, exploitation involves turning vulnerability into an opportunity for 
advantage taking which benefits the exploiter. The vulnerability present in a transaction 
is important because it shows the nature of the conditions for the exploited that are 
necessary in an exploitative transaction thereby broadening the understanding of 
exploitation. In other words, the vulnerability approach identifies what is common to 
exploitative relationships hence it avoids the limitations of the other theories such as 
mistaking what is peculiar about specific forms of exploitation for what is characteristic 
of exploitation in general. In addition, the vulnerability approach easily identifies the 
exploiter and the exploited both as individuals and groups. Nevertheless, these theories 
require some revision as they employ an unclear notion of vulnerability and as a result 
are either too narrow or too broad.  
 Chapter Four explains and defends my own vulnerability theory of exploitation. 
This chapter offers a refined notion of vulnerability that is relevant to understanding 
exploitation and which includes a notion of dependence that goes along with it. 
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Vulnerability is a condition in which a person or group’s welfare interests or wellbeing 
are threatened. As clearly depicted in the antidote case, one is vulnerable when one’s 
welfare interests are threatened. Welfare interests are those goods that are vital for one’s 
welfare or wellbeing. Dependence denotes a relationship between transactors where the 
cost of exiting the relationship with A is greater for B than remaining in it and where the 
transaction with A represents the best option available to secure B’s threatened welfare 
interests or wellbeing. Since this relationship with A represents the best option available 
to secure B’s threatened interests, it is disadvantageous for B to refuse to transact with A 
because her wellbeing is contingent on the prospects of this interaction or exchange. On 
this account, exploitation does not involve interdependence as such because B depends 
on A but not vice versa. The  relationship of dependence in this account resembles Frank 
Lovett’s social relationship of dependence, described as a relationship from which the 
cost of exiting the relationship is greater than remaining in it (Lovett 2010: 50). As it can 
be seen in the all the examples, it is detrimental for B’s wellbeing not to enter, or to exit, 
a relationship with A.  
 For this vulnerability account, exploitation occurs when A benefits by 
simultaneously taking advantage of the threat(s) to an agent’s welfare interests and her 
lack of the capacity to secure the threatened welfare interests. This definition plausibly 
accounts for various forms of exploitation because it does not face the limitation set by 
specific conditions such as harm, excessive benefit and others that may only exist in some 
forms of exploitation but not others. Vulnerability and dependence afford A power or 
advantage to offer conditions in an exchange that are more advantageous to him or her 
than to B. The vulnerable and dependent B accepts conditions of a transaction that do not 
adequately protect their welfare interests because the transaction represents the best 
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available option for securing their threatened welfare interests or wellbeing. The situation 
of the stranded motorist exemplifies such a situation in which the tow truck driver’s offer 
is only one that the motorist can put up with under the circumstances.  
 Part II of the thesis applies the proposed vulnerability theory to explain why two 
arrangements, commercial gestational surrogacy and clinical trials at the international 
level, are exploitative. This application also demonstrates the theory’s analytical 
advantage at the international level by comparing it to other views of exploitation, which, 
as stated earlier, struggle to account for exploitation at this level. Deveaux and Panitch 
(2017: 1) similarly note that dominant theories of exploitation cannot readily explain why 
certain practices are exploitative and the authors therefore challenge “leading 
philosophical accounts of exploitation to confront globalized, racialized, and gendered 
practices”, which are in their considered judgement exploitative.  
 Chapter Five begins by applying the vulnerability theory of exploitation to 
international commercial gestational surrogacy (IGS) arrangements. The chapter focuses 
on the surrogacy industry in India because India had, until recently, more permissive laws 
regarding surrogacy than other countries. Consequently, there is substantial literature 
available on the surrogacy industry there. However, my analysis of this topic applies to 
other surrogacy industries, as India is not the only destination for international gestational 
surrogacy. For the rest of the thesis, surrogacy stands for commercial gestational 
surrogacy in the international domain involving persons from rich countries seeking 
surrogacy services in poorer countries. The chapter argues that other theories - such as 
those that limit the occurrence of exploitation to issues of consent, harm and unfair 
compensation, for example - fail to recognise exploitation at this level because these 
conditions are either absent or difficult to identify. The vulnerability theory points out, 
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for example, that unfair compensation or price is not enough for a charge of exploitation, 
especially at the international domain where the fairness of compensation may be difficult 
to establish. In some cases, the compensation may be ‘fair’ but the transaction may still 
be exploitative. This suggests that, surrogacy contracts are not exploitative because 
surrogate mothers are not fairly compensated or do not consent. Surrogacy is exploitative 
when surrogacy seekers and their brokers and/or artificial reproductive technology (ART) 
clinics benefit by taking advantage of the vulnerability and dependence of the surrogate 
mothers. That is, surrogacy seekers are able to achieve their goals at low cost and without 
many obstacles such as legal red tape because the women are poor, unprotected by the 
law, illiterate and in a deeply patriarchal society that does not adequately protect women. 
The vulnerability theory is therefore able to account for exploitation where other theories 
may not recognise it. Secondly, the vulnerability theory exposes the existence of many 
opportunities for exploitation in the surrogacy industry since vulnerability and 
dependence are more likely or prevalent at the international domain.  
 Chapter Six illustrates that while it is plausible to argue that exploitation in the 
international arena can be attributed to the absence of instruments and regulations to 
protect vulnerable and dependent others across jurisdictions, as shown in gestational 
surrogacy, in some cases the existence of such instruments or regulations does not matter. 
The chapter uses international clinical research trials to show that even where 
international regulations and instruments are available, they do not extend to protect from 
exploitation vulnerable and dependent persons in developing countries. This is because 
the instruments are weak or are ignored altogether. As stated earlier, vulnerability and 
dependence afford power and advantage to A in exploitative transactions. Even when 
developing countries have their own regulations on clinical research trials that should 
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protect and promote the welfare interests of individuals, international corporations and 
their agents flout the regulations because of the advantage that is given to them by their 
position of power based on resource control. Lack of adherence or ignoring these 
regulations or laws effectively lead to the problem of application of double standards in 
clinical research trials at the international level which allows for the occurrence of 
exploitation. Developing countries face a myriad of health problems and lack the capacity 
to address these health issues. These countries’ populations are vulnerable and become 
dependent on international medical researchers or pharmaceutical companies for their 
welfare interests in health and life in general because such interactors represent the best 
option available for securing welfare interests. The chapter therefore argues that research 
subjects and their communities in developing countries are exploited insofar as they do 
not get adequate protection for their wellbeing while their transactors derive benefit. That 
is, clinical subjects and their communities are exploited when there are no safety 
guarantees; no legal protection from possible harms of the trials; or they cannot access or 
afford medical products they have participated in their discovery, posttrial. 
 In Chapter Seven, I argue that exploitative exchanges involving transactors from 
different jurisdictions might be distinctively wrong, for reasons that generally do not 
apply to exploitative exchanges between compatriots. These reasons have to do with the 
employment of double standards concerning the protection and/or promotion of people’s 
welfare interests. The application of double standards serves to benefit the stronger party 
at the expense of the welfare interests of the vulnerable and dependent others. The 
argument is that the practice of double standards at the international level demonstrates a 
form of hypocrisy that violates the belief in the equality of people as it involves subjecting 
international interactions with developing countries to weaker moral demands while 
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demanding stronger ones in similar transactions within or among developed countries. 
The application of these double standards in effect exposes vulnerable and dependent 
individuals from developing countries to exploitation in that the double standards fail to 
pay adequate attention to their welfare interests. The chapter further argues that the 
practice of double standards at the international level has further ethical concerns that 
may not obtain domestically. I argue that exploitative international gestational surrogacy 
and clinical trials involve unjustified practices of double standards that constitute covert 
arbitrary discrimination against vulnerable others in ways that suggest maintaining racial 
injustice and colonial attitudes. In part, this is because the condition of the developing 
world is considerably instigated by historical, political and economic arrangements that 
have been shaped by racial injustice through colonialism or imperialism. The claim is 
therefore that continuing to transact in ways and within systems designed by these morally 
wrong mechanisms without paying proper attention to conditions of vulnerable 
individuals constitute maintaining the same moral wrongs, sometimes inadvertently 






Examining Philosophical Theories of Exploitation 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter explores the definitional debate on the concept of exploitation by 
examining some prominent philosophical theories of exploitation. The examination 
exposes the different views about what constitutes exploitation and its wrongness among 
these theories. I argue that these theories of exploitation are unable to account for various 
forms of exploitation because they fail to identify the correct necessary conditions for 
exploitation. Consequently, the theories’ views on what constitutes exploitation limit their 
capacity to account only for specific forms of exploitation rather than others. We will 
constantly refer to the five examples of exploitation cited in the previous chapter in the 
examination of the theories of exploitation (and throughout the thesis) and other examples 
wherever necessary to demonstrate the limitations of the theories to account for different 
forms of exploitation. 
 The philosophical theories of exploitation under examination in this chapter 
include Marxist accounts of Karl Marx and John E. Roemer; and non-Marxist or liberal 
views of Hillel Steiner, David Miller, Alan Wertheimer, and Jonathan Wolff. These 
theories represent the approaches to exploitation and exemplify the different ways in 
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which individual theories account for exploitation. That is, the analyses demonstrate the 
differences both between and within the Marxist (structural) and liberal (individual) 
approaches. The differences in the meaning and application of the concept of exploitation 
in these theories shows the ambiguity of the concept of exploitation that remain less 
resolved even among these philosophical theories. This analysis is important because it 
highlights different elements from both these structural and individual approaches that 
we should consider for a theory that has the explanatory advantage as in the proposed 
vulnerability theory. This examination, however, excludes vulnerability theories of 
exploitation by Allen W. Wood and Robert E. Goodin, which are examined in the next 
chapter because they, in my view, provide a more plausible account of exploitation than 
the theories examined in this chapter. I view that the vulnerability theories point towards 
blending insights from the structural and individual approaches and therefore they 
provide the foundations for the vulnerability theory of exploitation proposed in this thesis. 
However, these vulnerability theories are incomplete, as will be argued in the following 
chapter, because they provide an imprecise conception of vulnerability central to 
exploitation.  
 I first consider the structural approach theories starting with Karl Marx’s as the 
leading theory of exploitation followed by John Roemer’s attempt to recast Marx’s 
theory, characterizing exploitation in game theoretical terms, using property relations and 
counterfactual property distributions. Steiner’s theory is considered first in the liberal 
approach because of its clear efforts to formulate and defend a theory of exploitation from 
the liberal rights tradition. Miller’s theory follows because his theory builds on a critique 
to Roemer and Steiner’s theories. Wertheimer’s analysis is necessary as he provides a 
very comprehensive analysis of exploitation. Lastly, I consider Wolff’s theory because 
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his task to reiterate Marx’s theory highlights the problems of definition and meaning that 
I find important for any discussion of exploitation. In particular, Wolff’s introduction of 
the notion of vulnerability is promising for developing a general analysis of exploitation. 
 
Marx’s Theory of Exploitation 
 Karl Marx’s account of exploitation rests on his labour theory of value and the 
concept of surplus value. Roemer (1985: 30) summarizes Marxist exploitation as 
involving “unequal exchange of labour for goods: the exchange is unequal when the 
amount of labour embodied in the goods which the worker can purchase with his income 
(which usually consists only of wage income) is less than the amount of labour he 
expended to earn that income”. Drawing on his labour theory of value, Marx argues that 
workers give more labour time to produce goods or services than the value in terms of 
wages they receive in return. This view follows from the basic claim of his labour theory 
of value that the value of a commodity is measured by the average amount of labour time 
required to produce a commodity. That is, labour essentially determines the value of a 
commodity as “the use value, in the form of a product, issues from the labour process” 
(Marx 2013: 123). According to Marx (2013: 113), workers sell their commodity “labour 
power or capacity for labour” which is the capacity to produce goods or services to 
capitalist. Since on Marx’s view workers sell their labour power or capacity for labour as 
a commodity, they should get in return commensurate wages.  In other words, on Marx’ 
understanding, since the value of the commodities follows from the labour that has 
produced it, workers ought to receive an equivalent value for their labour. However, the 
workers labour longer than the time that is necessary to produce the value of the wages 
they receive from the capitalist.  
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 Marx views that in capitalism, the workers produce surplus or excess product, 
which takes the form of “surplus value”, which then is the difference between the labour 
that workers put in to produce the value of commodities and the value of wages they 
receive in return for their labour power. On Marx’s definition, “surplus-value is the 
difference between the value of the product and the value of the elements consumed in 
the formation of that produce” (Marx 2013: 144). In short, the workers contribute more 
labour power in terms of hours than they are paid and the difference constitute a surplus 
that goes to the capitalists as profit. However, Marx emphasizes that profit is a privilege 
deriving from ownership of capital rather than a wage or reward for the entrepreneurial 
skill of capitalist (Marx 1999: 24). According to Marx, production of surplus value is 
central to exploitation in capitalism as he points out that “production of surplus value is 
the absolute law” of capitalism production (Marx 2013: 430). Thus, exploitation occurs 
when the workers’ compensation is less than or not equal to the value they produce with 
their labour hours. The workers are exploited because their labour power creates a value 
greater than the value of the wages they receive. On this understanding, exploitation in 
Marx’s view involves an inverse proportion of profits and wages because the wage-labour 
relation is not an exchange of equivalents. 
 From the above description of Marx’s theory, A exploits B when A appropriates 
surplus value produced by B’s labour and B receives less value in wages than the labour 
power he expends in producing a commodity. That is, since the value of a commodity 
issues from the labour that produced it, capitalist exploitation is “the appropriation of the 
unpaid labour of others” (Marx 1999: 262). It should be noted, however, that for Marx A 
and B are classes of people, the capitalists and the workers rather than mere individuals. 
As Richard J. Arneson aptly describes Marxist exploitation, it is “the appropriation by a 
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class of non-workers of surplus product of a class of workers” (Arneson 1981: 203). Marx 
utilizes these views about exploitation to criticize the structure and nature of capitalism, 
which in his view, forces B to transfer some of its labour value to A.   
 The charge of exploitation in Marx as described above denotes that workers do 
not enjoy all the fruits of their labour, or that the workers lose their rightful claim to the 
product of their labour or the value created by their labour. As G.A. Cohen points out, 
Marx’s view that workers should claim the value created from their labour sounds similar 
to libertarian self-ownership principle. This principle says that “each person enjoys over 
herself and power, full exclusive rights of control and use, and therefore owes no service 
or product to anyone else that she has not contracted to supply” (Cohen 1995: 12).8 Robert 
Nozick endorses this libertarian principle in his entitlement theory of justice putting 
forward a self-ownership argument that holds that since individuals own themselves, they 
also own their labour and therefore its products (Nozick 1974: 150 - 5).9 On this basis, 
taking away some value created by another’s labour suggests some form of injustice or 
wrongdoing. Cohen thus observes that “an appeal to self-ownership is latent in the 
standard Marxist condemnation of exploitation” (Cohen 1995: 12). This appeal to self-
ownership underlies Marx’s various characterisations of exploitation as “theft”, 
“robbery” or “embezzlement”.10 Marx’s vampire metaphor describing capital as dead 
                                                             
8  Cohen argues that Marx’s condemnation of exploitation endorses this principle, which is deeply 
inegalitarian affecting his Socialist agenda. See Chapter 5 pp.  116 - 143 
9 Nozick (1974: 253 -62) views that the labour theory of value is false and consequently, Marx’s theory of 
exploitation (which relies on the labour theory of value) is false. 




labour that sucks the worker’s labour also appears to highlight more on the wrongness of 
unpaid labour (Marx 2013: 162).11  
 There are two interpretations of Marx’s theory of exploitation. The first one is to 
think that the theory solely hinges on the view of appropriation of the unpaid labour of 
others. The second is that Marx’s theory takes into account background circumstances 
that affect the transaction such as those which make the workers offer their labour to the 
capitalists even when there is no fair compensation. Henry Laycock (1999) describes 
these interpretations as strains in Marxist understanding of labour-capital relations. The 
first view that exploitation means benefiting from another’s labour without due 
compensation is according to Laycock a mechanistic view that largely prevails (Laycock 
1999: 121). The benefits that accrue to the exploiter derive from the workers’ labour by 
virtue of the wealth-based power that is exercised over the workers. The first view is 
common in the criticism of exchanges in which the party that contributes more in terms 
of labour power benefits less than the party which invests less labour. On this 
interpretation, it is easy to see why sweatshops are often exploitative. The factory owner 
in the Pacific Rim country example is in this sense exploiting the workers by profiting 
from the workers’ long hours of labour for a few pennies. We should note here that on 
this interpretation the unsafe conditions usually associated with sweatshop labour do not 
necessarily matter to the occurrence of exploitation. On this view, sweatshops owned or 
contracted by multinational corporations such as Nike are exploitative because they 
                                                             
11 Marx (2013: 162) uses the vampire metaphor describing capital as “dead labour which, vampire-like, 
lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks”. He states that capital 
furtively “sucks up the worker’s value creating power” (Ibid. 400) and transforms “the labourer into a 
crippled monstrosity” (Ibid. 251). 
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derive benefits from an inverse exchange of labour and wages with workers in developing 
countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam.  
 Marx’s theory of exploitation offers a good model for analysing some forms of 
exploitation. In particular, exploitation within specific types of relationships that 
characterise capitalism. However, his theory of exploitation as surplus transfer leaves out 
other exploitative transfers or exchanges that fall outside a wage-labour relationship such 
as within the family (Folbre 1982: 317). As stated earlier, Marx’s theory begins with an 
analysis of the commodity produced for the market. In other words, Marx builds his views 
of exploitation and capitalism from the analysis of the commodity. Without this 
commodity meant for the market, there is no exploitation because no labour is infused 
into a product. This means that Marx’s theory of exploitation is narrow, as it cannot 
account for exploitation outside the wage-labour relationship. As John Roemer (1996: 63) 
observes, the labour theory of value approach to exploitation is correct only in certain 
special and simple cases but the labour theory of value is unnecessary for a theory of 
exploitation. Cohen (1979: 338) similarly shows that “the relationship between the labour 
theory of value and the concept of exploitation is one of mutual irrelevance”. Laycock 
(1999: 121) notes similar difficulties with Marx’s capitalistic exploitation and argues that 
the theory is undermined by the confusion surrounding the notion of labour power and 
that it deserves to be rejected. While Marx’s theory can account for exploitation in cases 
such as the factory example, this theory will struggle to explain exploitation in the 
psychotherapist example because of the lack of the necessary labour-wage exchange. That 
is, it is hard to picture exploitation as the appropriation of surplus value that issues from 
labour power without compensation in this example.  
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 Marx’s insistence on a specific type of exchange therefore leaves out other forms 
of transactions or relationships. For instance, other interactions that fall outside the typical 
wage-labour relationship such as women who work in the home are not considered 
exploitative because their labour is not recognised even though it plays an important role 
in the general scheme of things in capitalism.  Moreover, as Will Kymlicka (2002: 182) 
observes, by focusing on surplus transfer Marx’s critique of capitalism fails to address 
the primary injustice of capitalism, which is the unequal access to the means of 
production, and which also affects other groups that exist outside the wage-labour 
relationship. For example, “dis-enfranchised women and the unemployed, and wage-
workers in our society suffer from this injustice, while the capitalists benefit from it” 
(Kymlicka 2002: 182). Further, Marx’s view here may suggest that those who fall outside 
this relationship such as children, the unemployed and the infirm are exploiters because 
they are benefiting from a surplus created by other people’s labour (Kymlicka 2002: 182).  
As Jonathan Wolff (2016: 151) similarly summarizes this Marxist view, “those who 
receive rewards in the market without putting in a proportional level of work are 
exploiters”. Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James make a related observation that 
Marx’s view suggests that women and others falling outside the wage-labour relationship 
may only suffer other forms of injustice, such as male chauvinism or oppression, but they 
are not exploited insofar as they are outside the production relationship (Costa & James 
1971: 6). In Costa and James’ view, this is because Marx fails to see domestic work as “a 
masked form of productive labour” (1971: 6). Wolff also admits this inability of Marx’s 
view of exploitation built on the idea of surplus value to account for exploitation. 
However, Wolff shows that Marx’s definition of exploitation only applies to a specific 
model (capitalist relations of production) and trying to apply it outside this model may 
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lead us into error (Wolff 1999: 109). As it will argued later on, Wolff views that other 
forms of exploitation occur but those forms cannot be captured by the surplus value 
definition of exploitation (Wolff 1985: 89). 
 Noting the problems with the pillars of Marx’s theory of exploitation, namely the 
labour theory of value and the idea of surplus value, we should consider a different 
interpretation of Marx’s theory or the second strain in Laycock’s words. While holding 
unequal exchange central to the occurrence of exploitation, we need a theory that can 
account for exploitation in exchanges outside the wage-labour relation, and perhaps also 
one that considers background injustices. We should therefore abandon Marx’s idea of 
exploitation as appropriation of surplus value because it is narrow. As Roemer (1996: 39) 
points out, exploitation can exist where agents trade only produced goods not only when 
agents sell their labour power to other agents. Roemer (2017: 11) argues “it is not 
precisely true that a labour market is necessary for exploitation: a rental market for capital, 
at which the wealthy peasants can rent their capital to the poorer ones, will suffice to bring 
about exploitation”. Differential ownership of the means of production and a competitive 
market for finished goods are sufficient to generate exploitation. For example, Roemer 
demonstrates that the occurrence of exploitation in a subsistence economy or a credit 
market does not need a labour market. A credit market is in fact functionally equivalent 
to a labour market with respect to generating classes and exploitation. Property relations 
not labour exchange or labour value should be the central concern of Marx’s theory.  
 The next section therefore expounds Roemer’s theory suggesting, like Kymlicka, 
that a theory of exploitation should focus on the broader pattern of distribution in which 
transfers of resources occur. Laycock (1999: 129) similarly holds that “shifting the 
attention away from the idea of a specific economic mechanism of surplus transfer, 
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towards broader questions of distributive justice or property rights in the means of 
production” is a move in the right direction despite its own limitations. In Roemer’s view, 
focusing on property relations captures Marx’s ultimate goal in his critique of capitalism, 
which is to abolish exploitation by eliminating property relations in the means of 
production.12  
 
Roemer’s Theory of Exploitation 
 John Roemer’s theory of exploitation attempts to recast the Marxist theory of 
exploitation as a theory of distributive justice. Roemer suggests his property-relations 
theory as a more normatively adequate approach to exploitation than Marx’s approach 
founded on the labour theory of value (Roemer 1996: 16). Roemer challenges the classical 
Marxist identification of production as the essential locus of capitalist exploitation. 
Roemer defines exploitation as a transfer of labour time particularly caused by unequal 
access to the means of production rather than Marx’s definition of exploitation in terms 
of surplus transfer. Put differently, Roemer arrives at conclusions that run counter to the 
Marxian thought that the labour market is crucial to exploitation and that surplus is 
extracted at the point of production (Petersen 1984: 326).  
 In Roemer’s view, the material basis for exploitation as unequal exchange of 
labour and wages lies in the differential ownership of productive assets which give rise 
to his term property relations (Roemer 1996: 38). For Roemer, inequalities in the 
distribution of property rights in the means of production yields exploitation. He argues 
that exploitation should be “conceived as the distributional consequences of an unjust 
                                                             
12 Friedrich Engels emphasizes this goal for Marx arguing, “This exploitation is the basic evil which the 
social revolution wants to abolish by abolishing the capitalist mode of production” (Engels 1995: 15). 
32 
 
inequality in the distribution of productive assets and resources” (Roemer 1996: 96). 
Roemer’s conception of exploitation is therefore based on a principle of distributive 
justice since he views exploitation as more than an unequal exchange between labour time 
and goods. In other words, exploitation is an unequal exchange or distribution because of 
an initial unjust distribution of productive assets.  
 In Roemer’s view, the property-relations definition of exploitation attempts to 
make clear what Marx’s view of exploitation fails to clarify, namely the conditions that 
enable the occurrence of such exploitation hence its injustice. Roemer argues that 
exploitation is not in itself a fundamental theory of (in) justice, if by exploitation we mean 
the extraction of surplus labour at the point of production. Roemer observes, “exploitation 
can exist even when no agent sells labour power to any agent; it can exist when agents 
trade only produced commodities” (Roemer 1996: 39, 62). In other words, exploitation 
can occur, for example, in a market economy without any wage relations or where direct 
wage relations are absent, such as in international economic relations (Przeworski 1982: 
291). Roemer is convinced that “the property relations definition is superior to the surplus 
labour definition, as its verdict on exploitation conforms more to the intuitive judgements 
of Marxists” (Roemer 1996: 25 fn. 8). According to Roemer, “the property-relations 
approach to exploitation is more general and it resolves many classical problems that have 
inflicted the labour theory of value approach to exploitation” (Roemer 1996: 16). In his 
view, we require a deeper theory of exploitation that gives priority to property relations 
to perceive the injustice of exploitation beyond the wage-labour relations employed in 
Marx’s theory of exploitation.  
 Roemer’s property-relations definition of exploitation employs a game-theoretical 
illustration as a test for exploitation. According to Roemer, “exploitation involves the 
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possibility of a better alternative” (Roemer 1996: 19). In other words, exploitation is on 
Roemer’s account “revealed by appealing to a hypothetical state under which an equal 
distribution of alienable assets are realized” (De Caro 2006). That is, Roemer’s property 
relations theory requires first a state of redistribution termed as the redistribution 
condition. In the state of redistribution, B gains alienable assets and A loses alienable 
assets. Roemer also formulates a ‘withdrawal test’ which holds that whether a coalition 
of agents is capitalistically exploited or not depends on whether the coalition would be 
better off in a hypothetically feasible situation of distributive equality. This is a situation 
where a coalition withdraws its “per capita share of society’s alienable, non-human 
property, and its own inalienable assets” (Roemer 1996: 24). Contrariwise, the exploiting 
class would do worse if it withdrew with its alienable assets received in this redistribution. 
The party that gains in terms of alienable assets in the redistribution is said to have been 
exploited under its initial economic conditions, while the party that turns out worse off, 
in terms of assets received, exploited the other under the initial distribution. To determine 
whether a coalition is exploited or exploiting “we compare how well the coalition is faring 
at the present distribution of income and labour with how well it would have fared under 
a certain alternative distribution of property” (Roemer 1996: 40). Roemer’s definition of 
exploitation in terms of counterfactual alternatives to property relations in society also 
helps him to model other forms of exploitation other than capitalist exploitation. In fact, 
Roemer’s general theory of exploitation is an attempt to put forward a theory that 
encompass feudal, capitalist and socialist forms of exploitation, which in essence “runs 
counter to the received Marxian wisdom, namely the crucial role of the labour market” 
(Petersen 1984: 326). Note that, the withdraw rule requires some specification for each 
type of exploitation (Roemer 1982a: 200 – 202). 
34 
 
 The view above suggests that A exploits B when B would do better by 
withdrawing with his per capita share of his productive assets and work alone after 
redistribution while A would do worse by withdrawing with her per capita share of the 
means of production (Roemer 1982a: 202; 1982b: 94 - 97). In other words, B would do 
better under a hypothetical alternative of equal distribution of productive assets. This 
implies that under the current distribution, A benefits as a direct result of B’s labour or 
that A’s welfare causally depends on some form of deprivation of B. However, Roemer 
argues that a third condition for exploitation is that the relationship between A and B is 
that of dominance. This dominance enables A to prevent B from realizing the alternative 
(Roemer 1982a: 195). For Roemer, B is exploited when he or she is denied equal access 
to resources and dominated even though he does not elaborate what constitutes 
domination. Roemer views dominance as a condition “necessary to rule out certain bizarre 
examples” to his core definition of exploitation (Ibid). For example, using the withdraw 
rule, an invalid supported by the society at a very high cost will have capitalistically 
exploited the society, because the invalid will turn out worse off if he or she withdrew 
with his or her share of resources and society will be better off (Ibid., 237). Roemer holds 
that this is not a case of exploitation since the invalid does not stand in a relationship of 
dominance to the society. Thus, the dominance condition is for Roemer only strategic to 
sort out bizarre cases because the property relations and withdraw conditions, taken 
together, are satisfactory for a definition of exploitation (Ibid. 195). 
 Roemer holds that his view of exploitation, defined in terms of property relations, 
establishes a clear causal relationship between B’s situation, say of poverty, and A’s 
affluence in exploitative circumstances. In Roemer’s view, the injustice of exploitation is 
the product of the large inequality in access to the means of production or the unequal 
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distribution of productive assets and resources. Moreover, whether exploitation is bad 
depends on it being a consequence of the unjust unequal distribution in the means of 
production (Roemer 1988: 130). By Roemer’s account, exploitation is the most common 
consequence of distributive injustice. That is, exploitation is one of the common results 
of distributive injustice under capitalism, but it has no ethical interest apart from the 
inequality.  
 Fundamentally, the main issue for Roemer is the moral legitimacy of private 
property in the means of production (Roemer 1988: 3). This is clear in his argument that 
“the injustice of an exploitative allocation depends upon the injustice of the initial 
distribution” (Roemer 1988: 57). In other words, exploitation is unjust if it rests on an 
original unequal distribution of productive assets. The thought here is that the exploited, 
for instance the villagers in the factory example, are disadvantaged because of the 
inequalities that derive either from the original accumulation that is characterised by 
‘plunder and robbery’, or from morally arbitrary factors such as underserved “luck” such 
as “capital stock inheritance”, or socially determined saving preferences and skills 
(Roemer 1988: 58 – 69). Richard Arneson (1981: 208) concurs with Roemer that such 
workers are exploited because they suffer from undeserved inequalities in either wealth 
or talent which enable others to take advantage of them. This means surplus transfer is 
only wrong when it arises as a result of unjust unequal distribution of capital but otherwise 
legitimate if it arises independent of, or if it is used to compensate for undeserved 
differences in wealth or natural talents. Jonathan Wolff in his interpretation of Marx 
makes a similar observation arguing that Marx’s idea of exploitation “is limited to 
relations of economic exchange under conditions where there is no justified rights to 
capital; that is, to earn money purely in virtue of one’s property holdings” (Wolff 1999: 
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105). It is on this basis that Marx view the capitalist as benefiting on the back of the 
workers without much effort. 
 While Roemer’s theory aims to recast the Marxist theory of exploitation as a 
theory of distributive justice, his view is inadequate. Roemer’s theory fails to account for 
exploitation that occurs when holdings are justly acquired as it only focuses on 
exploitation that occurs because of unjust property holdings. That is, Roemer’s suggestion 
of unjustly founded asset inequalities as a necessary condition for exploitation is not 
entirely true because any form of asset inequality can lead into a transaction characterised 
by asymmetric relations that may yield exploitation. In short, the condition of unjust 
accumulation is restrictive (Warren 2015: 301). Robert Veneziani also argues that “even 
if differential ownership of productive assets arises in morally unobjectionable ways, it 
does not mean that the wage relation is not exploitative” (Veneziani 2013: 539). 
Exploitation can occur even where inequalities are not a result of unjust distribution 
because any such inequality translates into inequalities such as economic power. Any 
inequalities in productive assets or ownership of means of production, regardless of their 
source, gives leverage over those who do not own such means of production. For instance, 
exploitative conditions necessary for the transfer of labour will equally obtain where A’s 
leverage results from B’s preferences or wastefulness of her initial holdings that were 
equal to A’s. Ants that toiled through the summer to save and prepare for winter can justly 
accumulate resources that can yield inequality and therefore leverage to offer exploitative 
conditions to a grasshopper that spent its summer making music (Wolff 1999: 116). This 
Aesop’s fable of the grasshopper and the ants illustrates that even where the original 
unequal distribution arose in a just way such as through differences in preferences or 
choices, exploitation can still occur for conditions of inequality obtain between the 
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interactors. Moreover, Roemer’s purely distributive approach “ignores some arguably 
salient features of exploitation such as notions of power or force” which are at play where 
other forms inequalities enable exploitation (Veneziani 2013: 537). Jeffrey Reiman 
(1990) similarly questions the purely distributive definition of exploitation and argues 
that the definition of exploitation requires a notion of power or dominance. 
 Another challenge to Roemer’s insistence on looking at exploitation as rooted in 
differential control or ownership of productive assets is that it does not make it as general 
a theory for exploitation as he intends.  As Leslie Jacobs argues, Roemer’s theory seems 
insufficiently general because it is insensitive to non-class forms of exploitation, such as 
“job exploitation” (Van Parijs 1986) or “gender disadvantage” (Jacobs 1996). Van Parijs 
insists that exploitation (status exploitation) can result from inequalities in income, for 
example, “attributable to neither chance nor choice nor to inequalities in wealth or skills” 
(Van Parijs 1986: 462). Similarly, gender and race can give rise to inequalities that are as 
objectionable as inequalities deriving from inequalities in productive assets. This is 
because race or gender sometimes entails inequalities that can be taken advantage of 
despite not being inequalities deriving from initial unjust distributions. For example, male 
domination can enable men to appropriate surplus labour in the form of domestic services, 
and racial domination may enable exploitation regardless of economic class. Khalid 
Nadvi also notes that Roemer’s theory never mentions the existence or possibility of race 
or gender exploitation yet differential endowments of human assets can lead to 
exploitation (Nadvi 1985: 1482). The exploitation of female sweatshop labour in 
developing countries such Bangladesh and Vietnam, and low pay for black miners in 
South African mines compared to their white counterparts under Apartheid exemplify 
exploitation that is not merely a product of distributive inequality of productive assets. 
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Other instances of such exploitation not arising from initial unjust distributions manifest 
in how churches have the ability to exploit believers, and how a state can use military 
violence to appropriate part of the surplus. In short, it is plausible to argue that A can 
appropriate the social surplus through other mechanisms that are not necessarily asset-
based as Roemer suggests. This means Roemer’s view of exploitation has restrictive 
conditions that limit its capacity to account for other forms of exploitation outside 
exchanges characterised by inequalities founded on unjust accumulation.  
 Roemer’s distribution of productive assets condition limits us to defining 
exploitation in purely distributive terms hence fails to account for other forms of 
exploitation. Moreover, as earlier observed, asset inequalities are only necessary but not 
sufficient for the occurrence of exploitation. Therefore, we need to look beyond the 
theories of exploitation that focus on the structure of the interaction between agents 
perhaps to those that reveal specific features of exploitative interactions  and the outcome. 
Nevertheless, Roemer’s view of exploitation as theory of distributive justice points us in 
the right direction. As Veneziani (2013: 539) commends, “Roemer’s theory is an 
important and insightful contribution, and it sets an unsurpassed standard of rigour in 
exploitation theory”. 
 
Steiner’s Liberal Theory of Exploitation 
 Hillel Steiner’s theory is markedly the first theory of exploitation in the liberal 
tradition grounding its analysis in the liberal values of personal rights, liberties and 
choices (Otubusin 1987: 64). Steiner’s liberal theory of exploitation thus moves us away 
from the Marxist framework. Steiner defines exploitation as “a mutually self-interested, 
consensual exchange in which what one party transfers is - but need not have been - of 
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greater value than what is received in return" (Steiner 1987: 132). For Steiner, an 
exploitative transaction is essentially a trilateral relation where “at least three persons, or 
sets of persons, are needed” (Steiner 1984: 233). According to Steiner, exploitation is a 
voluntary transaction in which A benefits by exchanging with B an item of a transaction 
at a lower price than which C was prepared to offer for the item but could not because of 
some rights violation (Steiner 1987: 135). Steiner’s view of exploitation can be 
understood as a form of injustice involving violations of moral rights (Ferguson and 
Steiner 2018). Thus, an injustice – an exploitation – occurs when A exchanges with B 
items of unequal value because C’s rights to transact with B were violated. A exploits B 
when an unequal but voluntary exchange takes place but B receives less than what he 
would receive from C because C was not able to make an offer due to some rights 
violation. By way of illustration, Bob is exploited when he sells some object or service to 
Alice at $1.50 when he could have sold it to Carol for $2 had Carol not been robbed on 
her way to the auction or had Carol not been forcibly prevented from attending the auction 
(Ferguson & Steiner 2018). In other words, an unequal exchange occurs between Bob and 
Alice because of Carol’s exclusion from participating in an auction. On this 
understanding, the exploitation of B is a consequence of the violation of C’s rights and 
what A gains arises from an act of interfering with C’s valid rights. In short, exploitation 
involves A benefiting by taking advantage of B’s failure to transact with C because some 
rights violation has occurred. Steven Walt aptly summarizes Steiner’s definition of 
exploitation as “an unnecessary and voluntary exchange of unequally valued items 
resulting from the violation of the rights of at least one other party” (Walt 1984: 242). 
Steiner’s view thus requires “a prior injustice which consists in the violation of a relevant 
person’s rights – the exploitee’s or some third party” (Ferguson and Steiner 2018). On 
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Steiner’s account then, the factory example is not a case of exploitation unless the 
worker’s transaction with the factory owner results from a failure to transact on better 
terms with another employer (C) because of some interference through some violation of 
rights such as employer C losing his or her factory to a fire set by some arsonist.  
 Steiner’s view that exploitation involves a voluntary exchange of goods of 
unequal value is similar to the two preceding theories. The transaction must be voluntary 
because an involuntary exchange amounts to theft (Steiner 1984: 228). As Steiner 
illustrates, when A unilaterally takes B’s expensive watch without B’s consent it amounts 
to theft even when A leaves something for B. Secondly, exploitation consists in an 
exchange of goods. That is, goods must move in both directions because if an exchange 
does not occur, then it is counterintuitive to call it exploitative (Steiner 1984: 226). 
Unilateral transfers such as theft and donations are not cases of exploitation but perhaps 
involve some forms of abuse or oppression. Thirdly, exploitative transactions are unfair 
exchanges because the items exchanged are not of equal value (Steiner 1984: 226). These 
conditions for exploitation are agreeable and seem to be present in other theories.  
 However, Steiner’s inclusion of rights violations as a necessary condition for 
exploitation makes his theory narrow. As explained before, Steiner insists that rights 
violations distinguishes exploitation from other forms of transfers such as exchange, theft, 
benefit, and donation (Steiner 1984: 225 – 226).  First, Steiner’s rights violation condition 
that makes exploitation a trilateral relationship hinders his theory from accounting for 
other forms of exploitation. Steiner insists that even slavery as a form of exploitation is a 
trilateral relation where "it is the master's forcible exclusion of all other persons from 
engaging in commerce with the slave that creates the circumstance of the slave's 
exploitation by the master” (Steiner 1984: 233). This condition makes his theory 
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restrictive as it discounts the occurrence of exploitation where there are no third parties 
as seen in the factory and stranded motorist examples. Secondly, on his view, unequal 
exchanges that do not result from a violation of rights do not count as cases of 
exploitation. Voluntary and unequal exchanges can be exploitative without the violation 
of property rights or the presence of a third party. As Walt argues, we can illustrate the 
occurrence of exploitation even in the absence of a violation of rights (Walt 1984: 242 – 
3). For instance, John and Frank produce art works at the same value of 3X per painting. 
Through a natural mishap, John loses the use of his fingers and can no longer paint. Frank 
enjoys the monopoly that results at sell his paints for 5X. Frank exchanges his painting 
(actual value is 3X) with Joseph’s shoe of 5x value (Otubusin 1987: 79). Clearly, Frank 
exploits Joseph because if John were still painting, Frank would have not made a surplus 
of 2X. However, this exploitation is not a consequence of a rights violation. Exploitation 
occurs because the exchange involves items of unequal value not because a violation of 
John’s rights. Similarly, in the stranded motorist example, the tow-truck driver benefits 
from a voluntary and unequal exchange by taking advantage of the motorist without 
involving a third party and the occurrence of some rights violations. Rights violations are 
also not visible in the psychotherapy, surrogacy and clinical trials examples yet many 
people regard them as exploitative.  
 If these examples are exploitative even when rights violations have not occurred, 
it means that rights violations are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the 
occurrence of exploitation (Miller 1987: 153). David Miller argues that rights violations 
are not sufficient because “rights violations can occur, and yet all participants in the 
market may be left with sufficient partners to make non-exploitative exchanges” (Miller 
1987: 153). Rights violations are also “not necessary because it appears that other types 
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of intervention in the market may create circumstances of exploitation” (Ibid). That is, 
other possible interventions apart from rights violations can exclude C from transacting 
with B and yield the same result whereby B is exploited. For example, the lack of other 
factories in the Pacific Rim example could be because of a simple business decision on 
the part of other factory owners who do not want to invest in the region. This example 
does not seem to involve rights violations but the transaction in the example is still 
exploitative. Aesop’s fable of the grasshopper and the ants mentioned earlier also 
illustrates that exploitation can occur without rights violations. We can therefore dismiss 
rights violations as neither both a necessary nor a sufficient condition for exploitation. As 
earlier illustrated in Roemer’s theory, the way in which people find themselves in a 
position that is open to exploitation is irrelevant to a charge of exploitation. The examples 
also demonstrate that exploitation need not involve trilateral relations and Steiner fails to 
show how exploitation cannot be a quadrilateral or bilateral exploitation (Walt 1984: 245 
– 6; Miller 1987: 152).  In short, there seem to be no good reason why the occurrence of 
exploitation should depend on the existence of a third party and rights violation. In 
addition, Steiner’s analysis is too narrowly historical in focus as it is premised on previous 
rights-violation as the source of exploitation (Miller 1987: 155). The rights violation 
condition would make all unequal exchanges exploitative because property rights may 
involve the problem of rights violation. As Walt points out, “most if not all titles have far 
from clean causal ancestry” (Walt 1984: 242). In other words, most titles are unjustly 
acquired and therefore may invalidate all unequal bilateral exchanges. Walt alludes to 
Marx’s statement describing property or capital accumulation that “in actual history it is 
notorious that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, briefly force, play the great part” 
(Marx 2013: 502). Thus, since exploitation involves a prior injustice in the form of 
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violation of moral rights, most transactions would qualify as exploitative because most 
titles do not have a clean background which would make exploitation omnipresent.  
 
Miller’s Equilibrium Theory of Exploitation 
 In his theory of market exploitation, David Miller comments on both Roemer’s 
and Steiner’s theories of exploitation. Miller argues that Steiner’s rights analysis is too 
narrowly historical in focus as all exploitation stems from previous rights-violations. As 
earlier pointed out, Miller argues that that there is no reason to tie exploitation to one 
particular feature of the historical background to a current exchange, as Steiner’s theory 
suggests. According to Miller, this approach overlooks the fact that even when individuals 
begin with a fair (equal) allocation of resources some participants may gain advantages 
as the market evolves “that enable them to strike bargains that are quite as 
disadvantageous to their contractual partners as the bargains that would be struck 
following rights violations” (Miller 1989: 186).  On the other hand, he argues that 
Roemer’s theory is too broad and too indifferent to history since all that matters is whether 
some coalition could now be better off by redistributing assets (Miller 1987: 155). Miller 
argues that the basic flaw with counterfactual accounts of exploitation such as Roemer’s 
is that they disregard the processes whereby the final distribution has come about. In his 
view, since all that matters is whether a coalition could be better off by the redistribution 
of assets, “it may therefore include as exploitative resource-distributions that have risen 
in quite unobjectionable ways, while at the same time excluding other states of affairs 
where groups of producers are deprived, on the grounds that there is no withdrawal 
scenario under which particular groups would do better” (Miller 1989: 185). However, in 
Roemer’s defense, I think Miller is mistaken to criticist Roemer’s view for being 
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indifferent to history because Roemer connects exploitation to how property distribution 
arose. In other words, only focusing on Roemer’s hypothetical withdrawal test is a 
misinterpretation of the theory.  
 Based on these observations about Steiner’s and Roemer’s approaches, Miller 
points out that “exploitation does not refer simply to the distributive results of the 
transaction but to the fact that the exploiting agent had available an alternative course of 
action whose outcome would have been close to the relevant benchmark” (Miller 1987: 
161). This suggests that exploitation should not be reduced to unfairness in initial 
endowments even though that may be a source of exploitation. Further to that, 
exploitation should not be reduced to injustice in the final distribution as an unequal 
distribution can occur without exploitation occurring. Miller argues that, “exploitation is 
a particularly repugnant form of injustice. It implies not only the final distribution of 
resources as between exploiter and exploited is unjust, but that this imbalance arose 
through the exploiter’s use of power of some kind: both the process and the outcome are 
objectionable. Thus, a theory of exploitation links together the issue of market power with 
that of the final distribution of resources” (Miller 1989: 175).  
 According to Miller (1989: 189), exploitative transactions are exchanges made at 
non-equilibrium prices, due to asymmetries of information or of bargaining power. Miller 
argues that exploitation occurs when one uses special advantages to deflect markets away 
from equilibrium – defined as exchanges involving equivalent value (Miller 1989: 175). 
In other words, exploitation occurs when those favoured by the asymmetries of 
information and bargaining power “use their position to extract a surplus return from 
those who have no alternative but to deal with them” (Miller 1989: 191). By definition, 
an equilibrium price is the price that one would pay in a perfectly competitive market 
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where all existing holdings are justly possessed (Miller 1989: 187). Miller acknowledges 
that a perfectly competitive market does not exist and that the question of just possessions 
is highly controversial. In general, Miller holds that exploitative transactions have two 
essential conditions: “the terms of the transaction must deviate in the exploiter’s favour 
from the terms that would obtain at a (suitably defined) competitive equilibrium”; and 
“the deviation must be brought about by some advantage that the exploiter already enjoys, 
whether of information or of bargaining power” (Miller 1989: 193). In other words, 
according to Miller an exploitative transaction is “typically more advantageous to the 
exploiting party and less advantageous to the exploited than some benchmark transaction 
which we use (tacitly or explicitly) as a point of reference” (Miller 1989: 186). In addition, 
the actual transaction “must have come about through some special advantage which the 
exploiter enjoys, upon which he capitalizes to induce the exploited to engage in this 
relatively less beneficial exchange” (Miller 1989: 186).   
 According to Miller, the first condition shows why exploitation always involves 
injustice and the second condition shows what is distinctive about exploitation as opposed 
to making mere windfall gains through the market. These conditions capture his view that 
“both the terms of the exchange and the causal history leading up to it are necessary 
ingredients in identifying a case of exploitation” (Miller 1989: 186 – 7).  In his view, to 
identify the first condition, we need to identify an equilibrium price, which is the ideal 
price in a perfectly competitive market.13   
 Miller argues that exchange at non-equilibrium prices is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for exploitation because in some circumstances exchanges at above 
                                                             
13 Miller (1987: 156 fn.6) agrees with Goodin (1987) that the idea of exploitation trades upon an idea of 
“normality” which straddles “what usually occurs in fact” and “what morally ought to occur”. 
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or below the equilibrium prices are not -exploitative (Miller 1987: 157).14 For Miller, 
exploitation consists in paying a price above or below the equilibrium price because the 
exploiter has the ability to bring about the exchange, which actually occurs by virtue of 
certain factors. Miller thinks that A can exploit B when A sells an item to B at a price 
above the equilibrium price if A knows that the price of the item is X and B mistakenly 
believes it to be Y (when Y is greater than X). Conversely, A can exploit B by buying at 
below the equilibrium price. In other words, exploitation requires an asymmetry between 
the parties to an exchange caused by influential factors that Miller categorises into 
asymmetries of information and asymmetries in bargaining power (Miller 1987: 158). 
The argument is that exploitation occurs when the exploiter uses their position with 
reference to these factors, to extract benefits from those who have no alternative but to 
deal with them (Miller 1989: 191). A must in some sense be better placed than B for 
exploitation to occur and, in Miller’s view, A is better placed either by information or  
bargaining power. For example, an antiques dealer exploits an old woman if the dealer 
buys a picture from her at a price she thinks is good for her Victorian rubbish when the 
dealer knows that the picture is a probable Renoir (Miller 1987: 158). In the event that 
the buyer has no idea about the probable Renoir, then he does not exploit the old woman 
even when it may seem that the woman is hard done by when the real value is revealed. 
The asymmetrical information leads to exploitation in this case because the dealer has the 
knowledge and capacity, which is not available to the old woman.  
                                                             
14 Miller (1987: 157 – 8) states that there are three circumstances of this sort. First when there is genuine 
ignorance on both sides of the transaction. That is, neither A nor B knows the worth of the item. If it turns 
out that A gains from the deal when the equilibrium price is revealed, A is not an exploiter. Second, an 
exchange is not exploitative if both parties value the good at the price it is sold. Third, if a person who loses 
out in comparison to the equilibrium price is willing to lose out.  
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 Similarly, asymmetries in bargaining power leads to exploitation because A has 
an advantage over B. For example, when there is a short supply of goods that are in 
demand or when there is a monopoly over particular resources, the party owning the 
goods or resources has an advantage over those who do not. As seen earlier from Roemer, 
inequalities of productive assets, for instance, lead into asymmetrical relations of power 
that control over productive assets. Control over such assets gives bargaining power to 
the exploiting party rather than the exploitee. That is, A has an advantage over B by virtue 
of the control A has over goods or assets that B does not have but needs, in addition to 
that, there are no alternatives available to B. Thus, the researchers in the Tuskegee trial 
exploited the subjects because they had control over resources that the subjects needed 
and because the subjects had no alternative way to get those resources.  
 Miller’s view, which says that exploitation involves some form of asymmetry, 
manifests in our five putative examples. In each example, one party enjoys an advantage 
with which to take advantage of their interactor in the transaction. The tow truck driver 
and the factory owner, for example, use their superior bargaining power to make the 
stranded motorist  or the workers agree to terms that are not in their favour and that the 
exploited would rather transact with the tow truck driver or the factory owner rather than 
do nothing at all. In the psychotherapy and Tuskegee trial examples, the exploiters use 
their advantage based on both bargaining power and information as their positions also 
denote some form of knowledge and therefore advantage to induce the exploited into a 
transaction that is less beneficial.  
 Miller holds that his view of exploitation allows us to understand why capitalism 
is characteristically exploitative, whereas under market socialism, exploitation would 
only occur in specific circumstances. According to Miller, “market socialism avoids the 
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systematic exploitation that characterizes capitalism” because capital is treated as a social 
asset allocated to cooperatives by investment agencies unlike the monopolies of resources 
that exist in capitalism which are a source of exploitation (Miller 1989: 197).  
 In summary, Miller’s theory suggests that attaining equilibrium prices derived in 
a competitive market indicates that there is no exploitation in exchanges. This position 
follows from the idea that exploitation is the product of differences in bargaining strength 
which are absent in a competitive market. That is, Miller holds that in a competitive 
market, prices are set fairly by the market and such prices are the appropriate norm as a 
benchmark for determining the occurrence of exploitation since no one has more 
bargaining power to use to their advantage to dictate prices. However, this view of 
exploitation is premised on the contested idea that a competitive market can reach 
equilibrium. As Jonathan Wolff points out, the possibility of attaining equilibrium prices 
so defined is doubtful because the very nature of a competitive market precludes it from 
the sort of equilibrium that would eliminate exploitation. Wolff argues that the idea of a 
competitive market reaching a state of equilibrium is self-contradictory (Wolff 2002: 87). 
Wolff uses some Marxian explanation to illustrate that in a competitive economy such as 
capitalism reaching equilibrium is impossible because both the supply of labour is 
expanding and there are labour-saving machines or innovations that disturb wages when 
they approach equilibrium. For instance, in the factory, surrogacy, and Tuskegee trial 
examples, a competitive market is near impossible because of the number of potential 
exploitees, those willing to take on the contract. In other words, the availability of a 
surplus population available to transact with the exploiter gives bargaining advantage to 
the exploiter comparable to a surplus population described as “a disposable industrial 
reserve army” in Marx’s analysis (Marx 2013: 440). 
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 Wolff also shows that the equilibrium price fails to provide the right exploitation 
benchmark as it cannot “discriminate morally pertinent from morally arbitrary 
determinants of price” (Wolff 2002: 89). That is, since the equilibrium price is a just price, 
it appears to treat price-determining factors such as one’s possession of rare skills and 
enormous effort in performance work as morally on par and this is implausible since in 
some cases rare skill does not justify high income. This means that equilibrium prices are 
not a morally neutral baseline for determining exploitation. Additionally, the idea of 
equilibrium price as the baseline for exploitation seems compatible with violations of his 
view about basic rights/needs (Pearson, 2011).  
 
Wertheimer’s Account of Exploitation 
 In his book Exploitation, Alan Wertheimer provides a comprehensive analysis of 
the notion of exploitation. For Wertheimer, exploitation occurs when “A takes unfair 
advantage of B” to benefit (Wertheimer 1996: 207). Central to exploitation is the benefit 
or advantage that accrues to A since “A cannot exploit or take advantage of B unless A 
obtains some advantage through the transaction with B” (Wertheimer 1996: 208). 
Secondly, the occurrence of exploitation requires that the terms or substance of a 
transaction be unfair (Wertheimer 1996: 208). Wertheimer’s theory of exploitation, like 
David Miller’s theory, appeals to a fair hypothetical market price derived in a competitive 
market to determine the occurrence of exploitation. In other words, both Wertheimer and 
Miller view that an exchange is exploitative if and only if an exchange occurs at prices 
that deflect away from the counterfactual price.  
According to Wertheimer, a hypothetical market price generated by a competitive 
market provides “a plausible conception of a fair transaction at least for a certain range 
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of cases” (Wertheimer 1996: 230). In his view, whether a transaction is unfair depends 
on a “fair market value” which is a counterfactual or hypothetical notion. A fair market 
price represents “the price that an informed and unpressured seller would receive from an 
informed and unpressured buyer if the object of the transaction were sold on the market” 
(Wertheimer 1996: 230). This counterfactual price  is called a reservation price: “the 
minimum threshold that the party is prepared to accept for entering into an agreement” 
(Wertheimer 1996: 211).This understanding of a fair market price is also comparable to 
Miller’s equilibrium price, which is a price unaffected by special advantages due to 
asymmetries of information or bargaining power. For Wertheimer, this fair price obtains 
when an exchange occurs where both parties are informed and not pressured. These 
conditions for a price are comparable to Miller’s fair price which obtains when no 
asymmetries of information and bargaining power create special advantages to deflect the 
markets away from equilibrium. Thus, for both Wertheimer and Miller, exploitation 
consists in paying for something at a price that does not adhere to some standard 
hypothetical market price. In other words, no exploitation occurs when fair prices obtain. 
In the Pacific Rim factory example, for instance, the factory owner exploits the workers 
because the owner purchases the services of the workers at a lower price than the price 
for the workers’ labour that would obtain at a competitive market where the workers’ 
labour would be purchased. The workers are exploited insofar as the price for their labour 
is a price that they are not prepared to accept if they were informed and not pressured. 
This description of the example suggests that the workers are pressured by their life 
circumstances to transact with the factory owner.   
 According to Wertheimer, a competitive market is the foundation for the fairness 
of the hypothetical market price. In his view, a hypothetical market price is fair because 
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it “is a price at which neither party takes special unfair advantage of particular defects in 
the other party’s decision-making capacity or special vulnerabilities in the other party’s 
situation” (Wertheimer 1996: 232). This hypothetical market price therefore serves as the 
normative baseline with which to measure the occurrence of exploitation. By way of 
illustration using the stranded motorist example, it means that were other tow truck 
drivers present to compete with the greedy driver to transact with the stranded motorist, 
no one would take advantage of the motorist in the way that the tow truck driver in the 
example does. In other words, the presence of other tow truck drivers would make the 
tow truck driver ask a fair price for towing if the driver insists to transact with the motorist 
who is informed (say about the availability of other options) and is not under pressure to 
transact with the greedy driver.15 In other words, a hypothetical market price obtains 
because the availability of other tow truck drivers creates a competitive market for towing 
services. The same also holds for the other examples in which A has monopoly because 
B has no other transactors. A’s position enables her to take advantage of B but this 
position would be lost as soon as that monopoly is lost. That is, A loses her ability to 
transact with B on exploitative terms when there are other potential transactors. 
Wertheimer’s point then is that a fully competitive market is attractive and fair because 
“no one can choose to transact at anything but the market price” (Wertheimer 1996: 233). 
This implies that a competitive market price is a standard price and is non-exploitative 
“for neither party takes unfair advantage of the other party” (Wertheimer 1996: 232). 
However, this price is not necessarily a just price. Wertheimer states that this hypothetical 
market price “does not assume that the outcome of non-exploitative relations are just, tout 
                                                             
15 Wertheimer (1996: 40) uses a similar example of a famous maritime case, The Port Caledonia and the 
Anna to illustrate this point. A vessel in difficulty asked for assistance from a nearby tug but later refused 
to uphold an agreement of £1000. It is argued that the Anna used its monopoly position to force such an 
agreement, which could not have been possible if there were other competing tugs.  
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court” (1996: 233). B might still suffer some misfortune or injustice. The hypothetical 
market price only reflects a price at which exploitation does not occur, and a price at 
which the distribution of the social surplus is fair.  
 Not everyone, for different reasons, accepts Wertheimer’s theory of exploitation 
despite it being one of the most comprehensive theories. Wertheimer’s definition of 
exploitation is, for example, viewed as too conservative because in his view transactions 
are non-exploitative as long as they adhere to a convention, namely, paying the standard 
price for a given object or service in a competitive market (Sample 2003: 23). However, 
as much as paying the standard price may be regarded as fair, for example by law, as 
expressed by the doctrine of unconscionable contracts, it does not mean that the prices 
are genuinely fair and non-exploitative. As Sample (2003: 24) argues, competitive market 
prices are set by demand and supply which may be influenced by monopolies of 
resources. In other words, if exploitation essentially means paying a non-standard price, 
then we lack the ability to explain intuitively exploitative cases that occur when a standard 
price is paid (Sample 2003: 23). The Pacific Rim factory example illustrates this point 
that there is a competitive market for labour because there exist other offers albeit not as 
good as the factory offer in the example. If this interpretation of Wertheimer is correct, 
then the factory offer is not exploitative because a competitive market generates the offer 
and is therefore a fair price. Evidently, the existence of more labourers than the employers 
or capitalists need makes the market price for labour low. Wertheimer’s account may 
suggest that the factory offers a competitive price in the context of the other available 
jobs that are offering less than the $2 offered by the factory making the exchange non-
exploitative. Sample’s objection to Wertheimer’s account illuminates the significance of 
the background conditions such as poverty in an exploitative transaction. I argue that the 
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transaction is still exploitative even though the factory wage is better than the existing 
average wage of $1. Despite being a better offer, the factory wage is exploitative because 
the factory’s wage nonetheless results from taking advantage of worker’s situation. 
Employing an argument suggested by Robert Goodin, the factory owner exploits the 
workers because he benefits by taking advantage in a situation where advantage taking is 
inappropriate hence not permissible, for example, where there is disproportionate 
bargaining power or where one party suffers some grave misfortune (Goodin 1987: 186).  
 Sample’s observations about Wertheimer’s theory are insightful as they point to 
other worrying features of exploitative transactions that may ensue even where the 
fairness of the price is determined by a competitive market. On Sample’s view, B in the 
examples is exploited because under the circumstances of the transaction, taking 
advantage signifies a failure “to respect a person” when one takes advantage of an 
injustice done to or suffered by another (Sample 2003: 57). 16   Sample’s theory of 
exploitation as degradation may at this point seem to put into question all transactions 
involving persons affected by conditions that possibly affect a transaction such as 
background injustices. This may imply that business operations in the developing 
countries are likely exploitative because certain conditions such as injustices affect the 
workers. However, Wertheimer has a solution to this objection to his theory which lies in 
making a “distinction between taking advantage of unfairness (misfortune), and taking 
unfair advantage of unfairness” (Wertheimer 1996: 298). In his view, it might be 
detestable to profit by “charging exorbitant prices for materials to those whose homes 
have suffered a natural disaster - but not because they are profiting from other’s 
                                                             
16 Snyder (2008: 192) argues similarly. That is, the action of taking advantage of the unfairness caused by 
an injustice constitutes a failure to respect a person. 
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misfortune” (Wertheimer 1996: 298). Nevertheless, there is no exploitation when one 
profits from charging a fair fee for plumbing, building, repairing automobile, medical or 
legal services etc. even when the service provider gains from an injustice or misfortune. 
Therefore, while it appears that Wertheimer’s view is limited in the said way, including 
background circumstances as a necessary condition for exploitation is not tenable as it 
stands to make every benefit from misfortune exploitative as pointed out that most 
business operations would turn out to be exploitative on this basis.  
 While Wertheimer’s theory is comprehensive, his approach to exploitation takes 
away crucial details that are relevant for exploitation. His approach abstracts certain 
features from the actual markets such as those in which sweatshops operate when the 
focus is on a fair price set by a competitive market. A simple exchange at a fair market 
value may certainly be fair but this does not make the transaction non-exploitative. For 
example, Marx shows that competitive market prices can be exploitative “when there are 
many unemployed people, the workers are not organised and the alternative to 
employment is bad for workers while the alternative not employing for the capitalist need 
not be bad since there are many others” (Christiano 2013: 6).  Moreover, Wertheimer’s 
condition is satisfied when A steals a car from B and offers to sell it back to B at an 
equilibrium price. Yet, this transaction is not fair because a fair price is $0 which is simply 
returning the car to B (Ferguson 2013: 102). Therefore, concurring with Sample’s 
observations, Wertheimer’s hypothetical market price is inadequate to explain other cases 
of exploitation because background conditions affect market operations. In other words, 
the hypothetical market price “is not sufficient to assure us that a transaction is fair” 




Wolff’s Theory of exploitation 
 Jonathan Wolff’s account of exploitation reiterates Marx’s idea of exploitation by 
stating the conditions under which Marx’s definition should operate. Wolff maintains the 
Marxist view that exploitation is paradigmatically the consequence of differential 
bargaining strength (Wolff 2002: 86). Wolff argues that Marx’s definition of exploitation 
“is limited to relations of economic exchange under conditions where there is no justified 
right to capital, that is, to earn money purely in virtue of one’s property holdings” (Wolff 
1999: 105). Wolff argues that Marx’s definition of exploitation in terms of surplus value 
captures exploitation in capitalist production where it is assumed that capitalists have no 
moral entitlement to the means of production. According to Wolff, Marx’s definition of 
exploitation only applies to a specific model and trying to apply it outside that model may 
lead us into error (Wolff 1999: 109).  For example, the theory can only account for 
exploitation in the factory example if the factory owner has no moral entitlement to the 
means of production or resources he owns. This may sound awkward because in the 
analysis of the other theories, such Roemer’s, we established that the source of exploiter’s 
advantage is not relevant to the occurrence of exploitation. Wolff agrees with this 
observation and his response is that there is exploitation outside this model and 
exploitation can occur even where there are justified entitlements but it will not 
necessarily be captured by the surplus value definition of exploitation (Wolff 1985: 89).  
 Wolff’s reinterpretation of Marxist exploitation attempts to provide a more 
general definition of exploitation which then can account for our intuitions of exploitation 
outside the capitalist model including where entitlements are justified. He argues that 
exploitation is more than unfairness and unequal exchange even if it is true that unequal 
exchange is often exploitative (Wolff 1999: 107). Wolff argues that Marx’s theory of 
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exploitation does not begin and end with the labour theory of value (Wolff 1985: 57). He 
suggests that a general Marxist theory of exploitation should be based on the theory of 
alienation. On Wolff’s account, it is on this understanding of the theory of alienation that 
we can provide a definition of exploitation as benefiting by wrongfully or unfairly taking 
advantage of another person. Thus, exploitation involves wrongful treatment of another 
person and to say that one has wrongfully treated another requires an appeal to some 
moral norm (Wolff 1985: 33). In his view, Marx’s exploitation “involves deriving profit 
from the workers alienation and dehumanisation” (Wolff 1985: 80). For Wolff, this 
general theory of exploitation derives from Marx’s views on human nature and on an 
account of objective human needs and interests found in Marx’s earlier writings about 
alienation. Wolff holds that human needs, conceived of as “what is necessary to lead a 
flourishing human life”, have a place in a Marxist theory of exploitation (Wolff 1985: 
62). This sense of human needs provides a moral norm for exploitation and this is at the 
heart of the Marxist claim that capitalism is a regime of exploitation. That is, Marxist 
exploitation consists in profiting because the workers are generally in a weak bargaining 
position and are treated without regard to their flourishing as human beings. 
 Wolff argues that within Marx’s theory exploitation plays a dual role. Exploitation 
functions as a moral category and as a technical term to show how capitalism works. As 
moral term, exploitation is “a moral complaint about A’s behaviour” (Wolff 1985: 11). 
That is, employing the idea of exploitation has some moral purpose meant to criticise a 
person’s behaviour in using another “improperly” (Wolff 1999: 110). For example, we 
will judge as improper and exploitative the conduct of parents who derive benefits from 
a religious, elderly, wealthy relative by enforcing a strict code on their teenage daughter 
as a means of impressing the relative to secure a piece of the estate (Wolff 1999: 110). 
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The parents in this example exploit their daughter by taking advantage of her. Wolff 
distinguishes between exploiting a person and exploiting circumstances and that 
distinction is treating the person as a means to our own end. For instance, the parents 
exploit their daughter’s circumstances of dependence by threatening to throw her out to 
enforce a strict code even when it is out of genuine concern for her (Wolff 1999: 10). 
While this distinction is clear and acceptable, later on in the thesis, I will use vulnerability 
and dependence as separate notions that should not be used interchangeably in discussing 
exploitation. This is because, according to my theory, exploitation occurs when A 
simultaneously takes advantage of B’s vulnerability and dependence.  
 The second role of the term exploitation in Marx’s theory is to offer a technical 
definition. This technical definition of exploitation is reference fixing. It only applies 
within a model by picking out all and only cases of exploitation that occur within the 
capitalist model. In other words, the surplus value based definition of exploitation “gives 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of exploitation within the capitalist 
relations of production” (Wolff 1985: 89). Despite this strict technical definition, Wolff 
aims to show that Marx has a theory of exploitation that goes beyond the labour theory 
of value. That is, while Marx’s theory only applies to this specific model, “it is by no 
means the sole possible theory of exploitation” (Wolff 1985: 6). This suggests that we 
need other conceptions of exploitation to explain the occurrence of other forms of 
exploitation outside the capitalist model. Wolff urges us not to view the Marxian 
definition of exploitation as a way of “giving meaning of exploitation or of giving a fully 
general reference-fixing definition, but a way of fixing the reference in within the model” 
(Wolff 1999: 109).  
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 Wolff’s general analysis of exploitation essentially reduces to what is wrong with 
exploitation. Wolff’s view of exploitation holds that for A to exploit B, A has to derive 
profit by taking advantage of B’s circumstances and A has to treat B merely as means 
rather than as an end (Wolff 1999: 112). As he views it, what is wrong with exploitation 
is in the broad sense Kantian. He argues, “the wrong of exploitation is in treating another 
as a means to your own ends, rather than with the respect that is due to another human 
being” (Wolff 1985: 97). Wolff in essence suggests a Kantian interpretation of Marxist 
exploitation where we can interpret treating another as a means in different ways. Kant’s 
interpretation of what is to be an end in itself motivates Wolff’s view of exploitation as 
benefitting from improper use of another. Thus, Wolff arrives at what he terms as Kantian 
exploitation, which is “to a first approximation, to use another’s vulnerable circumstances 
to obtain their actual compliance with a situation which interferes with their flourishing 
in some way; or with a situation which involves them in some sort of avoidable suffering” 
(Wolff 1999: 114). According to Wolff, this interpretation of Marxist exploitation can be 
given Kantian, Aristotelian, or Utilitarian content (Wolff 1999: 113). That is, we can 
explain what to be treated as means rather than as an end means by referring to the Kantian 
tradition that emphasizes the idea of will or choice, or the Aristotelian view that holds 
that ends have their own good, or the utilitarian idea of pleasure and pain.  
 While reiterating Marx’s view of exploitation, Wolff’s theory brings something 
new into the discussion of exploitation not mentioned or used by the other theories 
considered so far. Recall the two aspects of exploitation: taking advantage of 
circumstances and treating B in a morally objectionable manner. Wolff clearly suggests 
that there is a causal link between the benefits gained by A and the treatment that B suffers 
(Wolff 1985: 48). That is, the wrongful treatment of B (which is wrong with reference to 
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some correct moral norms), directly benefits A. Thus, in the psychotherapist and clinical 
trial examples, the exploiter benefits from wrongful or improper treatment of the patients 
or from harming them (wrongful or improper treatment because this violates the idea of 
Aristotelian human flourishing). Wolff concludes then that, “the key idea of exploitation 
is taking advantage of another’s vulnerability, for our own purposes without proper regard 
to the effect your behaviour has on the interests of the other” (Wolff 2002: 84). For Wolff, 
“exploitation is typically a matter of using another person’s vulnerability to your own 
advantage” (Wolff 1999: 111). That is, A exploits B when A takes advantage of B’s 
vulnerability as source of power over B for personal purposes without proper regard to 
the well-being of B. In Wolff’s view, to exploit a person is to “use another’s 
circumstances to obtain their actual compliance with a situation without having sufficient 
regard to whether that situation violates fairness, flourishing, or suffering norms” (Wolff 
1999: 119). In Wolff’s view, one’s vulnerability is exploited if another person uses this 
weakness to advance his advantage which were it not for the asymmetry of power the 
exploited party would not have accepted (Wolff 1999: 110).  
 Wolff’s attempt to broaden the theory of exploitation as involving misdistribution 
of the benefits of a transaction and the wrongful use of another by disregarding their 
interests is promising. I agree with Wolff’s key insight that “exploitation is typically a 
matter of using another person’s vulnerability to your own advantage” (Wolff 1999: 111). 
This insight is what I hold to be central to the understanding of exploitation and this the 
line of thought that this thesis pursues. However, Wolff’s analysis is somehow vague 
because the idea of vulnerability is not developed, acknowledging the difficulty in 
explaining the nature of vulnerability (Wolff 1999: 111). Wolff states that it is difficult 
to explain the nature of vulnerability. His view is that we can point out causes of 
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vulnerability such as poverty and ignorance or other such weaknesses in a bargaining 
situation with respect to the exploiter. In the examples at the beginning, we can easily 
show in what ways the exploited are vulnerable and how their vulnerability affects their 
bargaining strength. Their weakness in a bargaining situation is a product of different 
causes such as poverty, ignorance and other forms of weakness, which makes them accept 
terms that would not be acceptable under circumstances of equal bargaining strength 
where they are not vulnerable. However, an imprecise notion of vulnerability loses its 
usefulness in the discussion of exploitation as it risks making exploitation omnipresent. 




 The analyses of the above theories of exploitation show that these theories 
generally agree, in different ways, that exploitation is essentially benefiting by taking 
unfair advantage of another person. The major differences in the theories concern what 
constitutes unfair advantage taking or the source of the unfairness. The theories also point 
to different things as conditions for exploitation or benchmarks to determine the 
occurrence of exploitation.  
 However, as much as these theories sound plausible, their explanatory power is 
limited to specific cases of exploitation. I argue that their limitation is due to their failure 
to identify the correct conditions for exploitation and the relationship between A and B 
that is necessary to the occurrence of exploitation. For example, as shown in Marx’s 
theory, its explanatory capacity is limited to exploitation in wage-labour relationships. 
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Even Wertheimer’s comprehensive theory is limited because his fair price benchmark is 
not genuinely fair and non-exploitative as shown in the examination of his theory. 
However, Wolff’s account points us in a different direction in terms of how we should 
understand what constitutes exploitation. In my view, Wolff’s insights perhaps broaden 
our understanding of what exploitation involves. His description of exploitation as 
typically a matter of using another person’s vulnerability to your own advantage suggests 
how we should understand the conditions for B that are necessary for exploitation. 
However, I differ with Wolff that exploitation is typically a matter of using another’s 
vulnerability because vulnerability is a necessary condition for exploitation. Despite the 
disagreement, the vulnerability approach has an advantage over other exploitation views 
such as Roemer and Steiner’s that argue that exploitation depends on specific sources of 
inequality, unjust initial distribution and rights violations, respectively.  The advantage 
of the vulnerability approach is that it does not require explaining the source of B’s 
vulnerability to determine the occurrence of exploitation. We can use Wolff’s 
understanding of exploitation to determine the occurrence of exploitation in our five 
examples of exploitation. That they are all cases of exploitation insofar as A derives 
benefit by using or taking advantage of B’s vulnerability.  
 I argue that Wolff’s approach to exploitation is not as limited as the other theories 
because it identifies the nature of exploitation involving conditions of vulnerability. The 
thought here is that most of these theories portray exploitation as involving B who is 
vulnerable. We can argue that the exploitation in Marx’s labour-wage relationship is 
about the capitalists benefiting by taking advantage of the vulnerability of the workers. I 
believe that having vulnerability as a necessary condition for exploitation provides the 
basis for accounting for different forms of exploitation. In addition, these theories refer 
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to different moral principles to determine the wrongness of exploitation. This suggests 
that there are a variety of reasons that explain why benefiting by taking advantage of 
others’ vulnerability is morally wrong and why exploitation is therefore morally 
objectionable.  Going further than Wolff’s theory, I contend that exploitation is morally 
objectionable for numerous reasons, and not only Kantian, Aristotelian or Utilitarian 
ones.  
 However, the explanatory advantage of the vulnerability approach is not self-
evident. We require an argument to show its theoretical potency. A vulnerability theory 
of exploitation thus needs to explain the nature of vulnerability rather than merely 
appealing to it as if vulnerability is a self-explanatory term. In other words, we need an 
elaborate explanation of the nature of vulnerability and the role of vulnerability in 
exploitation. I embark on this task in the next two chapters beginning with a philosophical 
analysis of two vulnerability theories of exploitation in the next chapter to show the 
explanatory advantage of the vulnerability approach over other theories of exploitation 
and their deficiencies. This will lead to the other chapter clarifying and qualifying the 










 This chapter argues that vulnerability-based accounts of exploitation have the 
ability to account for various forms of exploitation than the theories examined in the 
previous chapter. I argue that vulnerability theories of exploitation, represented by Robert 
E. Goodin and Allen W. Wood, have an advantage over the theories because they at least 
identify the correct necessary conditions for exploitation. These theories identify 
vulnerability, despite the conceptual difficulty, to denote both a condition for the 
exploited and a relation between interactors. I will use these vulnerability accounts from 
Goodin and Wood as the foundation for the vulnerability theory I am proposing in this 
thesis. 
 Albeit largely agreeing with these the two vulnerability accounts, I find these 
accounts conceptually and normatively wanting. Both theories are not successful in 
spelling out what constitutes vulnerability. In addition, the theories use vulnerability in 
two different senses. These senses manifest in Goodin and Wood’s interchangeable use 
of vulnerability and dependence. They use vulnerability to denote a condition for B (c-
vulnerability) and a relationship between A and B (r-vulnerability, B is vulnerable to A). 
In my opinion, these refer to two different phenomena despite the proximity between 
vulnerability and dependence and this difference is important to maintain in a theory of 
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exploitation so that there is some conceptual clarity. Thus, the theories are incomplete 
because they employ an imprecise notion of vulnerability making both theories over-
inclusive and under-inclusive. An imprecise concept of vulnerability loses its usefulness 
in the discussion of exploitation as it makes exploitation socially ubiquitous on the one 
hand and too restricted to account for other cases of exploitation on the other. Goodin’s 
theory is further restricted because he includes a moral belief in what constitutes 
exploitation. I argue that vulnerability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
exploitation. Secondly, I argue that exploitation is not, as such, morally wrong because 
benefiting by taking advantage of another’s vulnerability may be wrong for various moral 
reasons rather than one as suggested by the two theories.  Thus, both Goodin and Wood 
are mistaken to limit what makes exploitation morally wrong to a specific moral reason 
rather than other possible moral reasons.  
 On my account, exploitation occurs when A derives benefit from taking advantage 
of B’s vulnerability and dependence in an interaction. My view is that the best way of 
capturing exploitative relationships requires separating vulnerability and dependence to 
achieve conceptual clarity rather than using the two terms interchangeably as used in both 
Goodin and Wood’s theories. I define vulnerability as a condition in which there is a 
threat to an agent’s welfare interests or wellbeing. Dependence signifies a relationship 
between interactors where B’s cost for exiting a relationship with A is greater than zero 
(Lovett 2010: 50) because this transaction is the best option available for securing B’s 
welfare interests. In my view, vulnerability as relationship between interactors and what 
it intends to denote in the occurrence of exploitation is best captured by the notion of 
dependence. That is, dependence rather than the phrase “vulnerable to” should be used to 
portray the relationship in which there is a cost for B greater than zero when he or she 
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exists a relationship with A perhaps because there are no better options for securing B’s 
wellbeing. We also need not use the two terms interchangeably because in the analysis of 
exploitation, it is possible to be vulnerable without being dependent but it is not possible 
to be dependent without being vulnerable in the context of exploitation because 
dependence presupposes vulnerability and not vice versa. In a dependence relationship, 
A’s action and choices can effect adverse consequences on B’s wellbeing rather than vice 
versa. I maintain that vulnerability and dependence are necessary conditions for all forms 
of exploitation. In other words, conditions of vulnerability and relationships of 
dependence characterise all forms of exploitation. I elaborate and defend this conception 
of exploitation in the next chapter  
 In this chapter, I give a brief overview of vulnerability theories of explanation 
before analysing Goodin and Wood’s theories. I address the two accounts separately, 
treating Wood’s account after Goodin’s account because unlike Goodin’s, Wood’s 
account acknowledges and attempts to address one of the issues with the notion of 
vulnerability that the concept should not be imprecise as that makes exploitation socially 
ubiquitous (Wood 1995: 143).  
 
A brief overview of vulnerability theories of exploitation 
 In general, vulnerability accounts hold that exploitation occurs if A benefit from 
taking advantage of B’s vulnerability. Both Goodin and Wood endorse the view that 
exploitation occurs when A benefits by taking advantage of B’s vulnerability in a 
voluntary transaction. That is, both accounts hold that exploitation lies in the 
opportunistic use of people’s vulnerability or weakness. The two accounts agree that 
vulnerability is a necessary condition for the occurrence of exploitation. Both Goodin and 
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Wood dismiss such things as unequal distribution and coercion or involuntariness as the 
necessary conditions for exploitation. The main difference between the two vulnerability 
accounts lies in when exploitation occurs, with Goodin suggesting that it is when one 
benefits by taking advantage of another’s vulnerability in an inappropriate situation while 
Wood holds that exploitation is simply deriving benefit by taking advantage of someone’s 
vulnerability (Wood 1995: 147). The second difference between the two theories is in 
what makes exploitation morally objectionable. Goodin (1987: 187) thinks exploitation 
is morally objectionable because it constitutes a failure to perform a duty to protect the 
interests of vulnerable others. On the other hand, Wood holds that exploitation is morally 
objectionable because “the proper respect for others is violated when we treat their 
vulnerabilities as opportunities to advance our own interests or projects” (Wood 1995: 
150 – 1).  
 
Goodin’s Theory of Exploitation 
 Goodin’s view of exploitation holds that the core notion of exploitation is 
fundamentally to take advantage of something.17  That is, the basic understanding of 
exploitation remains that the exploiter takes advantage of something to benefit and this is 
the same across all cases of exploitation. For Goodin, “exploitation is an act which, if 
successful, confers certain perceived benefits” (Goodin 1987: 168). “Otherwise, such acts 
would not be performed at all” (Goodin 1987: 168). Exploitation occurs when A 
successfully seizes an opportunity and cashes in on that opportunity, and not a moment 
before (Goodin 1987:168). In other words, benefits must necessarily accrue to A in a 
                                                             
17 Feinberg (1983) holds a similar view in his essay “Non-coercive exploitation”. 
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successful act of exploitation. Goodin holds that using a person is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for his/her exploitation. Goodin argues, “what more is required in 
order to make it sufficient is not the presence of harm, or the absence of consent, or the 
presence of coercion, or the absence of reciprocity, or the presence of manipulation” 
(Goodin 1987: 180). In Goodin’s view, “what is needed is instead some specification of 
the ways in which B is being used” (1987: 180) and this “reduces the analysis of 
exploitation to the analysis of why, and in what respect, it is wrong (unfair, exploitative) 
to use certain attributes of people and their situations in certain ways” (1987: 181). 
Goodin contends, “notions of exploitation and of a duty to protect the vulnerable are 
analytically inseparable” (Goodin 1988: 148). This is similar to Wolff’s general analysis 
of exploitation that essentially reduces to what is wrong with exploitation, which in 
Wolff’s view is “treating another as a means to your own ends, rather than with the respect 
that is due to another human being (Wolff 1985: 97). 
 On Goodin’s account, A exploits B when A benefits from taking advantage of B 
in inappropriate situations, and thereby violates the norms governing certain social 
interactions (Goodin 1987: 184). In other words, exploitation occurs when A derives 
benefit by taking advantage of a person under unusual or inappropriate circumstances that 
impose a moral responsibility on an agent to protect another’s interests (Goodin 1987: 
187). This understanding of exploitation means two things must be satisfied for the 
occurrence of exploitation. Exploitation first involves A benefiting by taking unfair 
advantage of B (Goodin 1987: 167). Secondly, A takes advantage of B in circumstances 
that are unusual or inappropriate for such behaviour. By this understanding, exploitation 
fundamentally consists a certain sort of behaviour that is inappropriate or wrong when 
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done in a certain situation. Goodin’s account is therefore moralised since “to commit an 
act of exploitation is to commit a wrong” (Goodin 1987:182). Goodin’s argument is that 
it is morally wrong or unfair to play for advantage under these inappropriate 
circumstances. He argue, “the generic unfairness associated with interpersonal 
exploitation lies…in playing for advantage in situations where it is inappropriate to do 
so” (Goodin 1987: 184).  
 For Goodin, it is inappropriate to take advantage of B in four situations. On 
Goodin’s view, in these inappropriate situations B is particularly vulnerable to A’s actions 
and choices regardless of the particular source of their vulnerability (Goodin 1987: 187). 
Goodin states that B is vulnerable to A if and only if A’s actions and choices have a great 
impact on B’s interests (Goodin 1985b: 779). Put differently, “vulnerability amounts to 
one person’s having capacity to produce consequences that matter to another” (Goodin 
1985a: 114). For Goodin, A is in these four situations under an obligation to avoid taking 
advantage of B because B’s interests are sensitive to A’s actions and choices. The first 
inappropriate situation for advantage taking is when one’s interactors have renounced 
playing for advantage themselves (Goodin 1987: 185). On Goodin’s view, it is unfair 
and/or inappropriate to take advantage of friends and lovers, for example, because they 
let their guard down. In such situations, B trusts that A’s actions and choices would take 
into consideration his or her interests, or that A would not act against B’s interests such 
that taking advantage of B in such a situations amounts to betrayal of trust. Lovers are in 
this case vulnerable because they trust that their partner will act in ways that are fair to 
them by considering their interests when dealing with them. The second situation where 
it is inappropriate to take advantage of others is when one’s interactors are unfit or 
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otherwise unable to play for advantage because such people are in positions where they 
do not have a choice but to accede to A’s demands (Goodin 1987: 185). Taking advantage 
of people with some weakness of will or cheating a blind person fall into this category of 
inappropriate situations. The third inappropriate situation for advantage taking is when 
one’s interactors are not your match (Goodin 1987:185). Goodin claims that it is 
inappropriate to take advantage of others where there is disproportionate bargaining 
power or that it is unfair to take advantage of the weaker counterpart, which perhaps is 
the central objection to all forms of economic exploitation such as one depicted in the 
Pacific Rim factory example in the previous chapter. The fourth situation that is 
inappropriate for advantage taking is when one’s interactor suffers some grave misfortune 
(Goodin 1987: 186). On Goodin’s view, it is inappropriate to take advantage of victims 
of natural disasters or famine.  
 The four inappropriate situations are not exhaustive but they all manifest some 
kind of weakness on B’s part and the moral wrong that is central to Goodin’s theory 
(Goodin 1988: 144). 18  Goodin’s point is that taking advantage of others in these 
inappropriate situations is exploitative and constitute one kind of wrong which is the 
violation of one’s moral responsibility to protect the interests of others (Goodin 1987: 
187). It follows then that in situations described in the five examples of exploitation, it is 
inappropriate to take advantage of another, or act in certain ways against B because in 
these situations A is morally obligated to protect B’s interests. Goodin argues that in these 
situations individuals have a moral duty to protect the interests of vulnerable others 
because “ceteris paribus it is morally desirable that people’s interests and welfare should 
                                                             
18 Goodin (1988:147) acknowledges that the catalogue of such situations is not exhaustive, but he views 
that the conditions that make it inappropriate for advantage taking are principally of four kinds. 
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be furthered” (Goodin 1985b: 779). Conversely, it also then follows that in other kinds of 
situations, A’s taking advantage of B is acceptable and hence not exploitative since A is 
not under the moral obligation to protect B’s interests.  
 On Goodin’s account, exploitation therefore consists in the failure to perform the 
duty to protect persons that are particularly vulnerable to our actions and choices.19 To 
exploit a person is to fail to uphold a moral duty that restrains A from taking advantage 
of B who is vulnerable to A’s actions and choices. Moreover, this moral duty instructs 
that A ought to assist or meet B’s interests when B’s interests are affected by A’s choices 
and actions (Goodin 1987: 187). According to Goodin, in the four inappropriate situations 
for advantage taking that he identifies, A ought to “suspend ordinary rules of behaviour 
with B who is particularly vulnerable” (1987: 187) because doing otherwise is a failure 
to perform this duty or a failure to engage in fair play (1987: 183). In other words, it is 
wrong for A to derive benefit by taking advantage of B in these unusual or inappropriate 
circumstances because B is essentially vulnerable and vulnerable to A. This suggests that 
vulnerability is a condition or circumstance of weakness. At the same time, vulnerability 
is a relation between interactors where A has the capacity to produce consequences that 
matter to B (Goodin 1985a: 114). In other words, B is vulnerable to A is a relationship in 
which B’s interests rely on A’s choices and actions. In Goodin’s view, the essence of 
exploitation is thus in the characteristics of the process of a transaction that brings about 
an outcome that is more favourable to A than to B. In other words, to exploit a person is 
thus to commit a wrong which lies in the act or process, a failure to perform a moral duty 
                                                             
19 Goodin (1987: 187) develops this view based on his moral norm of protecting the vulnerable suggesting 
that “we have a strong moral responsibility to protect the interests of those who are particularly vulnerable 
to (i.e., whose interests are strongly affected by) our own actions and choices, regardless of the particular 
source of their vulnerability”. 
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that leads to the outcome. As earlier stated, for Goodin the notions of exploitation and of 
a duty to protect the vulnerable are analytically inseparable (Goodin 1988: 148).   
 
Examining Goodin’s Account 
 Goodin’s theory has an advantage to capture a range of exploitative cases because 
it spells out some things that are correct about exploitative transactions. In Goodin’s view, 
exploitation occurs because A possesses something that B wants or needs. This 
possession gives A the capacity or advantage to prescribe to B terms and conditions that 
are more favourable to A than to B. Under the circumstances, it is B’s need for what A 
has that necessitates an interaction with A. Moreover, because A has what B needs, B 
wants to interact with A more than A wants to interact with B such that B cannot negotiate 
as an equal in the interaction. On Goodin’s account, vulnerability or dependency is 
exploitable when the following conditions obtain (Goodin 1988: 175 – 176):  
1. The relationship embodies an asymmetrical balance of power. 
2. The subordinate party needs the resources provided by the relationship to protect 
his vital interests. 
3. For the subordinate party, the relationship is the only source of such resources. 
4. The superordinate party in the relationship exercises discretionary control over 
the needed resource.  
Goodin (1985a: 195) also argues that dependency or vulnerability relationships that 
display these four features are morally objectionable and the presence of these features 
increases the risk of exploitation. In other words, our moral objection to a vulnerability 
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relationship diminishes if a relationship fails to display these features (Goodin 1985a: 
196). 
 Using the stranded motorist example, the relationship between the tow truck drive 
and the motorist embodies an asymmetrical balance of power. The tow truck driver has 
and controls what the motorist needs, which gives the driver the capacity to demand as 
much money from the driver whereas the motorist cannot negotiate. Similarly, the 
capitalist in Marx’s depiction possess a resource in the form of private property that many 
other people need if they are to labour productively and earn a living. This suggests that 
various forms of exploitation involve asymmetrical relationships between the interactors. 
Goodin (1895a: 196) argues, “only asymmetrical power relations, only unilateral 
dependencies create opportunities for one side (the stronger) to exploit the other (the 
weaker).” The asymmetrical relationship is very important in identifying the exploiter 
and the exploited in an interaction. This relationship addresses the weakness of some of 
the theories addressed in the previous chapter that may view the exploiter as also an 
exploitee or include others outside an interaction as exploiters.20 The examples given in 
the previous chapter are therefore exploitative by Goodin’s characterization that B’s 
interests rely on the resources provided by the relationship with A.  
 The use of vulnerability as a condition of weakness and unsatisfied interests of 
the exploited party in a transaction serves as the foundation of asymmetrical relationships 
between interactors necessary for exploitation. For example, the Pacific Rim factory case 
satisfies Goodin’s conditions for exploitation. It is clear that there is an asymmetrical 
                                                             




balance of power between the factory owner and the workers because the factory owner 
has what the workers need. The workers desperately need the job to provide them with 
resources that address their welfare interests or wellbeing. Moreover, entering into a 
relationship with the factory owner is the workers’ only source for the resources they 
require for the protection of their interests. The factory owner exercises discretionary 
control over the resources - the work and its attendant benefits, which is the reason why 
the factory owner has the ability to decide on the terms and conditions with little or 
without consideration of the workers’ input. In other words, Goodin’s theory suggests 
that all forms of exploitation occur because A exercises control over something that B 
needs because B is vulnerable and therefore weak to negotiate in a transaction with A. 
 The first problem with Goodin’s theory is his use of the notion of vulnerability. 
Goodin’s theory of exploitation is broad because the notion of vulnerability on which the 
theory hinges, is imprecise. The notion is not narrow enough to yield a plausible account 
of exploitation. Goodin (1987: 187) argues that a person is vulnerable when his or her 
interests are strongly affected by other’s choices and actions. As Tea Logar observes, this 
conceptualisation is too broad because it does not answer the question “what in particular 
constitutes the notion of vulnerability that could be usefully applied to the philosophical 
analysis of exploitation” (Logar 2009: 82). The lack of precision in the use of the concept 
thus appears to include superficial desires since it does not outline the relevant or genuine 
vulnerability required for a charge of exploitation. Such imprecise use of the notion of 
vulnerability trivializes the notion of vulnerability that it does not offer the illumination 
it promises on the problem of exploitation. The lack of precision on the notion of 
vulnerability makes the account too broad, which compromises its explanatory advantage. 
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Examples of such broad use of vulnerability are found in medical research where 
categories of vulnerable persons have expanded widely without defining vulnerability 
such that it is difficult to know who is not vulnerable (See World Medical Association’s 
(WMA) Declaration of Helsinki 2009 Article 8).    
 The use of the notion of vulnerability in Goodin’s theory may suggest that all 
transactions in which A benefits when dealing with vulnerable others are exploitative. 
We therefore run the risk of charging every transaction that involves vulnerable others, 
however we identify vulnerability or vulnerable people, as exploitative because the use 
of the notion does not state what constitutes vulnerability in the analysis of exploitation. 
As Wood cautions, such use of the notion of vulnerability may mean that any need or 
desire constitutes vulnerability and this would make “exploitation virtually ubiquitous in 
human social life” (Wood 1995: 143). An imprecise notion of vulnerability puts into 
question, for example, economic transactions, which involve a vulnerable party (the 
weaker) as may be suggested by unequal bargaining power between the transactors. 
Unequal bargaining power usually suggests that one party is weaker than the other 
therefore vulnerable. Yet, many such transactions often seem ordinary and not 
exploitative even where some form of vulnerability is used for advantage taking. Goodin 
attempts to narrow down the concept by referring to specific situations where advantage 
taking constitutes exploitation but I think it does not successfully help his theory of 
exploitation. For instance, Goodin states that it is unfair and/or exploitative to take 
advantage of persons when relative advantage derives from another’s unfortunate 
circumstances or grave misfortune (Goodin 1987: 186). For example, transactions 
involving surgeons, dentists, personal trainers and dieticians to mention a few, all seem 
to involve benefitting from people’s unintended weaknesses but we do not tend to think 
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of these transactions as intuitively exploitative. Similarly, if an ordinary driver happens 
on the stranded motorist offering to help the motorist at the usual towing price, the driver, 
by Goodin’s account, exploits the motorist since he has benefitted from the motorist’s 
situation, which he would otherwise have not. Goodin’s account is thus broad since it 
seems to suggest that any form of vulnerability is source of exploitation and morally 
objectionable.  
 Since Goodin holds that to be vulnerable is when one’s interests are strongly 
affected by the choices and actions of others, it presents us with other problems in terms 
of how we should construe interests and the extent to which they should be protected to 
avoid exploitation. Goodin’s maintains that exploitation is essentially the failure to meet 
the interests of B and includes this as a necessary condition for exploitation in his account 
of exploitation. I argue that this inclusion is mistaken, as this is not consistently true in 
all exploitative cases. Goodin does not offer much clarity on these interests and the extent 
to which these interests should be met, by which we may exclude other exploitative cases 
because interests have been met. Holding this condition as necessary for exploitation 
makes Goodin’s account problematic because it is possible to exploit someone while at 
the same time meeting his or her interests. The Pacific Rim factory example illustrates 
this problem. Most people would agree that this is an example of an exploitative 
transaction because the factory owner takes unfair advantage of the villagers’ 
vulnerability that puts them in a weak bargaining position. It does not seem that the 
factory owner exploits the villagers because he has failed to discharge Goodin’s moral 
injunction to meet or protect the worker’s interests. That is, understanding exploitation as 
a mere failure to discharge this moral duty may suggest that the above example is not an 
instance of exploitation because it is clear that the factory owner meets some of the 
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interests of the villager’s by contributing to the workers’ welfare. In fact, the factory 
owner achieves more by offering $2 instead of the current average wage of $1, which is 
only enough to prevent the workers and their families from starving. Unless we offer a 
further explanation to this condition of protecting B’s interests, for example, by 
describing what these vital interests are and/or to what extent should they be satisfied, it 
would be counter-intuitive to claim that the factory example is not an exploitative 
transaction.  
 Failure to meet B’s interests is not a necessary condition for exploitation even 
when we construe these interests as basic needs. As Meena Krishnamurthy (2013: 4) 
observes, failure to meet or protect interests is not a necessary condition for exploitation 
because this condition can be satisfied yet the transaction remain exploitative. The 
stranded motorist example similarly illustrates this observation. While we may view that 
the tow truck driver exploits the motorist, the driver at the same time protects the interests 
of the motorists to survive considering that, there is an impending snowstorm and it is not 
certain when another tow truck may come around. This shows that it is possible to exploit 
someone even when his or her interests are met. The same thing can be said about the 
psychotherapist example that even in the event that the patient gets the expected or desired 
result from her therapy. That is, taking advantage of the patient is still exploitative 
regardless of the fact that her interests are met or protected. 21  Thus, understanding 
exploitation as a failure to protect another’s interests does not then correspond to the 
                                                             
21 One may argue that the client in the psychotherapy example has an interest in not being manipulated and 
she is therefore exploited because of this unmet interest. However, Goodin defines interests in terms of 
welfare and in the event of the successful treatment; it means the therapeutic process enhanced welfare 
regardless of the manipulation.   
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general notion of exploitation as unfair advantage taking because in most cases B’s 
interests are somehow met, which is precisely why B agrees to transact with A.  
 To solve the difficulty in determining when A has protected B’s interests in 
Goodin’s theory, we need to appeal to a particular baseline by which we can judge 
whether A has discharged her duty to protect B’s interest or has failed to do so. However, 
Goodin’s theory does not appeal to such a baseline. His the moral injunction that A has a 
duty to protect the interests of others as a condition for exploitation is on this account 
problematic. This is because as shown above, the moral injunction alone does not provide 
any proper guidance in terms of determining the extent to which we should meet B’s 
interests. Moreover, the notion of interests by itself does not give adequate guide even 
though Goodin is very clear that vulnerability places constraints on A’s actions and 
choices.  The factory setting is one example showing how difficult it is to determine the 
occurrence of exploitation by focusing on the protection of interests in Goodin’s account. 
As explained earlier, the factory owner certainly does protect the interests of the villagers 
by giving them a better option than the status quo and contributes to their welfare by 
giving them something more than to keep the workers and their families from starving.  
 We may want to interpret interests in terms of welfare as suggested by Goodin 
that to be vulnerable is a condition in which B has a threat of harm to his or her welfare 
or interests, terms which he uses interchangeably (Goodin 1985: 111). However, even 
when interests are construed in terms of welfare, without a baseline, it is not very clear 
why the factory example is exploitative when the transaction is positively contributing to 
or improving the villagers’ wellbeing or welfare. Goodin’s view may want to suggest that 
B is exploited in the factory example because A does not sufficiently contribute to B’s 
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welfare. However, the question of sufficiency is another issue that may need some 
clarification because by other consideration the factory example may remain exploitative 
even when the compensation goes up in the same way the stranded motorist example is 
still exploitative when the driver demands $12 instead of the $200 demanded in the 
example. Moreover, as Krishnamurthy points out, even when we alter Goodin’s condition 
to failure to satisfy and protect the basic needs of B, it does not go very far because B can 
be exploited even when the basic needs are met as shown in the examples above 
(Khrishnamurthy 2013: 6).  
 Goodin’s attempt to define interests in terms of welfare equally fails to address 
the problem of under-inclusiveness. In the examples explained in the above paragraphs, 
A contributes something to B’s welfare. If the current average wage of $1 in the factory 
example is enough to keep the workers and their families from starving, then $2 offered 
by factory owner does more than keeping the workers and their family from starving. As 
Sample (2003: 51) argues, it is difficult to see how a transaction that improves the 
situation of the transactors is wrong no matter how unusual the transaction. It would 
appear then in this case that A contributes to B’s welfare. By the examples, it does not 
appear that A harms B’s welfare rather than improve or secure B’s welfare compared to 
what would happen if there was no interaction. As Goodin states about the argument for 
protecting the vulnerable, it “is first and foremost an argument for aiding those in dire 
need” (1985a: 111).  In short, it appears that A does secure or improve B’s welfare, or 
aids B in his or her dire need and therefore A does not exploit B. However, it is odd to 
hold the view that this example is not exploitative because A contributes to B’s welfare. 
Thus, using contribution to another’s welfare as a standard for determining the occurrence 
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of exploitation leaves out many cases of exploitation where A contributes to B’s welfare. 
In fact, in all our examples, A contributes to B’s welfare yet they are exploitative.  
 We should note that Goodin’s account also emphasizes the obligation that we 
ought to refrain from harming those who are vulnerable to us more than the obligation to 
promote welfare. However, A can refrain from harming vulnerable others by not 
interacting with them. In our examples, A improves the situation of the vulnerable party. 
This means Goodin requires an argument to show why A is obligated to improve B’s 
situation, perhaps to some extent more than is done in the examples especially where it is 
difficult to establish that some harm has been caused to the vulnerable party. For example, 
we can argue that A fails to refrain from harming B in the psychotherapy and Tuskegee 
examples, but it is difficult to establish harm in the factory example and the stranded 
motorist’s example.  
 Some critics identify a related problem that it is possible not to discharge the moral 
duty of protecting other people’s interest without the occurrence of exploitation. They 
argue that there are counter examples that demonstrate that failure to meet to another 
person’s interests does not entail exploitation. For example, Krishnamurthy (2013: 6 – 7) 
argues that A can fail to meet B’s interests while playing for advantage against B, yet still 
fail to exploit B. The Snow Shovel example below illuminates this point: 
“A prices snow shovels above the at-cost price just before a snowstorm hits. B, 
who is in need of a shovel, decides not to buy one because she does not have the 
money to do so. B cannot get to another store before the storm hits. So, B goes 
without a shovel” (Sample 2003: 8). 
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 Krishnamurthy argues that on Goodin’s account, A exploits B since the two 
conditions for exploitation are satisfied. That is, in the example A has played for 
advantage and has failed to protect the interests of B who is vulnerable (Krishnamurthy 
2013: 7). Krishnamurthy argues that the example above demonstrates that the two 
conditions are not jointly sufficient. Krishnamurthy thinks then that Goodin’s account is 
broad because it includes cases like these, which are not necessarily exploitative. 
However, this seems to be a wrong interpretation of Goodin’s account since exploitation 
requires the occurrence of an exchange and not a mere attempt to benefit by taking 
advantage. Goodin clearly states that exploitation “occurs when A successfully seizes an 
opportunity and cashes in on that opportunity and not a moment before” (Goodin 1987: 
168). Exploitation in Goodin’s account amounts to “seizing the opportunity – it is not in 
the act of seeking it, or creating, or discovering it” (Goodin 1987: 168). Most importantly, 
“the value of the act of exploitation to the exploiter is not contained within the act itself, 
but rather in the further advantage (i.e. benefits) that follows from seizing the (strategic) 
advantage” (Goodin 1988: 126). In short, in the snow shovel example, A’s behaviour 
intends to exploit B but he does not exploit B since no benefit accrues to A or that there 
is no exchange between A and B. Thus, Goodin shows that there is a link between taking 
unfair advantage and benefit and this takes care of the worries that he does not distinguish 
between successful exploitation and attempted exploitation.  
 The challenges that compromise the usefulness of the notion of vulnerability in 
Goodin’s theory shown in the preceding paragraphs implore us to clarify on the notion 
by providing some precision. Despite the challenges, Goodin’s vulnerability view of 
exploitation points out an important feature for the occurrence of exploitation. 
Vulnerability shows the circumstances of the exploitee that affords power to exploiter 
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who then has discretionary power to take advantage of his or her transactor in the pursuit 
of benefits. At the same time, vulnerability indicates a relationship between interactors as 
Goodin argues that B is vulnerable when his or her interests are sensitive to A’s actions 
and choices (Goodin 1985b: 779).  That is, without vulnerability or threat of harm to B’s 
interest or welfare, and the ability that A has in affecting B’s welfare, A cannot take 
advantage of B. Here, Goodin’s theory suggests that vulnerability is a condition and a 
relation as confirmed by his use of vulnerability and dependence as interchangeable terms 
(1985b: 779). I find the interchangeable use of vulnerability and dependence affects the 
description of what constitutes exploitation. As much as vulnerability and dependence are 
often close, and interchangeably used in common language, I suggest that separating the 
two notions to achieve some conceptual clarity necessary for an improved vulnerability 
theory. The separation of the notions is important because vulnerability and dependence 
are not synonymous and do not necessarily imply each other. I outline the use of 
vulnerability and dependence as separate notions in the next chapter and argue that this 
usage is relevant to clarifying the vulnerability view of exploitation. Meanwhile, I turn to 
Allen Wood theory as the starting point for providing relevant precision required for the 
notion of vulnerability.  
 
Wood’s Theory of Exploitation 
 As stated earlier, Wood subscribes to the vulnerability view of exploitation stating 
that exploitation involves “the use of a vulnerability for the exploiter’s end” (Wood 2016: 
92). However, unlike Goodin, Wood thinks that the occurrence of exploitation does not 
require a violation of any moral principle. For Wood, exploitation is the same whether 
used in the pejorative or non-pejorative sense (Wood 1995: 147). According to Wood, 
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exploiting a person means deriving some benefit by taking advantage of the vulnerability 
or weakness of another (Wood 1995: 142). In other words, exploitation consists in using 
something about B for A’s ends by taking advantage of B’s vulnerability or weakness 
(Wood 1995: 147). For Wood, this is the basic idea behind all exploitation involving 
human objects and “it applies equally to cases where exploitation is commonly considered 
unfair, wrongful, or unethical and to cases where it is not” (Wood 1995: 147).  
 Wood takes note of the obfuscations in the philosophical and economic reflective 
accounts of exploitation and states that his aim is not to provide a technical analysis of 
exploitation. Wood aims to explore what “people mean when they object to behaviour or 
social arrangement as exploitative, and identify the moral convictions which give such 
objections their force” (Wood 1995: 137). On Wood’s account, to exploit a person is to 
take advantage of their vulnerability and use that weakness/vulnerability to derive benefit. 
For Wood, exploiting a person involves two types of exploitation that form a 
complementary pair. First, benefit exploitation (b-exploitation) in which A exploits or 
uses some attribute of B from which to derive benefit or use to achieve his or her end 
(Wood 1995: 142). Second, advantage exploitation (a-exploitation) which involves using 
vulnerability or weakness on B’s part, which gives A the advantage over B and puts at 
A’s disposal the attribute which he or she b-exploits (Ibid). Wood’s argument is that 
exploiting a person is simply b-exploitation – deriving benefit by using some attribute of 
B as means to A’s end. In other words, b-exploitation, presupposes a-exploitation (1995: 
146). Thus, in his view, advantage taking of vulnerability and benefitting form a 
complementary pair in the occurrence for exploitation (Wood 1995: 142). In other words, 
without the benefit there would be no point of taking advantage of another’s vulnerability; 
and without vulnerability, it would be impossible to control or manipulate B to benefit. 
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Therefore, on Wood’s account, “for a person to be exploited, he or she has to be 
vulnerable to the exploiter, and it is this advantage over the exploited person that the 
exploiter plays upon to make use of the exploitee” (Wood 1995: 146). Note here that 
Wood also depicts vulnerability as a relationship in which the exploitee is vulnerable to 
the exploiter. 
 In Wood’s view, exploiting B requires that the B is under A’s control.  For 
example, A can exploit B’s labour if he finds B in position where B needs to work for A 
(Wood 2016: 95). In order to exploit B, A must find some vulnerability of which to take 
advantage to get B to work on A’s terms (Wood 2016: 95). Vulnerability or weakness in 
Wood’s sense gives A some form of advantage, essentially giving A some form of control 
over B. Wood argues, “the exploitation of a person by another requires that the exploited 
person should be under the control of one who exploits. And the exploiter should make 
use of this fact in furtherance of the exploiter’s ends” (Wood 2016: 96). For Wood, the 
occurrence of exploitation ultimately depends “on who is in control – who is vulnerable 
and how that vulnerability is used” (Wood 2016: 97). Again, the example of capitalists’ 
ownership of the means of production is handy here. Capitalists possess in the form of 
private property the opportunities many other people need if they are to labour 
productively and earn a living. This makes the workers vulnerable to the capitalists. Thus, 
underlying all exploitative exchanges is that B is weak therefore vulnerable to A, and A 
uses B’s vulnerability or weakness as an opportunity for deriving benefit.  
 Having established what constitutes exploitation, Wood turns to engage his main 
aim to explain what makes exploitation morally objectionable. Wood argues that the real 
reason or the moral belief that makes exploitation objectionable is that “proper respect 
for others is violated when we treat their vulnerabilities as opportunities to advance our 
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interests or projects” (Wood 1995: 150 – 151). According to Wood, “it is degrading to 
have your weaknesses taken advantage of, and dishonourable to use the weaknesses of 
others for your ends” (1995: 151). In other words, benefiting by taking advantage of 
another’s vulnerability is morally wrong because it constitutes a violation of the proper 
respect owed to a human being. He views this badness of exploitation is there even when 
exploitation involves injustice, unfairness or violations of rights (Wood 1995: 154). This 
moral belief is important in Wood’s account because it is what distinguishes morally 
objectionable exploitation from morally permissible exploitation since as stated earlier; 
there is no difference in the meaning of the term exploitation. For example, it is 
permissible to exploit others or benefit by taking advantage of vulnerabilities or 
weaknesses of others in sports and games because you do not degrade your interactors. 
On the other hand, this moral conviction is, for instance, what makes surrogacy morally 
wrong, as opposed to that surrogacy is wrong or bad because it possesses that property 
which in light of certain moral principles will be regarded wrong (Wood 1995: 140). On 
Wood’s account, surrogacy constitutes morally objectionable exploitation when the 
exploiter uses the surrogate mother’s ability to carry and give birth to a child through her 
vulnerability to advance the exploiter’s project.   
 For Wood, vulnerable individuals need help rather than using their vulnerability 
for some end of our own and most importantly we need to preserve the dignity of those 
in need of help (Wood 1995: 153). Wood argues: 
“When people are vulnerable and in need of help, it is not only the helping itself 
which they need….They are also beings with dignity, with whom not all is well 




Thus, for Wood, the preservation of dignity is more vital than any positive contribution 
to welfare. Ruth J. Sample expresses a similar view in her theory of exploitation as 
degradation that exploitation involves “interacting with another being for the sake of 
advantage in a way that degrades or fails to respect the inherent value in that being’’ 
(2003: 57). By way of explanation, Wood’s account would charge the factory example as 
exploitative on the basis that the factory owner derives benefit from taking advantage of 
the worker’s vulnerability. The factory owner has an advantage over the villagers and 
more importantly has control over the villagers because of their vulnerability. Wood 
would further charge that taking advantage of the villagers’ vulnerability or weakness is 
morally objectionable if and only if there is a violation of the dignity of the villagers by 
not according them proper respect even though there is a contribution to their welfare. 
Thus, in Wood’s view benefiting B in a transaction, or protecting or contributing to her 
welfare as in Goodin’s sense, is not enough if proper respect is not given to the dignity of 
the recipients of that contribution. Violation of one’s dignity can occur while he or she 
benefits from a transaction or interaction. On Wood’s account, the psychotherapy 
example is exploitative because the psychotherapist uses his position to encourage or 
persuade his patient into sex, taking advantage of the patient’s vulnerability. However, it 
is wrongful exploitation because the psychotherapist fails to afford the patient proper 
respect due to her as a human being or that he fails to treat the patient as an agent with 
dignity particularly because in her situation the patient need help. In contrast to Goodin 
here, Wood does not think this example exploitative because A has not performed the 
duty to protect the vulnerable. As noted before, the psychotherapist can perform the duty 
of protecting the patient’s welfare even when some manipulation occurred. On Wood’s 
account, the example is exploitative because A derives benefit by taking advantage of B’s 
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vulnerability and it morally objectionable because A treats B without the respect due to 
B as a human being. In both examples, the villagers’ and the patient’s vulnerability 
requires their transactors’ help rather than using their vulnerability as an opportunity to 
derive benefit.  
 To illustrate further on Wood’s claim on what makes exploitation morally wrong, 
we can refer to the maritime case mentioned in the previous chapter between Port 
Caledonia - a vessel in difficulty, and the Anna’s (a tugboat) use of her monopoly to 
charge excessively to rescue Port Caledonia. The case represents an example of 
circumstances in which B, in this case the Port Caledonia (crew) can benefit from a 
transaction while at the same time have their dignity violated. When tugboat’s captain 
offers to rescue the Port Caledonia at a cost of sorts, the master of the Port Caledonia 
makes the only reasonable choice taking the offer to be rescued rather than passing it up. 
By Wood’s account, the crew of Port Caledonia (B) lacks the conditions under which 
proper respect can be accorded and it is degrading to take advantage of a person in that 
state, in this example, a state of distress. This example is comparable to the stranded 
motorist example, a situation in which A is in a position to insist upon his or her terms 
while B can only put up with it. Our five examples follow the same scheme where B is 
vulnerable and in a situation where only A can salvage that situation and are thus by this 
account exploitative because A benefits from B’s vulnerability. The relationship that 
Wood uses to describe an exploitative situation is clear in the five examples that A has 
control over B because of B’s vulnerability and capitalizes on this vulnerability to benefit. 
In other words, B’s interests depend on A more than vice versa in this relationship. 
However, whether these examples are morally objectionable cases of exploitation 
depends on whether we can determine that A treats B without proper respect or that there 
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is violation of B’s dignity. Wood’s theory therefore has to address with some detail how 
we should determine the occurrence of a violation of a person’s dignity. 
 Wood thinks that his moral conviction that makes exploitation wrongful or bad 
could be Kantian if given a different interpretation (Wood 1995: 151 fn 24). In principle, 
when A benefits by taking advantage of B’s vulnerability, A violates the Kantian maxim 
of respect for persons requiring that we treat other individuals not merely as means but 
also as ends in themselves (Kant 2002: 46 – 47). Wood proposes that respecting other 
persons, as ends in themselves, should go beyond the common interpretations of this 
Kantian maxim that demand absence of manipulation and coercion, or demand one’s 
consent to our treatment. He views that interpretations that employ ideas such as of 
consent are weaker than the interpretation that fits his belief. Wood points out the 
problem, for example, with Onora O’Neill’s interpretation of the Kantian maxim. 
O’Neill’s interpretation holds that treating others as mere means entails that we do not 
only “act in ways that they do not consent; we act on maxims that to which they could 
not consent” (O’Neill 1989: 138). Wood holds a contrary view that treating a person as 
mere means should go beyond issues of consent and include refraining from “making use 
of their vulnerability for our ends, whether they consent to it or not” (Wood 1995: 151 fn 
24). Wood is right to point out that treating other people merely as means should go 
beyond consent because if it is only about consent, then the alleged cases of exploitation 
we have looked at may not be exploitative since they are all voluntary transactions.  
 Despite focusing on what makes exploitation morally objectionable, Wood notes 
some problems that his vulnerability accounts will encounter. He firstly highlights the 
problems that affect the notion of vulnerability including what constitutes vulnerability. 
He acknowledges that needs and desires can sometimes constitute vulnerability as in how 
88 
 
“emotional needs for lovers make them vulnerable to those they love and hence create 
opportunities for exploitation” (Wood 1995: 143). While considering needs and desires 
may put many dealings between human beings in an exploitative light, Wood urges us to 
be clearer on the notion of vulnerability. He argues, “to suggest that any need or desire 
constitutes vulnerability…would make exploitation virtually ubiquitous in human social 
life” (Wood 1995: 143). He suggests that exploitative interactions are those that play on 
genuine vulnerabilities but is sceptical of the possibility of a proper distinction with those 
interactions that do not play on genuine vulnerabilities (Wood 1995: 143).  
 
Examining Wood’s account of Exploitation 
Unlike Goodin’s account, Wood’s account of exploitation takes note of the lack 
of precision on the concept of vulnerability in exploitation and attempts to clarify the 
notion. However, Wood’s attempt to rescue vulnerability accounts is not successful, as 
his theory does not successfully offer much clarity on the notion of vulnerability. As 
earlier stated, Wood argues that in advantage exploitation we take advantage of 
“someone’s weakness or vulnerability, which gives a hold or advantage over a person and 
puts at our disposal the attribute which we b-exploit” (Wood 1995: 142). The 
interchangeable use vulnerability and weakness in Woods theory, does not seem to solve 
his concern over the use of vulnerability because it faces the same over-inclusion 
problems that Goodin’s theory face on the use of the two terms.  
 Wood’s attempt to resolve the lack of precision on the term vulnerability by 
suggesting that exploitation plays on genuine vulnerability does not offer the clarity that 
we need in a vulnerability theory either. There is some difficulty with his suggestion that 
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the distinction between human interactions that play on genuine vulnerability and those 
that do not require the use of common sense rather than “inflexible philosophical 
conceptions or dogmas” (Wood 1995: 143). However, the use of common sense in an 
attempt to avoid using a specific notion of vulnerability that may equally end up being 
too narrow. That is, both inflexible philosophical conceptions of vulnerability and one 
based on the use of common sense will leave out other forms of vulnerability therefore 
exclude other cases of exploitation. Wood fails to spell out specific things about genuine 
vulnerabilities. Employing common sense to adjudicate between genuine and non-
genuine vulnerability does not seem to be a successful solution to the problem of precision 
hence does not resolve the issues of under or over-inclusiveness that also arise in 
Goodin’s use of notion of vulnerability. The problem with using common sense to 
distinguish between genuine vulnerability and any other need or desire in the 
determination of the occurrence of exploitation is that common sense mostly depends on 
one’s perspective. If we use common sense to determine the genuineness of 
vulnerabilities then we risk determining or defining vulnerability based on perspectives 
comparable to the perspectives of six blind men attempting to describe an elephant by the 
body part that they are experiencing.22 Samia A. Hurst (2008: 192) similarly uses this 
parable to capture the challenge of defining vulnerability. The common sense method 
thus makes vulnerability a very loose notion that it would lose its usefulness to accounting 
for exploitation because vulnerability becomes a matter of opinion.  
 Furthermore, Wood’s explanation that “if one party has a significantly stronger 
bargaining position than the other” and that therefore this “constitutes a clear case of 
                                                             
22 The parable of six blind men and the elephant is an Indian folklore retold and popularised by John 
Godfrey Saxe (1816-1887) in his poem ‘The Blind men and the Elephant” 
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vulnerability on the part of the weaker party” does not show then how the distinction 
between genuine vulnerability and others can be drawn (Wood 1995: 144). Determining 
a significantly stronger bargaining position may require pointing out some conditions that 
would indicate the strength of the position, which Wood does not provide and makes the 
determination vulnerability a matter of perspective. Viewed this way, Wood’s idea of 
vulnerability does not then seem far off from Goodin’s use of vulnerability. In short, his 
distinction between genuine and non-genuine vulnerability using common sense does not 
go very far to solve the problem at hand. In other words, Wood’s formula for 
distinguishing genuine from non-genuine vulnerability does not seem to address his initial 
worry that an imprecise notion of vulnerability will virtually make exploitation virtually 
ubiquitous in human social life.  
 Wood’s other use of vulnerability to refer only to “the vulnerability to be used” 
also does not help on this matter (Wood 1995: 144). It would appear that all forms of 
vulnerability render B weaker in some respect and therefore makes B vulnerable to be 
used because A capitalizes on this weakness to gain some control. In short, Wood’s 
suggestion that we employ common sense to determine genuine vulnerability from 
irrelevant vulnerability does not give us a precise guide. Since there is no clear distinction 
between genuine vulnerabilities and those that are not, the notion of vulnerability remains 
imprecise hence making the account equally broad. Thus, the account faces problems 
similar to those raised against Goodin’s account.  
 Another problem with Wood’s account of exploitation relates to what he thinks 
makes exploitation morally objectionable albeit appearing more encompassing. Wood 
views that exploitation is objectionable when we violate another’s dignity but he is not 
convincing on what constitutes the violation of human dignity. Wood’s moral reason for 
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objectionable exploitation at this point seems plausible because it is based on some 
specific way that A treats B if it is granted that A’s behaviour toward B does not afford 
B proper respect. Wood’s moral reason avoids the questions that we raised against 
Goodin’s moral principle. For example, Wood and Goodin agree that the driver exploits 
the stranded motorist because the driver derives benefit by taking advantage of the 
motorist’s vulnerability or weakness. Goodin’s moral objection, built into the definition 
of exploitation, is that the driver fails to perform the moral obligation to protect the 
interests of the motorist. However, the driver’s offer arguably does protect the most 
important interest for the stranded motorist, namely his interest in survival. As shown 
earlier, Goodin’s explanation seems inadequate even if the example changes such that the 
driver does not demand as much money to help the motorist. In other words, Goodin’s 
account struggles to explain how we should determine a failure to protect the interests of 
another or by what standard should we establish this failure. In contrast, Wood view does 
not face such difficulties to determine the occurrence of exploitation. His view holds that 
any benefit above the normal or standard cost of towing that the driver demands is 
exploitative insofar as the benefit results from taking advantage of the vulnerability of the 
stranded motorist. B is in Wood’s view still exploited even when B’s interests are better 
protected by not demanding too much for the towing cost. For example, when the tow 
truck driver tows the motorists for a slightly higher price, say $12 than the usual $10. In 
addition, Wood states that the transaction is morally objectionable by specifying 
something specific about the treatment of B.  
As much as Wood’s moral view seem to escape some of the challenges facing 
Goodin’s view, he requires some further argument that can help us determine this lack of 
proper respect towards another in a transaction or relation. His view of treating others’ 
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vulnerability for our ends whether they consent or not does give us the material to 
distinguish between morally objectionable and morally acceptable exploitation. What is 
missing is an explanation on when can we say that we have used another person for our 
ends in a way that violates their dignity. That is, it is not enough to employ this principle 
in his theory because respect or dignity are not self-explanatory terms and so is what 
constitutes their violation. For example, one can argue that B’s dignity is violated when 
they are harmed. Construed this way, Wood’s moral belief may only apply to the 
psychotherapy and Tuskegee trial examples. Nevertheless, it is difficult to use the 
principle in other three examples of exploitation where the exploiter does not cause harm 
but actually benefit B unlike in a situation of no interaction.  
 The above concern shows that there must be something more to exploitation than 
mere opportunistic use of vulnerability and equally suggests that there is more we can say 
about what makes exploitation morally wrong. Other attempts at defining exploitation, 
such as Mikhail Valdman’s, intend to escape the above problems but they do not succeed 
in accounting for other cases of exploitation. Valdman argues that exploitation “lies in 
the moral obligation not to extract excessive benefits from people who cannot, or cannot 
reasonably refuse offers” (Valdman 2009: 1). Valdman holds that benefits are excessive 
“insofar as they deviate from the benefits that we would expect A to receive were he 
transacting with someone who was rational, informed, and could reasonably refuse his 
offer (Valdman 2009: 12). However, this definition does not fit with other instances where 
B is rational, informed and could reasonably refuse A’s offer. For example, the stranded 
motorist is rational, could be aware of other towing possibilities but he cannot wait, and 
in this instance B can reasonably refuse A’s offer. We may equally call the same 
transaction exploitative where the driver does not demand any payment but demand 
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something else such as praise or an endorsement that enhances his reputation. By Wood’s 
account, these are all instances of exploitation as A benefits from the transaction by 
turning B’s vulnerability into an opportunity to meet A’s own ends.  
 From Wood’s perspective, the use of another’s vulnerability is degrading as he 
points out, “it is degrading to have your weaknesses taken advantage of, and 
dishonourable to use the weaknesses of others for your ends” (Wood 1995: 151). By 
appealing to the notion of proper respect, Wood’s account does not face the challenges 
such as which interests should be met before exploitation occurs or how much benefit in 
terms of excess constitute exploitation. Wood’s account would pronounce the variations 
of the stranded motorist example as instances of exploitation. That is, the driver exploits 
the motorist despite meeting or protecting her interests, or the driver not extracting 
excessive benefit. The driver equally exploits the motorist when the driver demands other 
things such as endorsement. As Wood argues, “helping those in need has a more profound 
moral ambivalence about it, making solidarity with them a far more vital achievement 
than any positive contribution to their welfare” (Wood 1995: 153). This means that A’s 
beneficence can be objectionable if it does “not preserve the dignity of the vulnerable” 
(Wood 1995: 153). This is why it is possible to say the driver’s offer to help the motorist 
at no monetary cost is equally exploitative and morally objectionable as there is no proper 
respect given to the motorist when the driver gains some reputational advantage from the 
motorist’s vulnerability. We should recall that the driver here benefits because in Wood’s 
view he or she has the motorist under his control because of the motorist’s vulnerability. 
Thus, all these instances are exploitative when A benefits from B’s vulnerability and are 
morally objectionable when A does not preserve the dignity of B not in the narrow sense 
pointed out earlier in O’Neill as there is consent given in all the examples. In Wood’s 
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sense, A exploits B because A has not refrained from using B’s vulnerability for her 
opportunistic interests or ends.  
 Meanwhile, as highlighted earlier, Wood’s moral injunction puts into question all 
forms interaction where A benefits when interacting with vulnerable B as it remains 
unclear on how we should understand what constitutes degrading. Further, it is also not 
easy to pinpoint in what ways it is degrading to a person when a transaction contributes 
to the welfare of another as compared to a situation of no transaction. Without further 
clarification, both interacting and not interacting with a vulnerable person may be 
degrading. As mentioned above, the notion of respect or dignity is itself problematic 
because it is vague. One can argue that in the examples A does not treat B merely as a 
means because A benefits B by interacting as compared to non-interaction. Moreover, 
other cases of exploitation do not seem to be violating this moral belief as proposed by 
Wood but they are equally morally objectionable. 
Wood’s analysis of exploitation, unlike Goodin, distinguishes what constitutes 
exploitation from what makes exploitation morally wrong. Recall that Goodin analysis of 
exploitation reduces to the analysis of why, and in what respect, is exploitation wrong 
(Goodin 1987: 181). Wood’s theory is thus free of moral limitations as it defines 
exploitation without including moral beliefs. However, his attempt to address the problem 
of lack of precision in the concept of vulnerability does not succeed. Wood does not 
provide a convincing formula for distinguishing between genuine and non-genuine 
vulnerability. That is, his suggestion that we employ common sense in distinguishing 
genuine from non-genuine vulnerability does not solve the problem mainly because 
common sense is a matter of perspective. In addition, the wrongfulness of exploitation is 
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not necessarily, in that we degrade other people even though exploitation in some 
instances may involve degrading others. 
Conclusion  
 The identification of vulnerability as a necessary condition for exploitation and/or 
relationship between interactors give vulnerability theories an advantage to account for 
various forms of exploitation. The notion of vulnerability pinpoints what underlies 
exploitative interactions and/or circumstances under which benefitting by advantage 
taking is exploitative. Vulnerability is also crucial in identifying the exploiting and 
exploited agents. I contend that the other theories of exploitation fail to account for a 
range of exploitation forms because they do not identify such relevant conditions or 
scheme for exploitation. Thus, the vulnerability theories provide a better approach to 
exploitation and offer good ground on which we can build an improved vulnerability 
account of exploitation.  
 I agree with the vulnerability theories that exploitation involves deriving benefit 
by taking advantage of another’s vulnerability in a mutually beneficial transaction or 
interaction. As emphasized, mutual benefit motivates both A and B to enter into a 
voluntary transaction. Despite both parties benefitting from the interaction, the benefit 
accruing to A is only possible because A has turned B’s vulnerability into an advantage 
or opportunity to benefit. Thus, benefit and vulnerability are necessary conditions for 
exploitation.  
 Nevertheless, this vulnerability conception of exploitation requires providing a 
more precise notion of vulnerability to address the problems affecting the two 
vulnerability theories. Conceiving exploitation as benefiting by taking advantage of 
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vulnerability is not self-explanatory or unproblematic. We need a precise notion of 
vulnerability to help us avoid the charges of incompleteness, over-inclusiveness or under-
inclusiveness that affects the above vulnerability accounts. Moreover, the concept of 
vulnerability remains vague and elusive as attempts at defining it often consists further 
imprecise notions such as human needs (Logar 2010: 335). We also need to address the 
use of vulnerability in the theories referring to both a condition - indicating B’s weakness 
or the source of weakness and a relation between the interactors – B is vulnerable to A. 
Vulnerability as relationship between interactors and what it intends to denote in the 
occurrence of exploitation is best captured by the notion of dependence. I propose a 
vulnerability theory of exploitation with a clearer notion of vulnerability in the next 
chapter separating the two senses in which the term vulnerability is used in both Goodin 
and Wood.   
 On what constitutes morally objectionable exploitation, I contend that exploitation 
is morally objectionable for various reasons, and not only those suggested by Goodin and 
Wood. That is, there are a variety of reasons why benefiting by taking advantage of 
others’ vulnerability is morally wrong or objectionable. Wood’s violation of the proper 
respect for a person or degradation and Goodin’s failure to protect another’s interest are 
only some of the reasons why exploitation could be morally wrong and not the only 
reasons. Wolff’s view makes a similar suggestion arguing that his Kantian interpretation 
of Marxist exploitation can be given Kantian, Aristotelian and Utilitarian content in 
spelling out the different ways in which exploitation is morally wrong (Wolff 1999: 113). 
Similarly, Risse and Wollner (2014: 21) think that exploitation could be morally 
objectionable for one reason or another, or it could be objectionable for more than one 
reason.  In terms of approach, I follow Wood’s approach of separating the definition of 
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exploitation from what makes it morally wrong. Wood’s method is more appealing than 
Goodin’s theory because it avoids the limitations set by the use a moral conviction to 
determine the occurrence of exploitation. That is, Wood’s account determines the 
occurrence of exploitations in different scenarios without the restrictions of a moral 







The Concept of Vulnerability: Towards A Revised 
Vulnerability Theory of Exploitation 
 
Introduction 
 The task in this chapter is to clarify the concept of vulnerability and its role within 
exploitation. The task contributes to the vulnerability approach to exploitation by 
philosophically analysing the concept of vulnerability. The analysis supports my claim in 
the preceding chapter that a vulnerability-based theory provides a better understanding of 
exploitation than other theories of exploitation. The claim in the previous chapter is that 
the vulnerability approach identifies the correct necessary conditions for the occurrence 
of exploitation thereby avoiding the mistakes made by other theories. The identification 
of the correct necessary conditions means that the vulnerability approach captures a wider 
range of exploitative relationships, including exploitation occurring in the international 
arena, than the other theories of exploitation.  
 However, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, Wood and Goodin’s 
vulnerability theories of exploitation both contain an imprecise conceptualisation of 
vulnerability, and this leads to the problems of over and under-inclusion. Thus, the 
clarification of the concept of vulnerability is against the backdrop that the concept 
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remains fuzzy and under-theorized. The concept of vulnerability is applied ambiguously 
even in academic fields where it is expansively used. As Mackenzie and her co-authors 
(2014: 18 – 19) remark, “the conceptual confusion within fields such as bioethics about 
the scope of vulnerability and the obligations it generates demonstrates an underlying lack 
of philosophical clarity about the concept of vulnerability.”  
 In the following sections, I develop the definition of vulnerability and qualify the 
concept of vulnerability that should guide our understanding of exploitation. The 
argument in this chapter builds on the claim made in the previous chapter that 
vulnerability is a necessary condition for exploitation because exploitation is only 
possible where one party is vulnerable. This is in contrast to the view suggested by other 
theorists, such as Sample, which says that although exploitation is typically connected to 
vulnerability it is not always at the root of exploitation (Sample 2003: 75).23 I further 
argue that vulnerability is only one of the necessary conditions for exploitation, and that 
it must also be the case that the exploited agent be dependent on the exploiter. 
Accordingly, on my account, exploitation occurs when A derives benefit by taking 
advantage of the vulnerability and dependence of B. Vulnerability is a condition in which 
B’s welfare interests or well-being is threatened. Dependence is a relationship between 
interactors where B’s cost for exiting a relationship with A is greater than zero (Lovett 
2010: 50) because this transaction is the best option available for securing B’s welfare 
interests. As a reminder, in an exploitative relationship, A and B refer to agents or groups 
or coalitions of agents where A is the exploiter and B is the exploitee. 
                                                             
23 Wolff (1999: 111) holds a similar view that “exploitation is typically a matter of using another person’s 
vulnerability to your own advantage”. 
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 As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Goodin and Wood use vulnerability and 
dependence interchangeably and to refer to two different phenomena: a condition for B 
(c-vulnerability) and a relationship between A and B (r-vulnerability, B is vulnerable to 
A). However, to achieve some conceptual clarity, we need to separate the notions rather 
than using them interchangeably. I argue that dependence rather than r-vulnerability best 
characterises the relationship between A and B in an exploitative transaction. In a 
dependence relationship, transacting with A is the best available option for B to secure 
his or her welfare interests which then entails that A’s action and choices can effect 
adverse consequences on B’s wellbeing rather than vice versa. The two notions of 
dependence and vulnerability should not be used interchangeably because despite their 
proximity, they are not synonymous. Vulnerability denotes a condition while dependence 
denotes a relationship, which is not properly depicted by r-vulnerability.  
 Thus, on this vulnerability account, the understanding of vulnerability that is 
relevant to exploitation is one that is accompanied by dependence. A exploits B when A 
benefits by simultaneously taking advantage of the threat(s) to an agent’s welfare interests 
and the relationship in which B can only exit at a cost above zero to his or her welfare 
interests. B is exploitable if and only if he or she is vulnerable and dependent on A. The 
vulnerability theory as proposed, explains the nature of exploitation and the mechanism 
by which it takes places in a range of exploitative examples. 
 In the following sections, I explore the meaning and use of vulnerability to 
highlight the lack of philosophical clarity on the concept of vulnerability in the various 
academic fields.  I also narrow down to concept of vulnerability that is relevant to the 
understanding of exploitation in ways that do not make exploitation narrow or broad. The 
explanation of the nature of vulnerability also shows how vulnerability disadvantages B 
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in a transaction. The last section explains the notion of dependence and its role in 
exploitation.   
 
What is vulnerability?  
 In ordinary language, something is ‘vulnerable’ when it is “capable of being 
attacked, harmed, or injured in some way” (Levine et al. 2004: 47). When something is 
vulnerable, it means it is in some state of weakness such that vulnerability and weakness 
are often used interchangeably. There is extensive use of the term vulnerability in a wide 
range of disciplinary fields where it means different things and sometimes differs in its 
application within the fields. Vulnerability may sometimes indicate a mere increased risk 
of harm while in other cases it refers to specific things such as lack of capacity to consent 
or increased susceptibility to coercion. Despite these differences, the use of the term 
vulnerability mostly indicates the probability of the occurrence of harm (broadly 
construed) due to some weakness in an entity, an individual or a group of people. In other 
words, the idea of vulnerability in various fields denotes a condition in which entities 
including human beings are susceptible to harm or injury or that there is an imminent 
threat of harm that may befall these entities or individuals. For example, in disaster 
management the term vulnerability suggests “the diminished capacity of an individual or 
group to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural or man-
made hazard” (IFRS).24 Similar definitions also exist in other fields such as bioethics 
emphasizing the likelihood of harm or injury because of some weakness and the questions 
                                                             






of capacity to avoid or deal with the threat of harm or the harm itself. For example, the 
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) defines vulnerable 
persons (or vulnerability) as “those who are relatively (or absolutely) incapable of 
protecting their own interests. More formally, they may have insufficient power, 
intelligence, education, resources, strength, or other needed attributes to protect their own 
interests” (CIOMS guideline 13). Similarly, Doris Schroeder and Eugenijus Gefenas 
(2009: 119) hold that “to be vulnerable means to face a significant probability of incurring 
an identifiable harm while substantially lacking ability and/or means to protect oneself”.  
 Despite becoming a key term among academics, in research and policy-making, 
vulnerability “is used without defining what they mean by the term” (Brown 2011: 314). 
That is, the concept of vulnerability in these fields is often used as a self-explanatory term. 
In research ethics, for instance, few policies and guidelines explicitly define vulnerability. 
Instead, they rely on implicit assumptions and delineation of vulnerable groups and 
sources of vulnerability (Bracken-Roche et al. 2017). McKenzie (2014: 82) shares a 
similar view that the concept of vulnerability remains a background assumption or is used 
implicitly in many accounts of clinical bioethics. Madison Powers and Ruth Faden make 
use of such implicit assumptions about vulnerability in their work stating, “Our 
background assumption is that some people are more vulnerable, less powerful, less 
advantaged than others, and that all live lives of dependency and interdependency” 
(Powers & Faden 2008: 30). The theme of vulnerability is also prominent in a number of 
areas of philosophy albeit without much clarity on what the concept precisely means. 
Issues of vulnerability run through the writings on international ethics, feminist ethics, 
global justice and human rights amongst others.   
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 The lack of clarity on the concept of vulnerability traces back to an unresolved 
issue about the meaning of vulnerability. That is, whether vulnerability refers to a general 
human condition of susceptibility to harm or to specific kinds of conditions in which some 
people have an increased susceptibility to specific kinds of harms or injuries. The 
definitions from disaster management and medical research ethics in the above 
paragraphs in part exemplify the differences. The first interpretation of the concept of 
vulnerability views vulnerability as an ontological condition. This interpretation views 
human vulnerability as inherent and inevitable as it results from our embodied humanity 
hence it is universal. On this view, we can point out how all humans are essentially 
susceptible to various harms such as physical illness, disability, and death, among other 
things.  
 Ontological definitions of vulnerability generally use the concept consistently 
with its derivation from the Latin word vulnus (wound). “The root of the concept of 
vulnerability lies in the possibility of physical harm” (Levine et al. 2004: 47).  Martha A. 
Fineman’s definition of vulnerability as “a state of constant possibility of harm” falls 
within this approach (2008: 11). In Fineman’s view, vulnerability is an inherent human 
condition that is universal and constant. It is universal because vulnerability arises from 
our “embodiment which carries with it the ever-present possibility of harm, injury, 
misfortune from mildly adverse to catastrophically devastating events, whether 
accidental, intentional or otherwise” (Fineman 2008: 8). Vulnerability is constant because 
our embodied humanity “carries with it the ever-constant possibility of dependency as a 
result of disease, epidemics, or other biologically-based catastrophes” (Fineman 2008: 8). 
We need to note here the use of dependence in the explanation of vulnerability also noted 
in Goodin and Wood’s conceptions of vulnerability. Some authors conceptualise 
104 
 
vulnerability in this way in recent debates in feminist theory and bioethics where there is 
a revived interest in the concept of vulnerability. For example, Mackenzie and her co-
authors (2014: 4) classify a number of theorists as those who understand vulnerability as 
a universal, inevitable and enduring aspect of the human condition. They include in this 
category Judith Butler’s (2004) corporeal vulnerability, Martha Nussbaum’s (2006) 
human animality, Alisdair MacIntyre’s (1999) vulnerabilities of human life and Margaret 
U. Walker’s (1998) vulnerability-in-principle.  
 However, this approach to understanding vulnerability is not useful for 
understanding the role it plays in exploitative exchanges. As Wood suggests, it implies 
that all human beings are vulnerable and, as a consequence, gives the misleading 
impression that exploitation is ‘virtually ubiquitous in human social life’ (Wood, 1995, 
145). In addition, other critics have pointed out that this ‘universalist’ conception of 
vulnerability is too broad and poorly defined to be of any practical use (Macklin 2003; 
Levine et al. 2004; Schroeder & Gefenas 2009). For instance, Mackenzie (2014: 6) 
observes that this approach renders the concept of vulnerability potentially vacuous and 
of limited use in responding to specific vulnerabilities by labelling everyone as 
vulnerable. 
 The above ontological definition is lacking because it does not explicitly 
acknowledge that while vulnerability is embodied in our biological nature, it is not the 
same for everyone. The distribution of vulnerability is not even, because susceptibility to 
harm is often significantly social and relational. As Fineman (2013: 21) states in her 
analysis, vulnerability is significantly a function of our positioning within the web of 
economic and institutional relationships, which determine our particular abilities to avoid 
or respond to risks. For example, all human beings are vulnerable to the outcomes of crop 
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failure. Nevertheless, vulnerability is of concern when individuals experience the 
outcomes of crop failure differently because of other reasons or conditions such as their 
socioeconomic positions. Our concern with vulnerability with respect to crop failure is 
when the conditions surrounding some people are such that practices or policies, for 
example, are not supportive and that they amplify the people’s precarious situation – their 
susceptibility to harms such as hunger. In other words, crop failure only turns into famine 
when there are no measures in place, for example, to compensate farmers and when socio-
political institutions are not willing to help the affected people. Under these 
circumstances, individuals experience vulnerability differently in that some individuals’ 
welfare interests are more threatened than other people’s. The differences in susceptibility 
as described, shows that beyond the human condition, our vulnerability is also a function 
of specific social conditions such as those born out of relationships, systems and 
institutions that we have in place to mediate, compensate, or lessen the likelihood of harm 
from occurring (Fineman 2013: 22).  
 Picking out the conditions or contexts that surround individuals and make them 
particularly vulnerable is important as this makes the notion of vulnerability less vacuous 
and more useful particularly for our understanding of exploitation. In other words, this 
understanding of the concept of vulnerability is helpful because it points to us what sort 
of vulnerability matters to the occurrence of exploitation. Onora O’Neill states that this 
understanding of vulnerability is further helpful because it identifies those who are “more 
deeply, variably and selectively vulnerable to the action of particular others and the 
particular institutions on whom [they] come to depend for specific and often unavoidable 
purposes” (1996: 192).  
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 Mackenzie and her co-authors (2014), while acknowledging the ontological 
nature of vulnerability as intrinsic to the human condition and therefore universal, 
emphasize the second view of vulnerability. They also view vulnerability as a function of 
positioning, social ties and institutions. This vulnerability is particular to some individuals 
rather than others. According to Mackenzie and her co-authors, there are two forms of 
such vulnerability. The first one is situational arising from context and the other is 
pathogenic, which is situational but arising specifically from significant oppression or 
injustice (MacKenzie et al. 2014: 7 – 9). Their argument uses this understanding of 
vulnerability as a critical or normative notion to make a case for a more responsive state 
and institutions in addressing individual vulnerability. Fineman (2008: 1 – 2) similarly 
employs this notion of vulnerability to analyse and reconfigure social policies on 
inequality and disadvantage founded on the understanding of the liberal subject as an 
autonomous being. This understanding of the concept of vulnerability is important 
because it serves as a critical notion that seeks to address the inadequacies of policies and 
institutions in fields such as moral, legal and political theory.  
 Without dismissing vulnerability as a human condition, the vulnerability that 
matters to our understanding of exploitation should focus on vulnerability that is often 
unequal because it is socially or relationally determined. That is, we should emphasize 
the second view of vulnerability as something that is unequally experienced because it is 
socially influenced rather than a mere human condition. The reason for this is that we 
may fail to grasp how threats to people’s welfare interests are often subject to their 
socioeconomic posturing. In addition, using this view of vulnerability we can easily 
identify the exploited party. That is, when we view vulnerability as unequally distributed 
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because of other circumstances, that other people are at a higher risk of harm or wrong 
more than others, we identify an essential characteristic of an exploitative relationships.  
 In this account of exploitation, I employ the second conceptualisation of 
vulnerability as the relevant sense of vulnerability to the occurrence of exploitation. Both 
A and B may have threats to their wellbeing because of their shared embodied humanity. 
They may both be threatened by diseases but B may be more vulnerable and therefore 
more exploitable than A because the threat to B’s wellbeing is escalated for instance by 
some injustice in the distribution of resources that may help to protect her from the 
disease. That is, because of the other socioeconomic factors, B may be vulnerable or 
“more or much more susceptible than others to certain harms, injuries, failures and 
misuse” (Schroeder & Gefenas 2009: 113). On this understanding, vulnerability is 
contingent on “contextual factors, which signifies increased precariousness or greater risk 
of harms for particular individuals” (Rogers 2014: 60). Put differently, vulnerability is 
relevant to the discussion of exploitation only when it “turns out to have been created, 
shaped, or sustained at least in part through certain social arrangements” (Titmuss 1958 
cited in Goodin 1985: 783). For example, vulnerability (or threats to welfare interests) 
associated with childhood or old age is inevitable and come along with dependence. 
However, this vulnerability is of concern in our case when intensified, for example, by 
institutional or social arrangements. Children and the elderly are inevitably vulnerable 
but their vulnerability is exacerbated by their situation such as one in which the social 
institutions or laws do not protect children and the elderly from some forms of abuse. All 
children are vulnerable as children because of their (or lack of) abilities, resources, etc. 
but those children in places where contextual conditions such as the absence of functional 
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child protection policies are vulnerable in a way that matters to the occurrence of 
exploitation.  
 The definition of vulnerability that focuses on contextual conditions avoids the 
problem of over-inclusiveness identified in the previous approach because it “focuses on 
a high degree of vulnerability” (Formosa 2014: 91). This implies that only those whose 
welfare interests are more threatened than their interactors because of other contextual 
factors are vulnerable in the relevant sense to this theory. This type of vulnerability 
motivates a person to interact with another to protect their welfare interests hence a 
potential victim of exploitation.  For instance, a mentally challenged person is vulnerable 
because s/he has more needs to be met hence more susceptible to various forms of abuse 
and exploitation. Lack of provisions or support and protections for people with mental 
challenges therefore makes them more vulnerable than those without such a challenge.  
This, in my view, is what should inform the identification and categorisation of 
individuals and groups as vulnerable people such as children, refugees, the elderly, and 
women among others. The idea here is that these groups experience vulnerability in more 
specific ways than others because of their context or situation and their condition 
produces other forms of challenging experiences. In other words, this conception of 
vulnerability views that individuals or groups’ likelihood of suffering some harm 
increases with the contextual conditions. Moreover, these conditions cause or contribute 
to their lack of the ability to secure their welfare interests to avert the threats that may 
ensue. For example, refugees are vulnerable because they are more susceptible to physical 
and other forms of harms more than non-refugees are because their condition or situation 




 The vulnerability view that is relevant to the understanding of exploitation is thus 
one that considers contextual conditions that further threaten B’s welfare interests. The 
idea is to bring into the picture the nature of vulnerability and its role, particularly when 
it concerns transactions or relationships. For example, understanding women as 
vulnerable should go beyond the mistaken view that still holds in some societies that 
women’s vulnerability simply connotes an inherent weakness. In this case, we need to 
consider how contextual factors such as society, tradition and institutions among others 
that particularly threaten their welfare interests expose women to various forms of harm 
or abuse and exploitation. By emphasizing such contextual conditions, we deal with the 
problem of over-inclusiveness because it helps to pinpoint the exact conditions that make 
women vulnerable. For instance, when we label women as a vulnerable we make the 
concept narrow enough to acknowledge the conditions that threaten their welfare interests 
even across different jurisdictions. Thus, institutional, environmental, social or economic 
contexts surrounding individuals are important to the understanding of vulnerability as a 
necessary condition for exploitation.  
 
Vulnerability and Disadvantage 
 The view of vulnerability sketched above adds some analytical advantage to 
understanding the concept of exploitation. To demonstrate this potency we need to clarify 
how vulnerability works in exploitative transactions. The view particularly shows how 
vulnerability is necessary for the occurrence of exploitation. For instance, when one is 
vulnerable to a disease, his or her welfare interests are threatened. However, the threats 
to one’s welfare interests by a disease increase by certain socioeconomic conditions such 
as lack of access to healthcare and lack of food caused by factors ranging from poverty 
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to other people’s irresponsibility and/or institutional failures. A disease such as Cholera 
is more threatening to the wellbeing of people who are victims of poor institutional 
policies that unequally distribute resources such as access to clean water, proper sanitation 
and medical care. Individuals living in parts of a society that lack access to clean water, 
have poor sanitary conditions and do not have proper medical care, are in this sense more 
threatened by the disease than those living in parts of the society that have better 
conditions. In other words, their vulnerability is about their contextual or socioeconomic 
conditions that increase the threats to their welfare interests rather than a mere human 
condition.  
 The conditions that intensify the vulnerability to diseases for the people living in 
poor conditions in the example above is their source of disadvantage when bargaining 
with their counterparts living in the better part of society. Their poor conditions influence 
their life chances and puts them to a disadvantage because they have more threats or 
serious threats to their welfare interests than other members of the society do. More 
clearly, the conditions surrounding each part of the society constitute an advantage or a 
disadvantage in an interaction or bargaining situation such that those living in the poor 
parts of this society are at disadvantage compared to those living in the more affluent part 
of the society. Those who have an advantage have the capacity or resources with which 
they can control their counterparts leading to exploiting them. The advantage is based on 
that they have the ability or resources to help secure the wellbeing of their interactors 
from the poor part. Vulnerability owing to contextual conditions indicate B’s 
disadvantage in bargaining situations because B lacks the capacity and/or resources to 
protect her threatened welfare interests. As an example, considering clean water as need, 
those from the poor part of society may wish to transact with those from the other part for 
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a resource that they do not have. However, B goes into this bargaining situation 
disadvantage because A has control over a resource B needs to secure his or her welfare 
interests. In this bargaining situation, vulnerable B is therefore more disadvantaged, that 
A’s choices and actions have more influence of B’s welfare than vice versa. Thus, A has 
the opportunity to use this vulnerability to his or her advantage.  
 This understanding of vulnerability emphasize that when the individual’s 
contextual conditions compound threats to one’s welfare interests, the likelihood of 
exploitation escalates. In the disease example, threats posed by the disease to one’s 
wellbeing are amplified by lack of resources or conditions that can protect individuals’ 
welfare interests. These contextual conditions ultimately put the vulnerable individuals at 
a disadvantage when transacting with less or non-vulnerable others because the protection 
of their welfare interests is subject to their transactors’ choices or actions. In this case, 
one can take advantage of their vulnerability to derive benefit. In Goodin’s words, under 
such conditions, A’s actions and choices have a great impact on B’s interests (1985b: 
779). The situation for the people from the poor part is comparable to the situation for the 
stranded motorist because he or she is in a position of disadvantage when bargaining with 
the tow truck driver. The stranded motorist is vulnerable to snowstorm and being caught 
in a ditch is the contextual condition that compound the threat to her welfare interests. 
Compared to the stranded motorist, the tow truck driver is not vulnerable to the 
snowstorm like the motorist because the tow truck driver is not trapped in a ditch. In short, 
the threats to the welfare interests of the two parties are not similar giving the tow truck 
driver an advantage over the stranded motorist. The tow truck driver and the people from 
the better part of society are therefore in a position to insist on their terms of a transaction 
and their interactors can only put up with it.  In a bargaining situation as described, and 
112 
 
where there are no alternatives to transacting with A, B’s vulnerability is his or her 
disadvantage when transacting with A. Thus, the difference between the two parties lies 
in B’s levels of vulnerability and lack of capacity and alternatives to protect his or her 
welfare interests without transacting with A. In this sense, B’s welfare interests are subject 
to A’s actions and choices. The clarification of what constitutes vulnerability and its role 
a bargaining situation only establish the necessary conditions for B in an exploitative 
relationship. The bargaining situation at best suggests an asymmetrical relationship 
between A and B, but does not explain the nature of the relationship that is necessary for 
exploitation. That is, not all asymmetrical relationships are exploitative. This leads into 
the discussion of the notion of dependence. As stated earlier, exploitation occurs if and 
only if A benefits by taking advantage of B’s vulnerability and dependence.  
 
Dependence and its role in exploitation 
 Vulnerability and the disadvantage it implies in a bargaining situation creates an 
asymmetrical relationship between A and B. B is at a disadvantage because he or she has 
threats to her welfare interests compared to A. B lacks the capacity to secure or promote 
her welfare interests without the assistance of other individuals and this assistance comes 
through a transaction. That is, B can only secure his or her welfare interests by entering 
into a relationship with A to secure the threatened interests. I argue that vulnerability 
caused by an individual’s specific circumstances often yields dependence. Dependence 
as defined earlier denotes a relationship between interactors where the cost for exiting a 
relationship with A is greater than zero for B (Lovett 2010: 50) because this transaction 
is the best option available for securing B’s welfare interests. This implies that B prefers 
this transaction to others since the transaction with A represents the best option available 
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for securing B’s welfare interests. In other words, dependence entails a relationship in 
which B’s welfare interest are more secure if B transacts with A because not transacting 
is costly to B’s wellbeing.   
This vulnerability account holds that exploitation occurs only where vulnerability 
and dependence are present together. In other words, vulnerability and dependence are 
necessary conditions for exploitation. It is not possible to benefit by taking advantage of 
a vulnerable person when not transacting with A is not costly for B and the best option 
for securing his or her welfare interests. For example, a person who is drowning is 
vulnerable because of contextual conditions as is a person with mobility problem. 
However, the two are not dependent if they lose nothing by exiting a relationship with A 
because they have the ability to secure their wellbeing or have available to them other 
assistive devices to secure their wellbeing. That is, the cost of not interacting with A to 
secure their wellbeing is not more than zero and there are other options to meet their needs 
or secure their wellbeing. Both are therefore not exploitable because their welfare 
interests or wellbeing can be met without transacting with A. Similarly, the research 
subjects in the Tuskegee experiments and the psychotherapy patient are not exploitable if 
they can exist the relationship without risking the opportunity of securing their wellbeing 
because they have other alternatives to secure their threatened welfare interests. The idea 
of dependence advanced here borrows from Frank Lovett’s idea of dependence that B is 
dependent on A if the cost of exiting the social relationship with A are greater than zero 
(Lovett 2010: 50). Lovett uses this idea of dependence as a necessary condition for 
domination that holding all other things equal, most people would prefer not to be subject 
to domination unless there is something holding them in place, which presumably is the 
cost of exit (Ibid 49). For instance, slavery in the antebellum American South represent a 
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relationship of dependence since the cost of exiting were made too high by the grave 
dangers of attempting to escape. Similarly, the lack of employment opportunities for 
women in the 18th century England and elsewhere, and to some extent today, makes 
women depend on their husbands since the prospects for life outside marriage are not 
attractive because of the legal and cultural difficulties of divorce (Lovett 2010: 50 – 51). 
Where there are no costs to exiting any social relationship there is no dependence or the 
level of the cost determines the level of dependence. Lovett view is comparable to my 
view of dependence because B has more to lose by not transacting with A since B has no 
better options to transacting with A. The cost for B refusing to transact with A or exiting 
a relationship with A is therefore high for B because his or her wellbeing remain 
unsecured and misses the best available option for securing the threatened interests. The 
stranded motorists and the research subjects are for instance in such a position where the 
cost of not transacting with A are high comparable to the slaves and women in Lovett’s 
examples. Thus, it is because it will cost B’s wellbeing not to transact with A and B is out 
of options than to transact with A that B is exploitable. In other words, vulnerable but not 
dependent persons are not exploitable because they can secure their welfare interests 
hence would not accept terms and conditions of transactions that do not adequately protect 
her welfare interests unlike persons who do not have alternatives to protect similar welfare 
interests. The cost for refusing to transact or exit a relationship for B who is vulnerable 
but not dependent is by Lovett’s depiction not more than zero (Lovett 2010: 50). Thus, 
exploitation cannot occur without conditions of vulnerability and a relationship of 
dependence between interactors. 
Dependence as a necessary condition for the occurrence of exploitation is also the 
significant difference between interactors in the vulnerability model. Dependence shows 
115 
 
the difference between the tow truck driver and the motorist, the villagers and the factory 
owner, the research subjects and the researchers, the psychotherapy patient and the doctor, 
and the interactors in the other examples. Unlike A, securing B’s welfare interests in all 
these examples is contingent on his or her transactor. For instance, the motorist needs the 
tow truck driver to secure his or her welfare interests because the motorist cannot release 
the vehicle from the ditch by himself or herself. Similarly, in the factory example, the 
workers’ vulnerability to hunger increases with poverty, and their lack the capacity to 
protect their welfare interests disadvantages them when bargaining. Contrariwise, the tow 
truck driver and factory owner’s welfare interests are not contingent on their transactors 
because they do not have the threats that the motorist and the villagers have. As stated 
earlier, B depends on A only insofar as there is a cost greater than zero to B’s wellbeing 
when B chooses not to transact with A. At the same time, transacting with A represents 
the best available options for securing B’s welfare interests compared to other 
possibilities if available such as in the factory example. A has an advantage over B 
because A’s interests do not rely on B as much as B’s welfare interests rely on A through 
the transaction for the protection of his or her welfare interests. Borrowing Goodin’s 
expression, the A’s actions and choices have a great impact on B’s welfare interests rather 
than vice versa.  
 From the above explanation, A can only exploit B when B is both vulnerable and 
dependent. In the absence of vulnerability and dependence, A would offer different 
conditions for B because B would not accept exploitative terms and thus exploitation 
would not occur. This understanding shows why or how people who have threats to their 
welfare interests and lack the capacity or resources to protect those interests, such as 
refugees, orphans, victims of natural disaster, patients without access to medical care etc., 
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are often victims of exploitation. Their situation is precarious and they generally lack the 
ability to protect their welfare interests.25 Their exploitability is in both that they have 
threats to their welfare interests and they lack options with which to secure their interests 
such that they become dependent on their transactors who represent the best option 
available for securing the threatened welfare interests. We can contrast this exploitable 
situation with a scenario where the stranded motorists has other drivers available to 
transact with him or her. The motorist is vulnerable to the snowstorm but she is not 
dependent on the driver because the cost of exiting the relationship with the greedy tow 
driver is less than zero as the motorist has other options available for securing her welfare 
interests. The motorist loses nothing by not transacting with the greedy tow truck driver 
hence exploitation does not occur. Thus, when employing the idea of vulnerability in 
discussing exploitation, we at the same time aim to indicate B’s need to transact with a 
particular A to secure the threatened interests because there is a cost to B’s wellbeing if 
the transaction does not occur. I think that this is the implication of Goodin’s four 
inappropriate circumstances where advantage taking is unacceptable (1987: 185). The 
exploited in all four circumstances are vulnerable – have threats to their wellbeing and at 
the same time, the vulnerable stand to incur a cost that is detrimental to their threatened 
welfare interests if they do no transact with A who is also the best option hence they are 
dependent on A to secure protect their threatened welfare. Dependence is therefore the 
better term to use to explain Goodin’s point that “one is vulnerable to particular agents 
with respect to particular sorts of threats to one’s interest” (1985: 112).  
                                                             
25 Virginia Held (2006) holds similar views of vulnerability in her Ethics of Care endorsing care as an 
activity that meets the needs of those who cannot care for themselves. Held’s ethics of care views that their 
various relations with others affect individuals and these relations are not only those that have been 
voluntarily entered into rather than viewing individuals as independent and equal competing with each other 
for resources and advantage. She argues that her care approach represents an alternative to moral theories 
such as Kantian ethics and utilitarianism and addresses the shortfalls that right-based approaches. 
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 The proximity between vulnerability and dependence underlined in this view of 
exploitation is not novel. As already indicated, other theorists including Goodin (1985b: 
779) use the two concepts interchangeably albeit without showing how or to what extent 
the terms are related. Goodin (1988: 174 fn 34) states that “all exploitation is the 
exploitation of dependencies or vulnerabilities (terms used interchangeably)”. Dodds 
(2014: 182 – 3) also explains the relation between the two concepts by stating that 
dependence is “a specific form of vulnerability” that “dependence is vulnerability that 
requires the support of a specific person (or people)”. The definitions of vulnerability 
stated earlier from Schroeder and Gefenas (2009) and the CIOMS similarly suggest the 
close relationship between the two terms such that vulnerability implies dependence. 
However, I argue that despite this proximity, vulnerability and dependence are not 
synonymous. Concurring with Mackenzie et al. (2014: 11), we should not mistake 
vulnerability and dependence for equivalents as much as the two are related.  
 The reason why we should distinguish the two concepts is that, as stated earlier, 
it is possible to be vulnerable without being dependent. For example, a person whose 
vulnerability to disease increased by lack of health care facilities may not be dependent 
if that person has not yet caught the disease. Such a person is not dependent in the sense 
that he or she has no costs to incur by not interacting with A or does not need to transact 
with A as the best way available for securing his or her welfare interests. In other words, 
such a person is not dependent on their interactor in the way a stranded motorist is 
dependent on the tow truck driver. Unlike this person, the stranded motorist as well as B 
in the other examples stand to lose by not transacting with A and because this transaction 
is the best options available for securing welfare interests.  
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 As noted, other authors hold that vulnerability denotes dependence. For instance, 
such usage is clear in Fineman’s definition of vulnerability as “the present potential for 
each one of us to become dependent upon our persistent susceptibility to misfortune or 
catastrophe” (Fineman 2008: 12). However, the emphasis on vulnerability that arise from 
contextual conditions intends to capture as O’Neill (1996: 192) states how other 
individuals or groups are more deeply, variably and selectively dependent on others. 
Examples of vulnerable people such as children, prisoners, the economically or 
educationally disadvantaged, refugees, racial minorities, the sick, etc. capture this idea of 
dependence. That is, their position is such that there is a cost to their wellbeing if they 
chose not to interact with another actor to protect their own interests for which they do 
not have options to secure their threatened interests. Thus, vulnerable individuals or 
groups are more exploitable than others not only because of the existence of threats to 
their wellbeing and their lack of capacity to protect themselves. They are exploitable 
because they risk their welfare interest if they do not engage with their interactors who 
represent the best option available for securing their welfare interests. The emphasis here 
is that dependence outlines the necessary relationship to the occurrence of exploitation 
where B is in need and stand to lose if he or she will not transact with a specific A because 
there are no better options for securing the threatened interests than a transaction with A. 
This means that a relationship of dependence is not merely an asymmetrical relationship 
where one party is weaker in comparison with the other.  
 Thus, the notion of vulnerability that is relevant to the occurrence of exploitation 
is accompanied with dependence to depict the necessity for B to transact with A. In other 
words, B’s vulnerability is exploitable when it is also the case that B is dependent on A -
the exploiter. B is dependent on A when there is a cost above zero to B’s welfare interests 
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if B chooses not to transact with A in addition to the fact there are no better options 
available for securing the threatened welfare interests. A has the capacity and/or resources 
to help B forestall a threat to her welfare interests. As Dodds puts it, dependence entails 
a special relationship with another which “makes one person reliant on the other party to 
attend to their needs and interests” (2014: 190). It is my view that dependence rather than 
vulnerability should be used to decide who is responsible for rendering assistance. For 
example, we should replace r-vulnerability with dependence in Goodin’s discussion of 
vulnerability as the source of responsibility (Goodin 1985b: 779).  
 The relevance of a relationship of dependence to exploitation can be illustrated 
using Nicholas Vrousalis’ modified pit example. Suppose a situation in which individuals 
trapped in a pit at different positions facing mudslides but individual “A has a rope, and 
it would be very easy for B to use that rope to climb up, thus avoiding worse mudslides” 
(Vrousalis 2013: 134). B is vulnerable to mudslides and her vulnerability increases with 
depth. B’s wellbeing is threatened and she has no ability to pull herself out of the pit. 
Vrousalis (2013: 133) calls this absolute vulnerability, which is comparable to what I 
simply term c-vulnerability – a condition in which one’s welfare interests or wellbeing is 
threatened.  Vrousalis (2013: 134) thinks that exploitation also requires r-vulnerability 
where B is vulnerable to A and A has some sort of power over B. In his view, in the 
presence of A offering to transact with B, B is vulnerable to A and B’s vulnerability 
becomes a function of A’s willingness to throw the rope. I argue that in this situation B 
is dependent on A because the cost of not transacting with A is high to B and transacting 
with A is the best option available to B for securing her wellbeing. A’s actions and choices 
with respect to the use of the rope have a significant impact on B’s wellbeing if B has no 
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other options. The vulnerability theories from Goodin, Wood, and Vrousalis’ hold that in 
exploitation B is vulnerable to A.  
 However, on my account, vulnerability is a condition which constitute threats to 
B’s wellbeing and stating that B is vulnerable to A would mean A is threat to B’s welfare 
interests. I argue that this is not necessarily the case. A does not have to threaten B’s 
welfare interests or contribute to the threats. A merely takes advantage of the existence 
of those threats. In the deep pit example as well as in the other five examples, for instance, 
A does not threaten B’s wellbeing because A does not add anything to the threat to B. In 
other words, with or without A, the threat to B’s welfare interests remains the same. Thus, 
when transacting with A, B enters into a relationship of dependence rather than r-
vulnerability. Moreover, it is in the sense of having no other better options to transacting 
with A to secure one’s interests that dependence is similar to the idea of helplessness. B 
in the deep pit example agrees to transact with A because she cannot power to pull herself 
out of the pit and avoid the mudslides and does not have any other better options available. 
At this point, other theorists such as Vrousalis may argue that exploitation therefore 
requires a relationship of domination as he argues that “exploitation should be conceived 
instead, as form of domination, that is, domination for self-enrichment” (Vrousalis 2013: 
131). However, understanding exploitation as a form of domination for self-enrichment 
makes the conception of exploitation too broad as it may include cases where thugs take 
money from B because they have power over B. The thugs’ scenario depicts a case of 
domination for self-enrichment but is not a case of exploitation, which implies that a 
relationship of domination is not necessary.  I therefore insist that a relationship of 
dependence rather than of domination is necessary for exploitation. Thus, B is open to 
exploitation by A because, first, her welfare interests are threatened by mudslides; and 
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second, the cost to exiting or refusing a transaction with A is high for B as A represents 
the best option for securing B’s welfare interests.  
 The severity of the threat(s) and the cost of exiting a relationship with A to B’s 
welfare interests, as well as the lack of better options for protecting those welfare interests 
determine the level of dependence. In the stranded motorist example, as well as in the 
other examples, A demands for what we may call unfair, unjust, or unequal benefit 
because there is a threat to B’s welfare interests and the cost of not transacting is high for 
B because B lacks other options for protecting her welfare interests. The impending 
snowstorm poses a greater threat to the motorist than if there was no snowstorm coming 
her way. That is, the threat to B’s welfare interests would be less if the motorist was only 
caught in a ditch and there was no snowstorm; or if there was an impending snowstorm 
but she was not caught in a ditch. The seriousness of the threat to B’s wellbeing is 
compounded by being caught in the ditch and the absence of other tow drivers as 
alternatives increases her level dependence on the greedy tow truck driver. It is therefore 
only under the conditions of vulnerability and dependence that A can derive benefit by 
taking advantage of B. Under different conditions, such as where B can help herself out 
of the ditch, or where there are other tow truck drivers willing to transact, A cannot insists 
on terms of a transaction that B can only put up with. B cannot accept such conditions, as 
exiting a relationship with A is not costly, in part, because A is not the best option 
available.  
 However, we should note that exploitation could be systematic or institutionalised 
that C and D can offer the same conditions as A that do not adequately secure B’s welfare 
interests. As argued above, the tow truck driver cannot exploit the stranded motorist when 
there are other drivers available to provide towing services to the motorists, which renders 
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A not the best option available to B. Where offers from C and D are not different from 
A’s offer, or perhaps where the drivers seem to have formed a cartel, the motorist is 
simply dependent as the cost for exiting the relationship is high for B and there are no 
better options available for the protection for B’s wellbeing. Henk ten Have makes a 
comparable observation on exploitation in clinical research stating that A (the more 
powerful party) is not a single individual, but usually represent a network of actors while 
B is often isolated and not embedded in a supportive network (Have 2016: 140). The same 
can also be said about Marxist exploitation where it is costly for the workers to exit a 
relationship with the capitalist as owners of the mean of production without whom the 
workers cannot labour productively and earn a living. In such a situation, the conditions 
of vulnerability and relationships dependence prevail and B’s capacity to protect herself 
diminishes and is simply exploitable. 
 As articulated above, the idea of dependence implies lack of bargaining power 
and advantage in an asymmetrical relationship. B is dependent on A implies that A has 
power or control over B. The pit example illustrates this point. In addition to A’s 
possession of a rope, A has advantage and power over B because B’s wellbeing relies on 
a transaction with A and B lack of other options for securing the threatened welfare 
interests. B’s need for a resource that A can provide to secure his or her wellbeing creates 
an asymmetrical relationship between the parties but the cost of exiting a relationship for 
B creates dependence hence A’s ability to insist on terms that do not suit B. In this 
dependence relationship, A occupies a position where she recognizes both the threat to 
B’s welfare interests and the cost of not transacting for B including the lack of options 
for securing his or her wellbeing. A uses these to his or her advantage. In the Tuskegee 
example, the researchers take advantage of the subjects because they recognise both the 
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threat to subject’s welfare interests through the disease and poverty and how much it 
would cost the subjects if they exit or refuse a relationship with the researchers because 
of their lack of options for protecting their welfare interests. In the context, only the 
researchers can secure the subjects’ wellbeing. The absence of alternative transactors or 
resources makes the cost of exiting the relationship high for subjects hence the subjects 
depend on the researchers in the same way individual B trapped in a pit is dependent on 
A with a rope. This is in my view what explains Goodin’s view of the exploiter and the 
exploitee as superordinate and subordinate respectively. The superordinate has 
discretionary power over some the resource in an asymmetrical relationship (Goodin 
1985a: 196) when the cost of exiting a relationship is high for B who has no alternatives 
for securing the threatened welfare interests.  
 It follows then that advantage taking is in the cases above only possible because 
the cost for exiting a relations for B - the stranded motorist, the workers, the 
psychotherapy patient and the syphilis subjects, is high particularly where B does not 
have options available for securing their welfare interests. B occupies a position of 
disadvantage or weakness compared to A in the interaction because B does not have 
alternatives for securing his or her wellbeing while A has other B’s available for 
transactions. This is perhaps why theorists such as Goodin, feel that exploitation is 
morally wrong because it involves violating some moral obligation or some kind of abuse 
of power. That exploitation involves a violation of a duty to help others in need by 
protecting their interests (Goodin 1988: 114). Similar expressions are found in John 
Wilson’s brief definition of exploitation as “self-interested exercise of power” (1978: 
307) and Vrousalis’ interpretation of exploitation as domination for self-enrichment 
(Vrousalis 2013: 131). 
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 We should also note here that A can exploit B by taking advantage of an actual 
threat to B’s wellbeing or a mere belief that there is such a threat. There is also a 
possibility that the cost of exiting a relationship may be real or a mere belief because B 
believes there are no better options or is not aware of the other options. We can liken 
taking advantage of someone’s beliefs that there is a threat to one’s wellbeing and lack of 
options for securing his or her wellbeing to Jeremy Snyder’s ‘exploiting hope’ (2017). 
Snyder defines hope as an “imaginative and optimistic engagement with this outcome 
despite its statistical unlikelihood” (Snyder 2017: 241). Snyder’s exploiting hope 
discusses unproven medical intervention and involves taking advantage of actual threats 
but a mere belief that the cost of exiting a relationship is high when it is not particularly 
when the trial involves unproven medical intervention. Researchers’ with unproven 
medical interventions exploit their subjects’ hope for securing their wellbeing and the 
lack of better alternatives to the researchers to secure their wellbeing. HIV\AIDS clinical 
research trials in developing countries exemplify such a situation where the subjects face 
existential threats and they lack options for securing their wellbeing except transacting 
with the researchers as the best available option for securing their wellbeing, which makes 
exiting this relationship costly. However, we can apply the idea of exploitation to other 
situations where people hold certain beliefs including unfounded beliefs about how their 
welfare interests are threatened and that there are costs of exiting a relationship with their 
interactor. For instance, the idea is applicable to some religious relationships where hope 
and faith form the basis of exploitation. Contemporary churches for example, benefit by 
taking advantage of the threats to the members wellbeing (actual or not) and their 
dependence on the church or church leader (s) to secure their wellbeing in the present life 
and/or afterlife. The churches’ teachings on prosperity teach their believers that God 
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wants them to be physically healthy, materially wealthy, and personally happy. This is in 
summary the main message of the “prosperity gospel” (Jones 2015). I argue that these 
churches exploit their members when they benefit by asking for offerings or other 
financial commitments to the church so that they secure their physical health or material 
wealth and happiness, which all pertain to the members’ well-being. These church 
members may be vulnerable in the sense that they are actually afflicted with sickness or 
poverty; or even when they are not sick or poor, but they all want to have a foreseeable 
continuance of good health, wealth and happiness. Their vulnerability is in this sense 
based on a strong belief that their wellbeing is threatened and their dependence is equally 
based on the belief that there is a cost greater than zero to exiting the religious relationship 
compounded by the belief that there are no better options for securing their wellbeing 
other than the religious institution such as the church.  
 
Conclusion 
The concepts of vulnerability and dependence broaden our understanding of 
exploitation. Exploitation as benefiting by taking advantage of vulnerability and 
dependence accounts for a range of forms of exploitation by pinpointing the correct 
necessary conditions for exploitation that are missing in the other theories of exploitation: 
conditions of vulnerability for B and a relationship of dependence between the 
transactors. These are the necessary conditions for exploitation and not merely typical to 
exploitation. As we have seen in the discussion above, this vulnerability theory accounts 
for all the five and other cases of exploitation without struggling like the other theories of 
exploitation. That is, exploitation occurs in the stranded motorist, psychotherapy, 
Tuskegee trial, the Baby M and other examples of exploitation used in the discussion 
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because A benefits by taking advantage of the vulnerability and dependence of B. In 
addition, the notions of vulnerability and dependence identify who the exploiter and the 
exploited are in an alleged exploitative relationship. That is, it is easy on this vulnerability 
account to identify the exploited as the one whose interests are threatened, cannot easily 
exit a relationship because his or her welfare interests are more threatened, and does not 
have any better options to protect those interests apart from the transaction at hand. This 
vulnerability account thus makes it easier to explain how or when different agents, 
including individuals as well as collectives, such as states and companies, could be 
implicated in the exploitation of vulnerable others. Thus, this theory is not limited in 
accounting for a range of exploitative cases in the ways that other theories are limited 
because they use notions such as harm, coercion, or lack of consent to determine the 
occurrence of exploitation.     
Vulnerability indicates a condition in which certain contextual factors threaten 
B’s welfare interests or wellbeing. Vulnerability is necessary because it indicates the 
reason for B to enter into a transaction with A, which is to avert a threat to one’s 
wellbeing. Dependence shows a relationship between interactors where B’s cost for 
exiting a relationship with A is greater than zero. A utilizes these to transact with B on 
terms that are more favourable to A than B. This transaction represents the best option 
available for B to secure his or her threatened welfare interests or wellbeing. Thus, on this 
vulnerability view, exploitation will not occur where conditions of vulnerability are not 
accompanied by a relationship of dependence between the transactors. Even though an 
exploitative transaction is mutually beneficial, it is more important to B because the 
transaction secures her wellbeing or that her wellbeing depends on the transaction more 











 The analysis of commercial gestational surrogacy in this chapter demonstrates the 
analytical advantage of the proposed vulnerability theory of exploitation by comparing 
the vulnerability theory with other views of exploitation that are commonly applied in the 
discussion of international commercial gestational surrogacy arrangements. I argue that 
commercial gestational surrogacy arrangements are exploitative if surrogacy seekers,  
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) clinics and/or their agents benefit by taking 
advantage of the vulnerability and dependence of the surrogate mothers. At the 
international domain, the presence of pervasive inequalities of wealth and income, and 
other forms of injustices create and/or sustain conditions of vulnerability conducive for 
relationships of dependence. In other words, the levels of inequalities and injustice in the 
international domain create a favourable environment for exploitation in arrangements 
such as commercial gestational surrogacy among others. The argument is that the 
likelihood for exploitation in commercial gestational surrogacy arrangements is high 
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where surrogate mothers are vulnerable (have threats to their welfare interests) due to 
their socioeconomic conditions. The likelihood for exploitation is even higher as the 
surrogate mothers must transact with commissioning parents and their agents because this 
interaction represent the best option available for securing their welfare interests. In other 
words, surrogacy contracts between commissioning parents in the developed world 
(and/or their agents) and surrogate mothers in the developing world are likely to be 
exploitative because of the comparatively high levels of vulnerability and dependence 
amongst women in the developing world. Thus, under increased conditions of 
vulnerability and prospects for relationships of dependence at the international level also 
characterized by lack of or poor regulations, commercial gestational surrogacy is more 
likely to be exploitative. Under these described conditions present at the international 
level, surrogacy seekers and their agents, have increased opportunities to benefit by taking 
advantage of the vulnerability and dependence of women. Surrogacy is therefore 
exploitative notwithstanding the fact that surrogacy arrangements secures some of the 
surrogate mothers’ welfare interests as surrogacy serve as a source of revenue for women 
for basic survival, to fend for their families, or expand their children’s opportunities and 
more.  
 I begin this analysis by briefly describing commercial gestational surrogacy and 
the development of the international gestational surrogacy industry. I base the discussion 
of international commercial gestational surrogacy mostly on the Indian surrogacy 
industry because India has until recently had lax laws regarding surrogacy promoting 
reproductive tourism by comparison with other countries. 26  Consequently, there is 
                                                             
26  The Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill was introduced in August 2016 banning 
commercial gestational surrogacy after increasing criticism that IGS was inherently imperialist and 
oppressive and was passed in December 2018. See Parry & Ghoshal (2018) 
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substantial literature available on the surrogacy industry in India including empirical and 
ethnographic reports about the practice and the lives of Indian surrogate mothers. 
However, the discussion on this topic applies to other surrogacy industries in the 
developing countries, as India is not the only destination for international commercial 
gestational surrogacy. An overview of the debate on surrogacy follows, briefly outlining 
the types of objections that are raised against surrogacy before examining exploitation 
arguments on surrogacy following Stephen Wilkinson’s (2003) categorisations of the 
exploitation in surrogacy as involving wrongful use or unfair advantage taking. I first 
examine the wrongful-use exploitation views mostly founded on the claim that selling 
reproductive labour is degrading arguing that these views fail to provide satisfactory bases 
for exploitation. I follow on to examine the unfair advantage taking view, which I find 
plausible but not convincingly addressed by theorists such as Wertheimer and Miller 
among others. For the rest of the discussion, surrogacy stands for commercial gestational 
surrogacy in the international domain involving persons from rich or developed countries 
seeking surrogacy services in developing countries.  
 
International gestational surrogacy and its development 
 Surrogacy as a medical procedure enables a woman, acting as a carrier, to bear a 
child on behalf of other individuals. Existing research on gestational surrogacy indicates 
that it is a relatively safe and effective procreation alternative. Gestational surrogacy is 
now an available solution for people who choose not to bear children or are infertile, 
having difficulties in conceiving or gestating and also a solution for women who have 
conditions that may be worsened by pregnancy such as diabetes. Gestational surrogacy 
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also allows parenting opportunities to same-sex couples and those who suffer from 
illnesses such as HIV/AIDS (McEwen 1999: 274).  
 
 As gestational surrogacy involves a complex medical process, I will not 
comprehensively describe the process or its various types or forms (See Brinsden 2003 
for a detailed description). However, my concern – commercial gestational surrogacy, 
refers to a contractual relationship wherein a surrogate mother is paid compensation over 
and above medical expenses for a nine-month gestation period (Kornegay 1990). The UK 
Surrogacy Arrangements Act (1985) defines commercial surrogacy as remuneration to 
the surrogate mother beyond reasonable expenses incurred by the pregnancy. Other 
payments include any reasonable medical, legal and psychological expenses. Many 
ethical issues including those dealing with fair or unfair compensation and unfair 
treatment of surrogate mothers among others arise in commercial surrogacy. These issues 
mostly arise because of the compensation that is at the centre of the arrangement. For 
example, some people believe that commercial surrogacy reduces child birthing to an 
economic transaction that can be evaluated by market principle when it should not 
(Anderson 1990).   
 Gestational surrogacy, like other forms medical tourism, has grown as 
globalisation has gradually erased economic and cultural borders. Advancements in 
technology and free trade regimes have also contributed to the growth of the surrogacy 
industry in scale and numbers. The significant increase in the number of infertile couples 
in developed countries has also contributed to the demand for surrogacy services. For 
instance, existing reports indicate that about one in six (1/6) couples in the US (Pittman 
2013) and one in the seven (1/7) couples in the UK (NHS 2017) face difficulties in 
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conceiving or are infertile. The proportion of these numbers is increasing as women delay 
motherhood to focus on careers (Birns & Hay 2013: 264). Reported figures of surrogacy 
births is evidence to the growth of surrogacy industry. For example, between 1977 and 
1992, an estimated 5000 surrogate births had taken place in the United States (Levitt & 
Lorenzo 1992: 71 cited in Perdue 2011). By 2008, the number of surrogate births had 
skyrocketed to approximately 28,000 (Kuczynski 2008). Considering the increase in the 
number of people affected by infertility and other reasons necessitating gestational 
services such as same-sex unions in the world today, we can safely project that these 
figures will continue to grow.  
 The numbers of surrogate births in India remain unknown but “anecdotal evidence 
indicates that the number continues to rise as the numerous assisted reproductive 
technology (ART) facilitators continue to streamline the process for prospective 
commissioning parents” (Smerdon 2013: 187). One clinic in Anand run by Dr Nayna 
Patel has produced over 500 babies two-thirds (2/3) of which are for foreigners (Bhalla 
& Thapliyal 2013). Recent reports indicate that the number doubled in 2 years as Dr 
Patel’s clinic reached a milestone 1000th surrogacy births in October 2015 (Kumar, 2015). 
According to a 2013 study in the United Kingdom, there is also an increasing demand for 
foreign surrogacy services (Crawshaw, Blyth & van den Akker 2012). Data collected by 
Family through Surrogacy from 12 major overseas surrogacy clinics show an 180 per 
cent increase in commissioning parents from the UK between 2010 and 2013 (Dugan 
2014). The figures from another study by Surrogacy Australia indicate that Australian 
couples are increasingly seeking surrogacy services in India as evidenced by 97 surrogacy 
births in 2009 and 269 in 2011 (Everingham et al. 2014: 270). Apart from these partial 
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figures, numerous media reports in the last couple of decades also indicate that there is a 
growing trend. 
 Another factor that has propelled the growth of gestational surrogacy is restrictive 
and paternalistic legislation in most developed countries compared to the developing 
countries such as India. These restrictions then incentivise couples or individuals to go 
abroad to countries such as India to bypass local limitations, such as legal red tape, ill-
defined laws, and costs (Humbryd 2009). Reproductive tourism has subsequently grown 
into a multimillion industry in developing countries such as India with the potential of 
stimulating economies and providing jobs in both the service sector and healthcare. A 
study by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) estimated that the reproductive 
industry in India could become a $2.3 billion business by 2012 (cited in Sarojini et al 
2011).   
 
The Debate on Surrogacy: An overview 
 Surrogacy arrangements remain controversial despite being a viable reproductive 
alternative for couples and individuals and showing potential for economic contribution 
to countries. Advocates consider surrogacy simply as a matter of individual choice. That 
“surrogacy empowers women to choose whether to participate and gain financial 
compensation for their valued service” (Chamie & Mirkin 2014). Some feminists argue 
in favour of surrogacy that constructing pregnancy as a productive, economic endeavour 
shifts the boundaries of public/private dichotomy (Sistare 1988). Some more liberal or 
libertarian feminists agree with radical free marketers that the freedom for women 
includes the freedom to contract for labour (Posner 1992). Practitioners such as Dr Patel 
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favour surrogacy because it permits childless people to have children while giving 
surrogate mothers a capacity to lead a good life (Thapliyal 2013).  
 However, critics have raised both intrinsic and contextual objections. On the one 
hand, some critics cite concerns such as baby selling/commodification (Anderson 1990) 
and objectification/denigration of women among others (Berkhout 2008). These views 
hold that reproductive labour is a special form of labour different from other forms of 
labour consequently demanding that reproductive labour should be respected and not used 
(Anderson 1990: 72). That is, commodifying reproductive labour effectively use the 
surrogate mother like an incubator thereby compromising her dignity (Warnock 1985). 
Thus, these critics denounce surrogacy because it commodifies or objectifies women and 
constitutes the exploitation of women providing wombs for rent. Some critics believe that 
surrogacy enhances neither the surrogate’s autonomy nor women’s autonomy in general 
(Berkhout 2008: 95). Others argue that surrogacy may have negative health and social 
consequences for women despite the money motivation (Tieu 2009). Some conservative 
views hold that surrogate motherhood challenges traditional convictions concerning 
reproduction, motherhood and the formation of a family because each component of 
reproduction is now geographically separable and potentially transnationally 
commodifiable. They view that the innovations in reproduction “have compartmentalised 
reproduction into sperm donation, fertilisation of egg and sperm, and implantation of the 
fertilised egg into a womb.” (Banarjee 2012: 2). In other words, the human body and 
sacred motherhood is no longer solely a personal resource but transform into a commodity 
for sell, trade or rent at market value (Banerjee and Basu 2009). Furthermore, some view 
that the perceived major cost of subjecting reproductive labour to a market economy is 
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that it may have an effect on the attitudes of people and the tone of society making culture 
“fragmented, rootless and alienated” (Field 1990: 199). 
 On the other hand, there are concerns with the unequal bargaining power between 
the parties to a surrogacy arrangement (Perdue 2011: 279) or an imbalance of power 
relations in the arrangements (Teman 2009). Some raise further concerns that the general 
economic and educational vulnerability of surrogate women increases health injustice and 
stratifies reproduction (Sarojini et al. 2011). Such views are mostly based on the fact that 
many surrogate mothers suffer from certain background conditions such as poverty and 
structural injustices that make them particularly vulnerable and therefore disadvantaged 
in bargaining situations. Surrogacy is also complex because of the lack of international 
regulations for surrogacy arrangements. What exist at best regarding regulations is “a web 
of conflicting national laws that generate loopholes and removes safeguards for both the 
surrogates and commissioning parents” (Ramskold & Posner 2013: 397). Surrogacy, 
therefore, presents us with a variety of moral, legal, emotional, theological, cultural and 
sociological dilemmas. It is important to note that exploitation concerns feature in or 
appear alongside these other issues about surrogacy. In some cases, these issues are raised 
as the bases for a charge of exploitation, for instance, where commodification and 
degradation issues are raised.  
 
Exploitation Arguments against Surrogacy 
 In the following paragraphs I examine some exploitation arguments on surrogacy 
to illustrate how they do not adequately account for exploitation. I employ Stephen 
Wilkinson’s illuminating insights on the conceptualisation of exploitation to categorise, 
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broadly, the arguments in the discussion of commercial surrogacy. Wilkinson identifies 
two moralised views of exploitation: the wrongful use conception and the unfair 
advantage conception (Wilkinson 2003). According to the wrongful use conception,  A 
treats B as if B has only instrumental value when in fact B has some value which generates 
some right to respect to (some level of) non-instrumental consideration and treatment 
(Wilkinson 2003: 171 – 2). I will argue that using the wrongful use conception in 
surrogacy, as the basis for exploitation charges, is mistaken and weak because the 
arguments assume some agreement on what constitutes wrongful use. Moreover, the 
wrongful use conception is not consistently applied to other comparable arrangements 
such as bone marrow transplants or blood transfusions to warrant exploitation charges. 
The unfair advantage conception holds that A uses B as a means and does so unjustly 
under conditions which make it the case that either B does not consent or that B’s consent 
is not valid (Wilkinson 2003: 172). In other words, exploitation as unfair advantage taking 
occurs if and only if there is an unjust distribution of benefits between A and B, and B 
does not validly consent to the transaction (Ibid 179). Wilkinson, however, focuses on the 
unfair advantage view where exploitation occurs when both the conditions of justice and 
consent are not satisfied.  
 One of the arguments that falls within Wilkinson’s wrongful use conception of 
exploitation holds that surrogacy is degrading. That subjecting reproductive labour to 
market principles amounts to treating women as commodities. Furthermore, treating 
women as commodities is an improper intrusion indicating a failure to respect the intrinsic 
or special nature of women and their reproductive labour. The view is that once we 
commodify reproductive labour, we effectively use the surrogate mother like an incubator 
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thereby compromising her dignity (Warnock 1985, ).27 Central to this understanding is 
the belief that reproductive labour is not intrinsically a commodity that should be bought 
or sold as other forms of human labour. By extension, viewing surrogate mothers as 
commodifiable objects devalues women as a class. In short, the commodification of 
reproductive labour (or women) constitutes wrongful use because it objectifies women. 
Objectification is degrading to women because women are deemed to have only 
instrumental value when in fact they have a value which generates a right to respect and 
to non-instrumental consideration and treatment. Such views correspond with the Kantian 
maxim, notwithstanding in different ways, which instructs us not to treat an individual 
merely as a means. As Siegel (2008: 177) suggests, a provisional and very general 
formulation of a Kantian account of exploitation should hold that “A exploits B when A 
secures benefit from B by acting toward B on a maxim that violates the categorical 
imperative.”  Thus, on this view, surrogacy is exploitative because it involves benefiting 
by treating women or their reproductive labour as fungible objects which is perceived to 
violate this Kantian maxim.  
 Richard Arneson, Elizabeth Anderson, and Ruth J. Sample agree with the above 
views in different ways. Mary Warnock links reproductive labour to a person’s dignity 
holding that “it is inconsistent with human dignity that a woman should use her uterus for 
financial profit” (Warnock 1985: 45). Warnock further denounces surrogacy “a form of 
exploitation similar to prostitution” (Warnock 1985).28 Andrea Dworkin makes a similar 
pronouncement drawing an analogy between surrogacy and prostitution arguing, 
“motherhood is becoming a new branch of female prostitution… Women can sell 
                                                             
27 See also The Iona Institute 2013: 3 
28 Warnock has recorded in Nature and Mortality (2003) a change of heart on surrogacy that her strong 
abhorrence for surrogacy was a matter of feeling rather than reason. 
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reproductive capacities the same way old-time prostitutes sold sexual ones but without 
the stigma of whoring…” (Dworkin 1983: 181 – 182).  Arneson (1992: 133) argues that 
there is a datum of common sense morality that individuals should be left free to engage 
in some activities or not as they wish, but not to engage in them for a price. He argues 
“there are some goods that we should be left free to transfer to others if we wish, but not 
buy or sell” (Arneson 1992: 133). The point is that there should be limits on the 
permissible scope of market exchange activity. He claims, for instance, that individuals 
should be left free to vote or not, for instance, but not free to sell their vote or to vote in 
a certain way at any price (Ibid). Reproductive labour, by Arneson’s account, simply falls 
into the category of things that should not be bought or sold. This argument rests on the 
belief that the intrinsic nature of reproductive labour sets it apart from other kinds of 
labour. Treating reproductive labour as a commodity, therefore, amounts to wrongful use 
of the person because it is not a commodity similar to other forms of labour that can be 
bought or sold. Thus, as per Siegel’s suggestion, benefiting from commercial surrogacy 
is exploitative because it treats the surrogate mothers without regard of the Kantian 
categorical imperative (Siegel 2008: 177). 
 Anderson similarly argues that commercial surrogacy involves the wrongful use 
of women since treating women’s labour as a commodity is degrading to the women who 
perform it (Anderson 1990). The special character of reproductive labour demands that it 
should be respected and not used (Anderson 1990: 72). It is in this regard that we ought 
to preclude reproductive labour from market use or put it beyond the scope of market 
exchange. The lack of respect in this argument is also expressed in the view that surrogacy 
is merely a commercial transaction aiming to fulfil the desire of adults, to enable foreign 
parents to satisfy their wish for a child at any price (The Iona Institute 2012: 4). On 
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Anderson’s view, surrogacy is exploitative because it involves an unequal exchange of 
gift values that include love, gratitude, and appreciation of others “which cannot be 
bought or obtained through piecemeal calculations of individual advantage” (Anderson 
1990: 84). In Anderson’s view, A benefits by taking advantage of B’s emotional needs 
and vulnerabilities. In her view, instead of showing consideration for these needs and 
vulnerabilities, they are manipulated to encourage B “to make grave sacrifices to the 
broker’s and adoptive couple’s advantage” (Anderson 1990: 87). In other words, 
exploitation in surrogacy involves benefiting by wrongful use of the surrogate mothers 
treating them only as means to other people’s ends. 
 Sample’s views on commercial surrogacy concur with the above and similarly 
holds that reproductive labour is non-commodifiable and its commodification is 
degrading (2003: 57 – 58). Broadly, the notion of degradation here intends to capture the 
demeaning nature of exploitation which merely uses the surrogate as a means and that 
constitutes wrongful use of a person. Sample defines exploitation as benefiting from 
conditions that do not respect the inherent worth of another person, and that thereby 
degrades the other (Sample 2003). In summary, the wrongful use arguments highlight the 
violation of dignity in surrogacy, arguing that surrogacy commodifies women and their 
reproductive abilities and hence objectifies women by treating them merely as means. 
 Applying the abovementioned thoughts to our Indian case, one may argue that the 
surrogate mothers are exploited because the commissioning parents and their agents 
benefit by wrongfully using the women and their reproductive labour as commodities. 
This commodification or objectification constitutes a lack of respect for their dignity. 
However, surrogacy is not different from other forms of labour or services that are 
exchanged on the market. That surrogacy is degrading seem to depend on prejudices and 
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taboos surrounding reproduction (Del Savion & Cavaliere 2016: 83). Moreover, 
arguments that single out surrogacy as degrading are lacking because they fail to divorce 
from the assumptions regarding women’s sexuality and reproduction that have 
historically proven oppressive (Ibid 85).  Thus, surrogacy is is not a degrading form of 
work even though it may sometimes raise such a moral concerns. Traces of 
instrumentalisation of human beings are present in many other jobs that involve selling 
the capacity and physical powers yet they are not considered degrading. In other words, 
surrogacy is not degrading because it involves a special type of labour but rather by its 
context. Surrogacy, like other forms of labour selling ventures, is only degrading under 
particular political and socioeconomic conditions.  What is degrading about surrogacy 
lies outside the type of labour or service similar to what is degrading to poor women 
working in textile factories in Bangladesh or Cambodia. Thus, concurring with Debra 
Satz, selling “reproductive labour is not ipso facto degrading. Rather, it becomes 
degrading only in particular political and social context” (Satz 1992: 109). Therefore, 
objections to the commodification of reproductive labour are mistaken when based on the 
intrinsic and essentialist grounds. Objections seem plausible when based on contextual 
grounds such as pervasive gender inequality that characterise society, which reinforces 
gender hierarchies or asymmetrical social relations of gender domination (Ibid).  
 The degrading argument in surrogacy often culminates into the discussion of 
exploitation in some ways suggesting degradation as a condition for exploitation. Regula 
Stampfli (2017), for instance, argues that fair payment is not possible in surrogacy and it 
negates all human values including that it treats women merely as means. She also argues 
that surrogacy is not work but obscene exploitation. For Stampfli, reproductive labour 
(pregnancy) is a status, not work. This view seems to place the degrading aspect as a 
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necessary condition for exploitation when it is not. Exploitation occurs even where 
degradation is not an issue. Even where we consider other socioeconomic factors that 
may affect B in a bargaining situation we do not necessarily raise similar concerns. Thus, 
the reason that surrogacy is exploitative lies outside the claims that it involves degrading 
surrogate mothers. In short, the degradation arguments in surrogacy fail to establish a 
basis for a charge of exploitation. It is not enough to show that surrogacy involves the 
commodification or objectification and therefore degradation to make a charge of 
exploitation because these are not necessary to the occurrence of exploitation. This is an 
instance where exploitation is confused with other concepts or thought to be synonymous 
with other terms when it is not. Exploitation is therefore not the word to use if our 
concerns are merely about commodification or objectification or degrading. Consider the 
view that commodifying reproductive labour objectifies something integral to a woman’s 
identity. This view does not hold in other cases where the integral identity of a person is 
involved. For example, the charge of objectification is absent when you pay a priest to 
perform some religious rituals even though his labour is integral to his identity. As Satz 
(1992: 109) argues, nothing convincingly distinguishes reproductive labour from other 
forms of human labour. Any given form of labour is only degrading because of the 
circumstances but not in itself. Similarly, surrogacy is not exploitative because it involves 
a special type of labour but in the manner in which it is performed, or in the terms and 
conditions of the arrangement. In other words, surrogacy is exploitative not because it 
involves the wrongful use of reproductive labour or the women but in the conditions 
surrounding the practice. Particularly, those conditions that threaten the surrogate’s 
welfare interests and render them open to advantage taking.  
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 A related problem to the degrading concerns about surrogacy emanates from the 
use the notion of dignity to explain what constitutes degrading another person. The 
wrongful use argument is still problematic when it refers to a notion of dignity because 
the notion is complex and slippery as cursorily noted in the previous chapters. We do not 
have a satisfactory explication of human dignity, and we do not know when it is respected 
or violated. As explained earlier, defining degrading as treating others merely as means 
is not self-explanatory. Even when we refer to such things as the recognition of another’s 
autonomy as respecting human dignity, we may face problems explaining how one’s 
autonomy is recognised considering that this also is a highly contested concept as seen in 
the arguments on choice or consent. We may to this extent need to ask if there are other 
concepts besides autonomy that are involved in respecting or violating human dignity. 
Therefore, our attempt to understand exploitation in surrogacy should now shift to what 
constitutes unfair advantage taking. 
 
Exploitation in International Commercial Surrogacy: A Vulnerability 
Argument 
 Unfair advantage arguments in surrogacy largely focus on the compensation given 
to the surrogates. Some critics view that the compensation is unfair or unjust considering 
the services rendered or the value of goods exchanged in a surrogacy transaction. The 
basis of exploitation charges in this regard include the differences in the cost of the 
process and the compensation given to the surrogate mothers. Bearing in mind the basis 
of such exploitation charges, it is important to highlight the differences between 
surrogacy arrangements in developed and developing countries. This contrast serves to 
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situate my argument for a vulnerability theory of exploitation in surrogacy. The 
vulnerability view is broadly an unfair advantage taking argument as it argues contrary to 
the aforementioned wrongful use views that insist that surrogacy is degrading because 
reproductive labour is of a special nature that ought to exclude it from market transactions.  
Surrogacy in countries such as India costs considerably less than what it costs in 
developed countries, and the surrogates get a small fraction of the price of the process. 
For example, some reports indicate that the cost of surrogacy in India including all 
medical expenses and the surrogate’s fee is around $12,000 when it can cost up to $70,000 
in the United States (Haworth 2009). According to Scott Buckley, the director of legal 
services at Circle Surrogacy, which has facilities in four states in the United States and 
Sweden, surrogacy on national soil can cost upwards of $120,000. Meanwhile, the price 
tag for surrogacy in India is regularly cited as under $30,000 (Cuhna 2014). Leslie 
Morgan Steiner (2013) reports in her book that an American couple paid $50,000 for three 
children in India when it would cost almost double the figure ($100,000) per child in the 
United States. Alison Bailey (2011: 718) estimates that the entire surrogacy process in 
the United States can cost between $40,000 and $150,000 while the complete medical 
procedure, surrogate’s fee, airline tickets, and hotel stay for two trips to India costs around 
$25,000, but prices can go as low as $12,000. Surrogate mothers in the United States 
receive between $20,000 and $30,000 while their Indian counterparts get between $2,000 
and $10,000 (Gentleman 2008 cited in Bailey 2011: 718).  
 Some critics of surrogacy arrangements base their arguments of exploitation on 
these differences. For instance, Casey Humbryd (2009) holds this kind of view. Humbryd 
uses the following example to put his view into perspective supposing that:  
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“An incubator were designed to allow ectogenesis throughout a nine-month 
gestation. After obtaining an embryo through IVF, prospective parents contract 
with gestational service companies. These companies manage incubator facilities 
in the United States and India, and the gestational service industry is a profitable 
business. In Situation A, the incubator’s design requires full-time maintenance by 
a skilled, trained professional. In the United States, a trained professional is paid 
$20,000 per trimester, while in India a trained professional is paid $6,000 per 
trimester. In Situation B, the incubator requires full-time maintenance, but its 
simple design does not require a skilled worker. In the United States, the federal 
minimum wage requires workers to be paid $10,000 per trimester. In India, there 
is no set minimum wage for the incubator maintenance industry, and workers are 
paid $300 per trimester” (Humbryd 2009: 115). 
 
 According to Humbryd, while the two situations are similar in that those workers 
in India are paid less for the same work in either situation, only workers in situation B are 
exploited. Situation A is analogous to all other forms of international outsourcing in the 
service industry such as call centres where workers earn lower nominal wages but 
equivalent real wages (Ibid).29   On the contrary, situation B according to Humbryd 
constitutes exploitation because the workers are underpaid. That is, the only valid 
objection to international surrogacy is that surrogates may be exploited by being given 
too little compensation (Humbryd 2009: 112). However, there is a good reason to disagree 
with this opinion considering that the surrogates in the Indian case are not underpaid as 
per the figures presented earlier. Exploitation is not merely a function of payment.  
                                                             
29 The nominal wage rate is the salary in equivalent dollars, while the real wage rate is the amount that the 
nominal wage rate can buy in terms of goods and services 
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 I argue that neither the difference in costs for the same procedure nor the 
compensation given to surrogate mothers adequately indicates the occurrence of 
exploitation. We may want to consider, for example, that some salaries for similar jobs 
vary across the globe and there are no international guidelines regarding how much a 
cleaner or a dentist, for instance, should earn. Thus, the fact that the surrogates in India 
earn less compared to their counterparts in developed countries alone does not 
satisfactorily explain the occurrence of exploitation. It may only illustrate the difference 
between nominal wage and real wage rates (Ramskold and Posner 2013: 399). Moreover, 
we may think it otherwise if we consider the fact that the surrogates in Indian earn in 9 
months what they can only accumulate in years. There are no uniform surrogacy fees paid 
to gestating mothers in India, but almost all of them indicate that surrogacy pays better 
than other forms of employment. For example, Priya Shetty claims that Indian surrogates 
earn between $5000 and $7000 which is “an enormous sum for women who would 
normally earn about $300 a year” (Shetty 2012: 1634). This claim indicates that women 
in India gain an equivalent of around 10 years’ salary by becoming surrogates while 
others estimate up to 15 years’ of accumulation (Parks 2010: 334). These amounts suggest 
that Indian surrogates in relative terms earn more than what they would earn elsewhere. 
Perhaps this also suggests that such payment is fair considering the local setting of the 
contract and where unfair means low payment. Considering that the Indian surrogates get 
more by local standards, it is hard to say that the compensation is unfair hence exploitative 
if our measure of exploitation is underpayment. The point here is not to dismiss the 
exploitative concerns for underpayment but to state that we need an appropriate 
benchmark to determine underpayment and that underpayment alone is not a satisfactory 
basis for exploitation. 
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 Others may argue that these offers are not exploitative since the surrogates freely 
enter into these arrangements after deciding against the available options. As per 
Wertheimer and Miller’s stipulations about a competitive market, surrogacy offers in the 
Indian context may be viewed as obtaining from a competitive market and freely agreed 
to but it would be misrepresenting the two theorists that these offers are therefore fair and 
not exploitative if we stop there. Both Miller and Wertheimer argues that this market price 
is only fair if it is unaffected by special advantages due to asymmetries of information or 
bargaining power, which, as will be shown below, is not the case in this surrogacy 
industry.    
On exploitation arguments focusing on the fairness of compensation through 
voluntary agreements, Vida Panitch correctly suggests that the unfairness of the 
compensation should be determined by inter-contractual rather than intra-contractual 
comparisons (Panitch 2013: 332). That is, to establish the fairness of compensation, we 
should compare B to another party B in a similar surrogacy agreement. That is, we should 
establish fairness by comparing compensation for Indian surrogate mothers against their 
counterparts in developed countries rather than comparing the surrogate mothers in India 
to other women in other forms of contracts in India. Perhaps some would ask why we 
should compare contracts from different settings. It is because the surrogacy contracts in 
places like India are in fact dictated by the terms preferable to the surrogacy seekers from 
wealthy nations thus implicating them in these transactions.  
While acknowledging the point that the nominal wages for surrogate mothers in 
two locations may be different but there is a possibility of the same real wages, the 
unfairness of surrogacy in India is not merely in the payment but also in what makes such 
payments possible. Further, the unfairness of surrogacy contracts is in that the Indian 
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surrogates do not enjoy the other benefits and protections available to their counterparts 
in developed countries. Panitch summarises that unlike surrogate mothers in India, those 
in the United States are entitled to such things as legal representation and rights, grace 
period following birth within which they can change their mind, and compensation is 
guaranteed should they fail to produce a child among other (Panitch 2013: 332). These 
entitlements are not available for the Indian surrogates, and payment is contingent on the 
delivery of a healthy baby.30  
We can also add the fact that brokers or agencies make profit in this intersection 
of biotechnology and inequality is comparable to the exploitative role of pimps in the 
commercial sex industry. As described earlier, stark socioeconomic inequalities 
characterise the surrogacy industry in India. In the absence of institutionalized practices 
or regulations to provide oversight and demand transparency, recruiting agencies will 
likely exploit the surrogates. The weak regulations (or absence of) allows agents to be a 
major force in determining the benefits of the surrogacy process comparable to the way 
pimps control where and how prostitution is done, and how the benefits are distributed. 
Agencies and clinic owners are equivalent to managers and owners of sweatshops since 
they have the primary responsibility for their workers’ wages and other working 
conditions since they are causally responsible for setting wage levels and the other work 
conditions (Snyder 2010: 194). In my view, the agents, alongside the commissioning 
parents exploit the surrogate mothers because they both benefit by taking advantage of 
the surrogate mothers’ vulnerability and dependence. In addition, the social and cultural 
                                                             
30 According to Chief Judge John Pascoe, head of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and an expert on 
surrogacy, there is anecdotal evidence that commissioning parents would not accept babies with defects 
and problems (Associated Press 2014). The famous Baby Gamma case is therefore not an isolated incidence 
in the surrogacy Industry in Asia. Baby Gamma was left by Australian commissioning parents because he 
was born with Down Syndrome but they took his healthy twin sister. See Murdoch 2014. 
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environment of the surrogates heighten the injustices of conventional trade present in 
surrogacy and enable ‘exploitative’ contracts as surrogacy is often done in secret because 
of the taboo surrounding surrogacy (Shetty 2012:1633). In other words, surrogacy does 
not resonate with social, moral or religious values of most of the societies in India making 
some to keep their pregnancies from neighbours and community (Pande 2010: 297).  
 According to the proposed vulnerability account, surrogate mothers in India are 
exploited if their interactors benefit by taking advantage of their conditions of 
vulnerability and the relationship of dependence that develops between A and B. That is, 
contractual conditions for surrogate mothers in India and comparable places are 
exploitative if the surrogate mothers have threats to their welfare interests and the cost of 
refusing or exiting the relationship with A is high as this relationship represents the best 
option available for securing their wellbeing. A relationship of dependence means that 
surrogacy seekers and their agents command a position of advantage and power since 
they can secure the threatened welfare interests of the surrogate mothers. The point here 
is that we should not only think about the fairness of compensation in terms of the amount 
paid but in how that compensation materializes and how other benefits and burdens are 
distributed compared to other surrogacy agreements. This approach is much better than 
Wilkinson’s or Humbryd’s that establish the fairness of the compensation by focusing on 
the figures and view underpayment as an adequate indicator for the occurrence of 
exploitation.  
 Going beyond the figures resonates with our intuition about sweatshop labour that 
it is not problematic because of the underpayment, which is often times justified because 
it is better than nothing at all or the available options and within legal requirements such 
as minimum wage. The exploitation of sweatshop labour includes the conditions under 
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which the labourers work such as unsafe working conditions. In short, to determine the 
occurrence of exploitation we need to consider not only the distribution of the benefits in 
terms of payment, but also the distribution of other benefits such as protections through 
work conditions and what enables such types of distributions, which according to this 
exploitation theory is the vulnerability and dependence of the surrogate mothers. 
 To determine the occurrence of exploitation in surrogacy arrangements in India, 
we need to establish whether the benefit that accrues to the adoptive parents and their 
agents derives from taking advantage of the vulnerability and dependence of surrogate 
mothers. We therefore need to describe in what ways the surrogate mothers in India are 
vulnerable and how the relationship between the commission parents/agents and the 
surrogate mothers is a relationship of dependence. As per the definition of vulnerability 
in this work, the surrogates are vulnerable because they have threats to their welfare 
interests. The threats to their welfare interests make the surrogate mothers accept to work 
under comprimised or substandard contractual terms and conditions only to secure their 
welfare interests. A variety of factors causes the vulnerability of these women and the 
extent of their vulnerability is heightened by their lack of alternatives that may help them 
secure their threatened welfare interests.  According to the literature on surrogacy in India, 
typical surrogate mothers have limited education or are illiterate, have two or more 
children, they live below the poverty line, and have no access to other as well-paying jobs 
(Mukherjee 2015). As Gupta puts it, the choice for surrogacy is “made in a context of 
limited possibilities for self-expression or development, rising unemployment, lack of 
financial resources, low education levels, poverty, marginalisation in labour and job 
markets, and patriarchal social and family structures” (Gupta 2012: 16). These conditions 
explain the various ways in which surrogate mothers are specifically vulnerable unlike 
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their counterparts in the United States and other developed countries. Unlike surrogates 
in India, surrogates in the United States engage in surrogacy to help others and provide 
them the time to pursue other interests such as furthering their education, not due to an 
absence of other equally remunerable options (Panitch 2013: 332). These conditions 
surrounding the surrogate mothers in India threaten their welfare interests, and they lack 
the abilities and means to protect these interests. This vulnerability renders them open to 
advantage taking as they seek to secure their interests. That is, surrogacy seekers and their 
agents have an ability to influence the surrogate mothers’ wellbeing. By way of analogy, 
surrogacy is to the surrogate mothers in India what the factory in the Pacific Rim country 
example is to the workers, or the tow track driver is to the stranded motorists providing 
an opportunity for securing welfare interests. 
 Further, the lack of legal representation for surrogate mothers also amplifies their 
vulnerable conditions. The lack of legal representation coupled with the lack of functional 
legal instruments further threatens the surrogate mother’s welfare interests. That is, the 
lack of legal representation and legal instruments expose the surrogate mothers to 
exploitation because this lack and/or absence denies the surrogate mothers certain rights 
and protections in surrogacy agreements. The lack of such protections through 
representation and instruments make surrogate mothers carry more burdens by working 
under terms and conditions that are adverse. For example, in a bid to minimise costs, 
surrogate mothers are often given poor accommodation. Panitch states that some 
surrogates are “housed in clinical compounds where all of their meals and activities are 
monitored, and from which they are not permitted to leave until delivery” (Panitch 2013: 
282). Amrita Pande (2014: 122) reports that sometimes surrogates deliver the babies 
through caesarian section than natural delivery partly to accommodate the scheduling 
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needs of the intended parents and the clinic. It is thus clear that the commissioning parents 
and their agents implement contracts in ways that cannot be possible in the developed 
countries. Such skewed contractual terms are only possible because of the vulnerability 
and dependence of the potential surrogate mothers partly caused by lack basic legal 
protections. Largely, the low costs and skewed contracts in surrogacy agreements are 
possible because the conditions of poor legal representation and protection for the women 
confer an advantage to their interactors.  
 As argued in this vulnerability account, exploitative exchanges require a 
relationship of dependence between the interactors. A can exploit B if and only if B has 
to interact with A to protect her welfare interests because the cost of not interacting A is 
greater than zero. Surrogate mothers thus become dependent because surrogacy presents 
to the surrogates the best option available under their condition of vulnerability. The 
surrogates cannot meet their own needs without the assistance of other agents, in this 
case, commissioning parents and their agents. Surrogate mothers thus enter into a 
relationship of dependence with surrogacy seekers because the arrangement secures their 
wellbeing better than the status quo. For instance, poverty generally threatens the 
surrogate mothers’ welfare interests. Lack of better job opportunities or alternatives, 
compounded by illiteracy, which renders surrogate mothers not very employable; takes 
away their capacity to meet their needs making surrogacy arrangements the best available 
avenue through which they can secure their wellbeing. The surrogate mothers thus enter 
into a relationship of dependence insofar as they cannot exit or refuse a relationship 
because of the cost to their threatened interests in the same way man trapped at the bottom 




 Further, the surrogate mothers’ dependence is evident that opting out of the 
arrangement is disadvantageous than taking the contract because securing the contract is 
the best prospect through which they can secure their wellbeing. Surrogacy is in this case 
the best opportunity for securing their wellbeing compared to other possible avenues in 
the same way the factory offers better wages than the minimum wage of $1, or how the 
Tuskegee trial offers something that is otherwise unavailable to the subjects. In short, 
surrogacy provides the vulnerable women with a means of securing their welfare interests 
in the best ways possible compared to other alternatives available to them. As described 
earlier, Indian surrogates earn much more than what they could earn in other forms of 
work that may be available to them. Using Frank Lovett’s description of a social 
relationship of dependence, the cost of exiting or not entering this surrogacy arrangement 
is greater for the surrogate mothers than remaining in it (Lovett 2010: 51). That is, the 
women risk suffering from the various effects of poverty by not taking or by opting out 
of a surrogacy contract with no hope of change for themselves and their families. 
Surrogacy arrangements enable the surrogate mothers to send their children to school or 
generally provide for their families in better ways than when they choose to take other 
jobs if at all available to them. Thus, surrogacy arrangements are a source of refuge under 
their conditions of vulnerability that makes them accept terms and conditions that they 
otherwise would not accept. The ability to secure one’s welfare interests, in essence, 
determine the level of dependency. In other words, the levels of vulnerability determine 
the levels of dependency and consequently one’s exploitability. This understanding offers 
us a way of arguing that the exploitation of surrogate mothers in India is as a result of 
their being vulnerable and dependent unlike their counterparts in the developed world. 
Their counterparts in developed countries such as the Unites States may be vulnerable but 
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are not dependent on their interactors to meet their needs. In other words, surrogate 
mothers cannot be exploited if they can secure their wellbeing through other means as 
those that are available to their counterparts in the developed countries including state 
security and/or social provision. By this account, then, exploitation is a function of the 
levels of vulnerability and dependence.  
 The vulnerability and dependence of the women puts them at a disadvantage in 
bargaining their surrogacy contracts. As mentioned earlier, surrogacy contracts offer 
more protection to the women’s welfare interests than other forms of opportunities 
available to them. That is, losing or not getting a surrogacy contract is costly to the 
surrogate mothers. This inequality between the transactors contributes to the unfair 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of the contract. That is, unfair distribution is 
possible because the women have threatened welfare interests and stand to lose if they 
fail to interact with A to secure their wellbeing. As argued earlier, exploitation in 
surrogacy is beyond matters of compensation. It is evident that focusing on payment alone 
does not properly establish unfairness let alone exploitation. Adoptive parents do not only 
get surrogacy services at a considerably low cost, a third of what it would cost in the 
developed world where most of the surrogacy seekers originate. The adoptive parents 
enjoy terms and conditions of the contract that are more favourable to them than to the 
surrogate mothers. For instance, while surrogacy seekers obtain an agreement quickly and 
easily without too much red-tape or procedure because of lack of regulations, surrogate 
mothers cannot do the same without harming their own interests. In other words, the 
surrogate mother does not have much of the luxury to consider the terms and conditions 
of the arrangement that if she should be careful to avoid a bad contract. What is available 
to the surrogate is as is and there are no significant differences between surrogacy 
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contracts. In addition, the availability of a host of potential surrogates entails that the 
surrogate will lose the opportunity to secure her interests to other potential surrogates if 
she takes time to bargain. Using Marxist description, the availability of a surplus 
population constitutes “a disposable industrial reserve army” that available to transact 
with A and giving bargaining advantage to A (Marx 2013: 440). 
 Surrogacy is often exploitative when it is easier to replace B in a surrogacy 
arrangement than it is to replace A which is the case in India. The imbalance between 
demand and supply tips the scales against the surrogate mothers in the bargaining 
situation while working in favour of the surrogacy seekers giving them an opportunity for 
advantage taking. The availability of many women who can become surrogate mothers 
gives an advantage to the surrogacy seekers and their agents. Unlike B, A has alternatives 
and can thus easily walk away from a surrogacy arrangement that does not suit him or 
her. A is accordingly in a position of advantage and power compared to B while B is 
disadvantaged (by comparison with A) to influence the terms and conditions of the 
contract. A relationship of dependence is also sustained because what B desires from this 
contract is more vital to his or her welfare interests than A’s interests. In other words, this 
relationship is sustained because it is more costly for B than it is for A to decline or to 
leave this arrangement. Advantage taking would not be possible if A’s interests were 
more threatened than B’s, or if their interests were equally threatened. That is, if both 
parties’ interests were equally threatened the relationship between the interactors would 
be of interdependence rather than dependence. The surrogacy relationship as described 
now is thus similar to the basis of Goodin’s caution that it is inappropriate to play for 
advantage against others who are not our match in games of advantage (Goodin 1988: 
146). The case of surrogacy contracts involves vastly disproportionate bargaining power, 
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which makes it inappropriate or unfair for the commissioning parents and their agents to 
press for advantage against vulnerable women leading to unfair distribution of the 
benefits and burdens. Thus, surrogacy under these conditions is exploitative because it 
involves benefiting by taking unfair advantage of the women’s vulnerability and 
dependence. 
 The case of surrogacy is, as earlier mentioned, similar to that of workers in the 
Pacific Rim example. Like the workers’, the surrogates’ welfare interests are not secure 
largely also because their governments do not fulfil their obligations to adequately 
provide for and protect the people’s welfare interests. Both the workers and the surrogate 
mothers lack opportunities and alternatives to help them secure their welfare interests. 
Furthermore, the absence of a minimum wage and laws regulating the surrogacy industry 
in India makes the surrogate mothers more open to advantage taking just like the workers 
in a Pacific Rim country. Thus, in general, the benefits that accrue to A in surrogacy 
arrangements are only possible because of contextual conditions where there are no 
measures to protect and secure welfare interests of the surrogates. For example, lack of a 
minimum wage and the absence of other laws escalate the surrogates’ vulnerability and 
dependence. Broadly, surrogacy contracts in India take place against a backdrop of global 
inequality and constrained options, which are the source of the women’s vulnerability and 
dependence.  
  
Do vulnerable women consent in surrogacy? 
 Other unfair advantage views of exploitation in the discussion of surrogacy 
employ the idea of consent. Such views hold that constrained options or the lack of 
acceptable alternatives constitute consent-compromising factors to the surrogate mothers 
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like in any other transaction. That is, women’s choice to enter into surrogacy contracts is 
made against no other feasible alternatives to secure their interests. The circumstances 
under which transactions or arrangements such as surrogacy are made are sometimes 
viewed as coercive which works against the consent of the surrogate mothers. For 
example, Panitch argues, “we must look beyond the arrangement itself to appreciate its 
coercive nature” (Panitch 2013: 333). Inability to negotiate in a contract, and that the 
contract offer can disappear from the surrogate may indicate some kind of force that the 
makes surrogate mothers accept whatever terms of the contract. On Panitch’s view, “an 
inability to demand better terms is morally equivalent to inability to refuse” (Panitch 
2013: 333). However, this is the case for many other possible agreements or transactions 
on the labour market.  In particular, as Wilkinson (2016: 133) shows, lack of acceptable 
alternatives on its own (when not caused by coercion or other consent-invalidating 
behaviour) is not sufficient to generate a serious consent problem. Hawkins and 
Emmanuel similarly argue that merely possessing few good options does not undermine 
the voluntariness of choice (Hawkins & Emanuel 2008: 8). For example, individuals who 
need a transplant or major surgery confront a bleak set of options yet opting for a 
transplant is under the circumstances neither involuntary nor coerced. Until we establish 
the occurrence of coercion or other forms of manipulation, it is hard to see how the 
surrogate mother’s consent is at issue. Wertheimer expresses similar views arguing that 
surrogacy contracts are consensual because the offer does not threaten to make the 
surrogate worse off than she would otherwise have been if she turns down the offer 
(Wertheimer 1996: 109). Wertheimer further views that coercion would only happen if A 
had a pre-existing obligation to improve B’s circumstances without demanding anything 
in return (Wertheimer 1996: 110). Wertheimer explains his view using Nozick’s 
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drowning example where A come upon B who is drowning and proposes to rescue B if B 
agrees to pay A $10,000. Both A and B know that there are no other rescuers. Wertheimer 
argues that A’s offer is not coercive because B has no acceptable alternatives but rather 
because A may have an obligation to improve B’s situation without seeking 
compensation, or at least for much less (Ibid 110). A in the drowning example makes B 
worse off where A has a special obligation to help. This offer is  not coercive in the same 
way a doctor does not coerce a patient when the doctor tells the patient to choose between 
having his or her leg amputated or risk dying. In short, for Wertheimer surrogates are not 
coerced because commissioning parents do not make the surrogates worse off and do not 
have special obligation to help the surrogate without asking anything in return. 
Wertheimer (1996: 111) also dismisses the background conditions as factors that 
compromise the voluntariness of choice. He see the problem in background conditions 
and not in the offer that allows B to improve on those background conditions. However, 
we may draw similarities between the drowning B in Wertheimer example and the 
surrogate mothers in India. That is, the circumstances of dire need surrounding the 
mothers are comparable to B in the drowning example and the same special obligation 
that A has to help without asking anything in return can be establish between transactors 
in surrogacy arrangements. 
 A related consent view in charges of exploitation in surrogacy suggests that 
surrogacy offers cannot be refused under the circumstances. That is, the Indian women 
become surrogate mothers out of dire socioeconomic need, or are only financially induced 
to agree to surrogacy contracts and thus do not genuinely consent. Wertheimer calls such 
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consent distorting offers seductive offers (Wertheimer 2010: 212). 31  That is, some 
inducements compromise the surrogates’ consent and hence somehow involuntarily 
venture into surrogacy. However, payment to surrogate mothers is not different from 
other financial inducements in terms of payment in other forms of work. Payments largely 
influence all commercial agreements. For example, offering payment for digging a pit is 
a financial inducement for B to take the job. One may take this job without considering 
the long-term effects of such hard labour on the body because of the need to satisfy needs 
that are presently threatened. It is also difficult to sustain the view that the surrogate’s 
consent is impaired because the offer is something they cannot refuse. Private and 
international employers, for example, often offer more than local and public employers 
but we rarely raise an issue about consent. On such consideration, consent may not be the 
real problem in surrogacy because as Perdue argues, “surrogacy bears no more risk of 
exploitation than other money-making means, such as exotic dancing, posing for 
pornographic magazines” (Perdue 2011: 291). Like in any other contract or transaction, 
the surrogate mother expresses her consent by taking up the contract, and doing so may 
be a rational choice that takes into account her welfare interests and aspirations after 
assessing possible alternatives. 
 Other consent based exploitation charges in surrogacy refer to factors such as 
illiteracy as consent comprimising. That is, surrogacy arrangements target uneducated 
and illiterate women to minimise costs (Panitch 2013: 283). Surrogacy arrangements are 
thus in these societies more problematic than in developed societies because the 
surrogates may lack capacity and information to give valid consent. For instance, the 
                                                             
31 Wertheimer (2010: 212) defines seductive offers as “offers where the lure of short-term benefits causes 




contracts are often in English, a language that most surrogates do not understand and rely 
on brokers or recruiters for the interpretation and understanding of the contracts (Pande 
2014). It may thus be difficult for the surrogates to understand what the arrangement 
involves including the benefits and risks. There is also a good chance that these contracts 
are only explained in an attractive way since surrogacy is only a business that the clinics 
and their agents seek to profit from by recruiting surrogate mothers.  
However, while acknowledging that consent issues are a source of moral concern, 
I argue that lack of consent is not the basis for concluding that commercial surrogacy is 
exploitative. The consent arguments in exploitation miss the point because, as argued 
earlier, lack of consent is not a necessary condition for exploitation even though it is 
something that we need to pay attention to in transactions. What makes these surrogacy 
contracts exploitative is that A derives a benefit by taking unfair advantage of B’s 
vulnerability and dependence. In our case, surrogacy seekers use the vulnerability and 
dependence of Indian women to get cheap surrogacy services. The cost of surrogacy is 
cheap and without adequate regulations in countries such as India because the women are 
poor, illiterate and caught in circumstances where they have no access to a range paying 
jobs. Moreover, these women exist in the economies that tilt favourably towards men. 
That is, their patriarchal societies push women into their socially designed position of 
homemakers or minders. The agents and commissioning parents derive benefits by taking 
advantage of such contextual conditions. Poverty and its effects make women vulnerable 
and therefore become dependent on their transactors because they represent the best 
option available to secure their wellbeing. The women’s lack of capacity to protect their 
wellbeing, as they are less educated or illiterate, make them dependent on those offering 
surrogacy contracts to secure their wellbeing. Thus, commercial surrogacy in this context 
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constitutes exploitation insofar as the commissioning parents and the brokers benefit by 
taking advantage of the surrogate mother’s vulnerability to poverty and its related effects, 
and their dependence on their transactors to secure their interests.  
 We may find such surrogacy arrangements morally reprehensible, as it is similar 
to taking advantage of a blind person hinting at the basis of Goodin’s caution that we 
ought not to enter into games of advantage with people who are unfit or otherwise unable 
to play in games of advantage (Goodin 1988: 145). However, the surrogates are willing 
to play the game because they have real threats to their welfare interests including 
existential threats. The levels of vulnerability make the women dependent on these 
surrogacy opportunities to secure their welfare interests even when their interactor takes 
advantage of them. One would want to argue that these conditions are not caused by 
surrogacy seekers, and in fact, they should be encouraged for providing an extra option 
than being accused of exploiting the women. However, the way in which these women 
are exploited is comparable to how we may charge a passer-by of exploiting a drowning 
B by demanding compensation to rescue B who was out of sight of a sleeping lifeguard.32 
The lifeguard flouts the duty of rescue, and the passer-by takes advantage of this omission 
to derive profit, in the same way, commissioning parents take advantage of the failure of 
a third party – the state, to fulfil its obligations towards the people (Panitch 2013: 334). 
Unsecured welfare interest makes the women lose their bargaining ability. In short, the 
exploitation of a person is not contingent on the source of their vulnerability. Chances for 
exploitation are present wherever conditions of vulnerability and relationships of 
dependence exist. Exploitation is thus more likely in the Indian surrogacy industry 
because the conditions of vulnerability and dependence are high and more prevalent.   
                                                             





 The conditions for women entering surrogacy arrangements in India are a cause 
for concern because they provide a conducive environment for exploitation. Surrogacy 
arrangements are exploitative when commissioning parents and their agents benefit by 
taking advantage of the conditions of vulnerability and relationships of dependence that 
women enter. In other words, A benefits by simultaneously taking advantage of the threats 
to the B’s welfare interests and B’s inability to exit or refuse a relationship or interaction 
with A which represents the best available option for securing B’s wellbeing. The 
surrogacy contracts in India, as described, meet all the conditions for exploitation: benefit, 
conditions of vulnerability, and relationships of dependence. Thus, I dismiss 
underpayment, unequal distribution and lack consent as necessary to determine the 
occurrence of exploitation in commercial surrogacy arrangements.  
 Commissioning parents seek surrogacy services in developing countries because 
it is possible to reduce the cost of surrogacy when dealing with surrogates whose interests 
are threatened and lack the capacity to protect their wellbeing whether through lack of 
education, lack of options or legal protection among others. The surrogacy industry in 
developing countries thus thrives on the low costs of services and less stringent 
contractual terms and conditions that are premised on the vulnerability and dependence 
of women. In other words, the benefits that accrue to the commissioning parents (and 
their agents) such as low cost derive from the taking advantage of the vulnerability and 
dependence of the surrogate mothers. The surrogates enter into surrogacy because the 
contracts provide the only feasible or best option for securing their interests. The 
conditions as described above are not acceptable and probably do exist in the developed 
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countries as there exist laws and regulations to protect welfare interests of the surrogates, 
and in particular, the potential surrogates are not as vulnerable and dependent as their 
counterparts in India.   
 Moreover, surrogacy arrangements operate under conditions of conventional trade 
where the poorest or weakest producers experience different forms of injustices. 
Surrogacy operates in the same manner as free trade where large corporations maximise 
profits by minimising the payments to producers. Surrogacy arrangements are thus more 
beneficial to healthcare providers, agencies, and commissioning parents than they are to 
surrogate mothers. The regulation gap creates conditions that increase the vulnerability 
of women and thus enables the adverse conditions for the surrogate mothers hence 
exploitable by wealthier individuals. As Sarojini and her co-authors observe, commercial 
gestation surrogacy “has the potential to be unethical and exploitative as the seemingly 
free flow of people, capital, goods and services take place, and is made possible at all, 
within global relations that are characterized by stark economic inequalities” (Sarojini et 














 Pharmaceutical companies have adopted globalisation as a central component of 
their business modules especially by offshoring clinical trials to developing countries. 
The practice and the translation of these clinical trials raise a variety of ethical concerns 
over the beneficiaries of these trials; the exploitation of research subjects; and whether 
the increase in the number of clinical trials has improved the health of the host 
communities. Moreover, with HIV/AIDS reaching crisis proportions in the developing 
countries and in a rush to develop interventions, pharmaceutical companies flout or 
compromise the established international medical research guidelines. The companies use 
existing social and economic conditions of the research communities to justify their 
research conduct. The problems related to the ethics of conducting clinical research in 
developing countries reveal the implications of global social injustice and economic 
disparity over the ethics of clinical research.   
 The offshoring clinical research appears predatory and exploitative as 
pharmaceutical companies scour the earth to find sick people with whom they conduct 
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research with little or no regard to their welfare interests, in this case, their clinical needs. 
An increasing number of clinical trials in the developing countries take place against the 
background of poverty, limited or no access to health care and the high prevalence rates 
of illnesses. Illness in the absence of healthcare makes the subjects in developing 
countries particularly vulnerable.  The subjects’ lack of better options to protect their 
welfare interests in health and life leads them into relationships of dependence with 
pharmaceutical corporations. The argument is that pharmaceutical corporations and/or 
their agents exploit their research subjects when they derive benefit by taking advantage 
of the vulnerability and dependence of the subjects (patients) and/or their communities.  
In other words, exploitation in clinical research occurs when pharmaceutical corporations 
(and their agents) pursue financial interests by taking advantage of threats to subjects’ 
clinical needs and/or other welfare interests and the subjects’ lack of better options for 
securing their welfare interests. While acknowledging that there is nothing intrinsically 
wrong in conducting research in developing countries, the conditions affecting the 
subjects are a cause of concern. This chapter holds that clinical research trials are likely 
to be exploitative when subjects are affected by social, economic, psychological, cultural 
or medical misfortunes and lack of alternatives for securing welfare interests. 
 This chapter employs the vulnerability theory of exploitation to demonstrate how 
clinical trials are exploitative by analysing some examples of clinical trials in developing 
countries. The chapter argues that benefits that accrue to the researchers by using 
placebos, applying double standards, and not making reasonable posttrial availability of 
drugs/interventions among others in clinical research in developing countries are possible 
because of the vulnerability and dependence of the research subjects. The application is 
to demonstrate that the vulnerability theory is a more adequate theory of exploitation to 
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account for exploitation in clinical research than other theories of exploitation employed 
in the discussion of the ethics of clinical research. This chapter also demonstrates how a 
vulnerability theory of exploitation addresses some of the concerns that emanate from 
various uses of the notion of exploitation in clinical research. For example, the argument 
attempts to address Alan Wertheimer’s observation that the exploitation arguments 
advanced in the ethics of clinical research seeking to prohibit such alleged practices move 
quickly without stating explicitly when a practice is exploitative or providing an account 
of exploitation to support their claims (Wertheimer 2008: 64). For the rest of the 
discussion, ‘researchers’ is used in place of pharmaceutical companies, their agents such 
as contract research organisations (CROs) and investigators. The terms clinical research 
and clinical trials are also used interchangeably. 
 The discussion starts by describing what constitutes clinical trials and what has 
propelled the proliferation of clinical trials in developing countries by describing the 
conditions under which these trials are conducted in the developing world compared to 
the developed countries. Examples of exploitative trials are outlined to explain different 
exploitation arguments in clinical research. These exploitation arguments are also 
considered to show how they are limited to account for exploitation in clinical research 
because they confuse exploitation with other terms or mistake specific features of the 
transaction between researcher and research subjects for necessary conditions for 
exploitation. Lastly, the chapter use the vulnerability theory to explain how or when 




The proliferation and status of clinical trials in developing countries 
 Clinical trial refers to a phase in medical research involving the testing of products 
under investigations on human subjects after a long process of laboratory and animal 
experiments (Hawkins 2008: 22). Although there are steps in human trials, our concern 
is with the last phase – Phase III, where hundreds or thousands of human subjects are 
enrolled to determine whether a new product will be a useful treatment for the illness or 
condition under investigation. Clinical research also aims to generate knowledge that will 
lead to improvements in medical practice.  
 The process of inventing new, safe, and effective lifesaving medication is 
expensive. Pharmaceutical corporations and other interested investors pay for the 
research and development of new drugs/interventions as well as for elaborate testing and 
the subsequent approval process. Considering the possibility of loss on such investments 
if newly developed medical products turn out to be unsafe or not effective enough, it is 
only prudent for investors in medical research to minimise the costs in the production 
process. Clinical researchers like automakers and apparel manufacturers, thus aim to 
minimise costs by looking elsewhere, namely, the developing countries, where the 
conditions are more favourable for reducing costs and profit making (Shah 2006: 7). The 
developing countries attract clinical research because they mostly have a readily available 
pool of subjects and less regulatory burdens than developed countries (Shah 2006: 7). For 
example, in 2004, GlaxoSmithKline’s CEO claimed $200 million a year in savings due to 
the relocation of around thirty percent of its trial business to “low-cost” countries such as 
Poland and India (Shah 2006: 9). In addition to the mounting financial and regulatory 
burdens of research in wealthy countries, David and Sheila Rothman attribute the 
increased shift of conducting studies in the Third World from the 1990s to the HIV/AIDS 
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epidemic (Rothman & Rothman 2006: 53). That is, the AIDS crisis in developing 
countries has contributed to the growth of drug research to a multi-billion dollar global 
business. The vast majority of people infected with HIV live in low-and-middle-income 
countries with an estimated 66% living in the sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS 2018). The 
presence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, not to mention poor or lack of healthcare provision 
in developing countries and weak regulations, have attracted investors to conduct research 
in these countries. Specifically, the availability of a pool of subjects increases the speed 
at which trials are carried out unlike in developed countries. The lack of or limited 
healthcare also contributes to trouble-free recruitment of participants because the subjects 
view clinical trials as probably the best available opportunities to secure their clinical 
needs by receiving treatment. For instance, in South Africa, Quintiles recruited 3,000 
volunteers for an experimental vaccine study in just nine days (Shah 2006: 9). Lack of 
health care also guarantees that the subjects cannot drop out midway of a trial. For 
example, an executive of New Delhi-based industry trial centre boasted a 99.5 retention 
rate of their enrolled subjects (Shah 2006: 9). Weak or ill-defined regulations for clinical 
research also incentive researchers and investors as less legal red tape saves time and 
therefore costs in the research process. In short, the described conditions in the developing 
countries have contributed to their becoming “a great, global lab” (Ijsselmuiden 2003 
cited in Shah 2006: 10).  Clinical research has therefore evolved into a huge business 
finding its stronghold in developing countries.  
 
Sources of ethical issues in clinical research 
 Clinical research can be subject to unethical practices like all endeavours 
involving the generation and control of enormous financial resources (Okonta 2014: 188). 
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For instance, clinical research offers an opportunity to create new brand-name drugs to 
replace drugs whose patents run out more to serve the corporations' financial interests 
rather than the clinical needs of the subjects and their communities. Some critics point 
out that it is a common practice that “by adding minor variations to their blockbuster 
drugs, companies try to put a ‘new’ product on the market by the time the patent of the 
old drug has expired, thereby preserving their revenue stream” (Fahsi 2013). Such 
practices are possible because pharmaceutical companies enjoy some monopoly protected 
under international patenting laws. Further, the economic power of the pharmaceutical 
corporation is enormous in the face of developing countries such that pharmaceutical 
companies have the capacity to dominate and subjugate people in developing countries. 
The inequality of wealth between these corporations and developing countries also has 
implications on the influence of policy and bargaining as evident in the attempts to halt 
the government promulgating legislation it had passed in 1997 in the PhRMA vs. South 
Africa case (See Fisher & Rigamonti 2005).33 In other words, researchers can make profit 
in the intersection of medical innovation and various forms of inequalities such as 
inequalities of wealth and income and the greater the inequalities the greater the chances 
for profit making. There are striking economic disparities between some developing 
economies and some of the large pharmaceutical corporations. For example, the 2017 
revenues for GlaxoSmithKline and Bayer were $39bn and $29bn respectively 
(Sagonowsky 2018), whilst the World Bank reported that the GNIs for Malawi and 
Lesotho in the same year were $6.160bn and $2.896bn respectively (World Bank 2017). 
Such inequalities create and sustain an environment in which the financial interests of 
                                                             
33 Pharmaceutical companies withdrew their lawsuit in 2001 in a decision that was widely viewed as a 
South African victory. See Sidley 2001 
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researchers matters more than the interests of the communities in which they conduct 
their studies. In such an environment, the clinical needs of the subjects in developing 
countries are often secondary as they are often not the actual beneficiaries of the products 
of the clinical trials.34 This is similar to how locals were not primary and true beneficiaries 
of colonial systems. Thus, the burden of risks of experimentation that subjects shoulder 
has remained the same or perhaps grown.  As Shah (2006: 37) observes, “where there is 
a gap between risks and benefits, the global poor who are the subjects of today’s body 
hunt pay the price.”  
 The above views partly form the bases for some critics’ claims labelling clinical 
research as “pharmaceutical colonialism” because researchers wield similar power as the 
colonial powers of previous centuries. Tanya Lyons (2009: 1) describes pharmaceutical 
colonialism as “the activities of some pharmaceutical companies and their contract 
research organisations (CROs) that involve exploiting the sickness and poverty of weak 
and/or developing states.” Jean-Phillipe Chipaux (2005) considers such actions of 
pharmaceutical corporations in developing countries as a form of ‘strategic imperialism’ 
where foreign forces (pharmaceutical companies), target a particular resource (poor, sick, 
treatment naïve populations) to extract the profits (data for new drug approvals) without 
colonising an entire country. Lyons further describes the activities of pharmaceutical 
companies in Africa as amounting to what she terms ‘Globonialism’: 
                                                             
34 It is important here to acknowledge that since the 1990s anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs have become widely 
available in developing countries, so in this particular case people in developing countries have benefitted 
from the associated clinical research. However, despite some notable efforts in some of these countries to 
use domestic funding and access generic products, responses to HIV/AIDs remain hugely donor driven. As 
a consequence, developing countries are, strictly speaking, beneficiaries of philanthropic donations, since 
the researchers sell the drugs to these donors rather than making the ARVs reasonably available. 
Philanthropic donations have notably increased after a 7% decrease in funding from developed countries 
between 2015 and 2016 (UNAIDS 2017). 
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“a combination of globalization hindering state strength to benefit only global 
corporations, in the process of extracting clinical data from sick patients in 
vulnerable communities, to support scientific evidence to gain approvals for drugs 
mainly designed to be marketed in Western countries, but in drugs trials that 
would either not  be approved ethically in the West, and if they were, receive 
no volunteers” (Lyons 2009: 1).  
The above shows that the ethical concerns about conducting clinical research revolve 
around issues of conflict between the financial interests of researchers and the clinical 
needs of the subjects and their communities. There are also concerns about the effects of 
inequalities in bargaining situation and how the subjects that are weakened by their 
socioeconomic conditions. Such general concerns form the bases for different 
exploitation arguments.   
 
Examples of exploitative clinical trials in developing countries 
  The following are examples of clinical trials conducted in developing countries 
that involves violations of basic moral norms and flout international medical research 
guidelines. They are also considered exploitative but for various reasons as will be 
explained in the attempt to establish why the trials are actually exploitative on the 
vulnerability account.    
1. HIV/AIDS Drug Trials: In the search for an effective and affordable 
drug for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS 
(PMTCTT - also known as prevention of vertical transmission), the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) in 1994 approved randomised 
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control trials (RCTs) of shorter and simpler regimens of Zidovudine 
(AZT) against a placebo control. These trials were conducted after the 
AIDS Clinical Trial Group (ACTG) study 076 discovered and 
validated the preventive use of AZT as an active drug. The average 
cost for the full AZT regimen was $1000 per woman. The regimen was 
out of reach for most infected women, the majority of whom live in 
developing countries with approximately $10 or less per person annual 
health budgets (Grady 1998: 35, cited in Hawkins & Emanuel 2008: 
1). For example, around the period of the study, Uganda’s annual 
health budget was as low as $3 per person while in Malawi; the cost 
of the dosage for one HIV-infected woman around the same time was 
more than 600 times the annual per capita allocation for health care 
(Varmus & Satcher 1997: 1004).  
 Sixteen trials were designed, and fourteen were conducted in 
eleven developing countries that could not afford the available 
standard treatment (Hawkins & Emanuel 2008: 2). All trials in 
developing countries involved the use of placebos except in one 
conducted in Thailand where a shorter regimen of AZT was used. In 
the other two trials of the sixteen performed in the United States, 
subjects in all the study groups had access to AZT and other 
antiretroviral drugs (Lurie and Wolfe 1997: 853). The use of placebos 
in developed countries such as the United States is not allowed when 
a proven effective drug exists (Shah 2006: 21). The use of placebos is 
also against the Helsinki Declaration, which requires that trial 
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participants receive the best-proven therapy as a comparator in clinical 
trials (World Medical Association 2013 section 33). A variety of 
similar clinical trials using placebos continues to be carried out with 
the aim of gaining approval for marketing for new drugs when other 
effective drugs exist. The new drugs or interventions more often than 
not tend to be too expensive to be reasonably available and affordable 
for the indefinite future in the host countries. This means that such 
trials lose track of their objective to develop effective but affordable 
drugs in addition to that these types of trials are not permissible in 
developed countries.  
2. The Havrix Trial: In 1990, Smithkline Beecham Biologicals conducted 
tests for Hepatitis A vaccine (Havrix) on 40,000 Thai children. Due to 
competing vaccination priorities and the available health care budget 
in Thailand, and considering the cost of a newly developed hepatitis A 
vaccine, it was unlikely that Havrix would be included in Thailand’s 
national immunisation program in which vaccines are provided to the 
population at no cost in the near future (Hawkins & Emanuel 2008: 
56). The researchers made no commitment to provide free Havrix 
vaccine to Thailand after the trial, and it was recognised at the start of 
the trial that the largest market for Havrix would be travellers from 
developed countries to developing countries. Critics accused the Thai 
government and medical community of national betrayal in allowing 
the exploitation of Thai children (Hawkins & Emanuel 2008: 58).  
172 
 
3. The Surfaxin Trial: In 2000, a United States drug company planned to 
conduct a trial for a new drug for Respiratory Distress Syndrome 
(RDS). The drug company and the Federal Drug Agency (FDA) 
deliberated on an acceptable study design to demonstrate the 
superiority of Surfaxin to existing drugs such as Exosurf. However, 
after some considerations, a placebo-controlled trial was proposed to 
be conducted in Bolivia, where RDS continues to be responsible for at 
least 30 percent of neonatal deaths (Hawkin & Emanuel 2008: 59). A 
placebo of sham air was used in the study when there were already 
four proven surfactants. Surfactant therapy costs about $1100 - $2400 
precluding it as a viable option for most infants in Latin America 
where per capita annual health spending ranges from $60 to $140. 
“The principal target market for the drug was the United States and 
Europe, and the sponsor had no specific plans for marketing Surfaxin 
in Latin America” (Hawkins 2008: 61). In a similar trial, children in 
Zambia shouldered the burden for Nitazoxanide's development as a 
treatment for Cryptosporidium and Giardia, but they are hardly 
beneficiaries of the advantages of the drugs. Five years after the 
University Teaching Hospital had run the trial for Romark, they still 
had no supply of the drug and clinicians do not even bother trying to 
diagnose Cryptosporidiosis in children with diarrhoea. Further, the 




Exploitation in Clinical Research 
 Lessons from clinical studies such as the Nuremberg, Tuskegee, and Willowbrook 
research projects have led to significant changes in medical research conduct. These 
studies represent some of the medical research horrors in the long history of abuse and 
maltreatment of human subjects in biomedical research that are also considered 
exploitative.35 The Nuremberg trials involved gross violations of medical authority and 
basic moral norms by Nazi doctors’ experiments on nonconsenting concentration camps 
inmates, which culminated in the Nuremberg trials of 1946 (Wendler 2017). The 
Tuskegee trial was a 40 years-long study of untreated syphilis on poor Black men in 
America running between 1932 - 1972 merely to study the natural progression of the 
disease (Brandt 1978: 21 – 29). The Willowbrook hepatitis experiments involved the use 
of mentally disabled children by deliberately infecting the kids with a hepatitis virus to 
track the development of the viral infection and to test the effectiveness of gamma 
globulin injection as protection for hepatitis (Krugman 1986: 157 -162).  
 Despite the significant changes to address the ills of clinical research occasioned 
by these historic cases among others, the charge of exploitation continue to feature in 
contemporary ethics of clinical research. This may not be surprising because clinical 
research trials comparable to three described clinical trials continue to be carried out in 
developing countries. Clinical trials in developing countries are often carried out in ways 
that may not be permissible by international clinical standards that aspire to protect 
subjects from abusive research. In other words, some of the clinical trials in the 
developing countries can to some the extent be called them the new ‘Tuskegee’ trials. For 
                                                             




example, in the late 1990s, a Tuskegee-like government trial was exposed in India, in 
which researchers purposely withheld treatment from eleven hundred mostly illiterate 
women with precancerous lesions on their cervixes to study the inevitable progression of 
the disease (Shah 2006: 112 – 113). Shah also reports that at least fifteen different trials, 
testing experimental interventions to block mother to child HIV infection in developing 
countries, compared active drugs (even half doses of it) with a placebo which in her view 
is similar to purposeful withholding of treatment (Shah 2006: 90). Medical anthropologist 
and physician Jim Yong Kim considers this continuing trend of research as the 
exploitation of “the other”, a type of “global Tuskegee experiment” (Farmer 1999: 35).  
 
When are clinical trials exploitative? 
 There are a variety of ethical concerns about clinical research in developing 
countries including the worry that some clinical trials exploit the research subjects and 
their communities. However, the meaning of exploitation in clinical research is as 
contested as the occurrence of exploitation is determined by different conditions. As noted 
in the Chapter 1, the concept of exploitation remains a source of debate, as there is no 
uniform meaning or consistent use of the concept even in specified fields such as 
bioethics. That is, even in fields such as bioethics, the concept of exploitation is misused 
or confused with other concepts such as coercion, lack of informed consent and harm. 
Nevertheless, utilising the concept of exploitation has helped to unify “diffuse, disjointed, 
and even incoherent concerns about research in developing countries into a single, clear 
issue” (Hawkins & Emanuel 2008: 13). Several trials have been pronounced exploitative 
over the past three decades by some international guidelines albeit not having a uniform 
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interpretation of exploitation.36 Some views about exploitation in clinical research simply 
make reference to international guidelines such as the Declaration of Helsinki of the 
World Medical Association, or the World Health Organization Guidelines for Good 
Clinical Practice, and others refer to the Council for International Organisation of Medical 
Sciences (CIOMS) guidelines to mention a few.  
 One prominent argument on what makes clinical trials exploitative or not utilises 
the idea of informed consent. Briefly, the argument holds that clinical trials are not 
exploitative when the subjects give their informed consent to participate in clinical trials. 
In other words, exploitation does not occur in clinical trials that obtain the informed 
consent of the participants by making them aware of all the risks involved in the clinical 
trial. For instance, Miller and Brody (2002: 5) argue that subjects are not exploited when 
they are adequately informed and understand that they are volunteering to participate in 
an experiment and they are not exposed to excessive risk. Perhaps underlying such views 
is the thought that harm is not done to patients that are informed and consenting as 
captured in the ancient saying ‘no injustice is being done to the willing’. However, some 
critics have argued that in the context of developing countries, this view faces significant 
problems because the subjects are usually poor and uneducated which may compromise 
consent or make it non-existent altogether. Firstly, informed consent is compromised 
because illiterate subjects simply cannot grasp what is presented to them (Campbell 2009: 
1). Since the subjects are mostly ‘uneducated’, they cannot understand things such as 
aims or instruments of the study. For example, the documents for informed consent have 
                                                             
36 For examples of other unethical trials See “Briefing paper on ethics in clinical trials, #1 Examples of 
Unethical Trials”, February 2008, 
http://www.somo.nl/html/paginas/pdf/Examples_of_unethical_trials_dec_2006_NL.pdf,  accessed 12 
November, 2016  
176 
 
evolved from promoting ethical research to more of legal documents that are difficult to 
read and decipher its contents and more or less used to indemnify the researchers from 
litigation because of the increasingly litigious culture emerging in Western societies.  
Secondly, under the subjects’ conditions of poverty, where there is little or no healthcare, 
is it possible to obtain informed consent while at the same have questionable voluntariness 
of choice because the subjects have to choose between an opportunity to healthcare and 
none at all. That is, even when the subjects give standard informed consent to participate 
in trials, they may not necessarily volunteer because of their context where there are no 
acceptable options for basic health care. While concerns about illiteracy and poverty are 
worthy consideration in clinical trials, lack of informed consent or compromised informed 
consent due other reasons does not provide a good basis for a charge of exploitation as 
exploitation can occur even when subjects give informed consent to participate in the 
trials. In addition, lack of acceptable alternatives on its own is not sufficient to generate 
a serious consent problem (Wilkinson 2016: 133).  Merely possessing few good options 
does not undermine the voluntariness of choice (Hawkins & Emanuel 2008: 8). The 
explanations of the stranded motorist and factory examples illustrate how the occurrence 
of exploitation does not depend on lack of informed consent. B in both examples is 
exploited regardless of the fact that B makes a decision to enter into a transaction well 
aware of the factors surrounding their choice including the lack of acceptable options. 
 Thomas Pogge’s (2008) example of a successful United States filmmaker and 
fishing boat sinking in calm waters better illustrates the above point. In Pogge’s case, the 
filmmaker intends to film what would happen to the crew of the sinking boat and show 
the documentary in wealthier countries to sensitise people on panic behaviour and a 
person’s survival time in ocean water (Pogge 2008: 109). While scouring radio airwaves, 
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the filmmaker gets a distress call from a fishing vessel at sea and proposes to the crew to 
flip a coin to decide whether to rescue them or film them drowning. The crew accepts the 
offer because the value of the 50% chance of survival is far much greater than drowning. 
The result of the coin flip is that she does not rescue the crew but film them drowning. 
The crew agreed to the filmmaker’s proposal and understood the risks or consequences, 
but it would be odd not to think of this as exploitation. One can argue that the situation of 
the research subjects in developing countries resemble that of the sinking crew. Research 
subjects are thus on this view exploited regardless of their consenting to participate in 
clinical trials because their circumstances are very peculiar in the same way as those of 
the boat’s crew or the man at bottom of pit facing mudslides in the deep pit example.  
 Some critics of the clinical trials in developing countries argue that such trials are 
exploitative because they exhibit some lowering of practical and ethical standards 
indicating the application of double standards. For example, the use of placebos instead 
of an existing proven drug or the established standard of care as the Surfaxin example 
illustrates. Researchers are not allowed to use of placebos controlled trials in developed 
countries when one form of effective therapy for an illness or a condition exists. On the 
other hand, placebos controlled trials sponsored by corporations or other investors 
including governments from wealthy countries are prevalent in developing countries. 
According to Lurie and Wolfe (1997: 885), accepting a standard of care that does not 
conform to the standard of care in the sponsoring country, which is often a wealth country, 
results in double standards. Instead of addressing the ethical concerns of placebo trials, 
the trials are only shipped to developing countries where the laws are weak to protect the 
subjects, or there are very pressing health issues that warrant overlooking critical issues 
in research. As Angell (1997: 848) argues, the use of placebos in developing countries 
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amounts to the application of double standards in clinical research that may result in 
widespread exploitation of vulnerable Third World populations. The principle that 
placebo-controlled trials are not permissible when an effective drug exist is abandoned in 
developing countries and conveniently changes to the availability of a proven drug in the 
host communities. In most cases, not even the standard effective drug is available as it is 
not affordable in these communities. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics also advises 
against the use of placebos in developing countries, as this seems to take advantage of the 
vulnerabilities created by poverty or lack of infrastructure and resources (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics 2002). The claim here is that clinical trials that use placebos when 
there is a proven drug exploit the subjects in the same way the subjects are exploited by 
purposefully withholding already known interventions as in the Tuskegee trial. Further, 
some view that the subjects are exploited because they do not benefit from the study 
taking after the view that exploitation occurs where there is unequal distribution of 
benefits. That is, the subjects are only used to the advantage of the researchers. This 
lowering of ethical standards in the host countries also indicates a lack of equal concern 
for the welfare of the subjects. Lack of equal concern for the well-being of these subjects 
further reflects a disregard for the equal moral worth of other human beings. 
Consequently, according to some theories of exploitation such as Sample’s, these trials 
are exploitative as researchers benefit by treating subjects merely as means.  
 While the concerns raised above by critics such as Angell, Lurie and Wolff are 
genuine, I argue that the views misuse the concept of exploitation by somehow assuming 
that the concept is self-explanatory. For example, they argue that the lowering of 
standards in developing countries exemplified by use of placebos against the guidelines 
of international clinical conduct will lead to exploitation. Angell argues that lowering 
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standards may lead to widespread exploitation of vulnerable subjects (Angell 1997: 848). 
Wertheimer (2008: 64) expresses concern about such views about exploitation that do not 
provide an account of exploitation to support their claims. In other words, what is missing 
in views such as Angell’s is what they mean by exploitation and the absence of such an 
account may be misleading in that one may think the lowering of standards alone is a 
condition for exploitation. In part, that may be the case but it requires an elaborate account 
such as the proposed vulnerability account that can show how conditions of vulnerability 
and relationships of dependence enables the application of double standards for purpose 
of deriving benefits. 
 Advocates for placebo-controlled trials, however, argue that clinical trials are not 
exploitative because the research subjects benefit by participating in the trials. The view 
is that the trials that use placebos make the subjects better off by increasing the chance of 
getting medical care. The subjects in developing countries in the first place have nothing 
that can remedy their medical needs regarding intervention or drugs. For instance, those 
living with HIV in developing countries are, to say the least, condemned to death when 
there is little or no health care provision. The patients do not have easy access to ARVs 
or any other life-prolonging interventions. In other words, even when there is a proven 
drug, the subjects would face the same predicament of no treatment for their illness or 
condition since they cannot afford the available standard treatment or simply that they 
have no chance to access the treatment. On this thought, giving placebos to subjects that 
cannot access standard care such as in the Surfaxin and Hepatitis trials, makes no 
difference but perhaps makes the subjects important in the journey of discovering drugs 
that are more effective regardless of the fact that the drug may not be available to them. 
In addition, under these circumstances, the belief is that the use of placebos does not harm 
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the subjects since the subjects are not made any worse than they could have been without 
the trials. As Miller and Brody argue, the subjects are not exploited when they are not 
exposed to excessive risk and are adequately informed that they are volunteering to 
participate in an experiment rather than receiving medical care directed at their best 
interests (Miller & Brody 2002: 5). Placebo-controlled trials are also considered 
beneficial to the subjects as they improve the subjects’ chances of getting a drug from 
none. That is, when some fraction of the subjects receives an experimental drug it means 
there is a fraction percentage of improvement for the subjects in terms of access to drugs 
that they never had. Say, half of the subjects will receive the experimental drug, and the 
other half gets placebos, it means 50% improvement chance for getting medical care from 
nothing.   
 However, the arguments that these clinical trials are not exploitative because the 
subjects benefit or do not expose the subjects to excessive risks are flawed. Where one’s 
health and life are at threat because of an illness or condition, it may be difficult to point 
out what constitute excessive risks. In placebo-controlled trials, subjects have to endure 
no treatment and the consequences are simply dire (Shah 2006: 19). The argument of 
excessive harm builds on the view that the subjects are not made any worse by the trials 
than they otherwise would have been without the trial. In fact, the subjects are better off 
with trial than without the trial as they could not have had half a chance that the trials 
offer which is similar to how sweatshop labour benefits the workers in the Pacific Rim 
example where less is better than nothing. Similarly, the chance improvement to access 
much-needed drugs does not make the trials non-exploitative since exploitation is not 
merely a function of little or no benefit. The use of placebos exposes the subjects to the 
same risks as when they are not treated. That is, we do not have to think of excessive risks 
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under these circumstances when the risk is still the same as before the trial where one’s 
life is threatened. Further, it is rather unfair to expect participants facing a life-threatening 
illness not to think of clinical trials to be in their interests when there is a proven drug or 
a promising drug that is being tested.  Moreover, it is not only the subjects that receive 
placebos that are exploited, but also all subjects and perhaps their communities are 
exploited especially when the results of the study are not accessible or available to the 
subjects or their communities after the study. Thus, the exploitation in the AZT as well 
as the Surfaxin and Havrix trials is not in the fact that the trials are harmful to the subject, 
that they are not as beneficial or without benefit at all. As we have established through 
other examples, exploitation occurs even where one benefits and no harm occurs to B. 
This means the exploitation arguments based on the occurrence of harm and lack of 
benefit to the subjects in clinical trials do not properly account for exploitation because 
exploitation in medical research can also occur without the occurrence of harm.       
 A related charge of exploitation to the above holds that clinical trials are 
exploitative when they fail to address the clinical needs of the host country by providing 
posttrial benefits to the host population. In other words, the trials are exploitative when 
the subjects and perhaps the host communities do not benefit from the results of the 
interaction. For example, Annas and Grodin (1998: 561) view that doing research with 
impoverished populations is exploitative unless the interventions under investigation will 
be made available to the host communities. The CIOMS also holds that trials may rightly 
be characterised as exploitative and therefore unethical if the knowledge gained from the 
research primarily benefits populations that can afford the tested product (CIOMS 
Guideline 10). Most clinical trials results (drugs or interventions) are not available 
posttrial often because of prohibitive costs (Glantz et al. 1998: 3). The claim is that the 
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poor subjects are being used to develop medical products for the wealthy and that this is 
exploitative as suggested by the pharmacolonial argument. Lurie and Wolfe (1997) 
similarly argue that exploitation occurs when the inhabitants of the host country cannot 
afford the drugs that have been developed by testing on their members or communities.37  
Apart from the problem of reasonable availability here, there are also problems of 
obligations as to what is owed to the host communities and the participants, posttrial. The 
AZT or Havrix trials did not guarantee the availability of their results to the inhabitants 
of the countries after the trial if it was proven effective. This is against the CIOMS 
recommendation that researchers should agree in advance that any product developed 
through the research would be made reasonably available to the inhabitants of the host 
communities upon successful completion (CIOMS 2002 commentary on Guideline 15). 
In Annas and Grodin’s (1998: 561) view, not enough is done to guarantee that the hosts’ 
populations would access the developed drugs even though trials such as the AZT may 
have in mind the health needs of developing countries. In other words, there is usually no 
binding commitment from the researcher to make their products such as AZT available 
at affordable price. It should be noted here that even a 50 percent reduction of the cost the 
short-course AZT regimen would still be unaffordable in most of the host countries.38   
However, lack of reasonable availability argument does not fully capture the 
exploitation that occurs in clinical trials. It is not enough to say that exploitation occurs 
because the product is not made reasonably available to those who participated in its 
production. Besides, there are other interactions in which the products may not be 
                                                             
37 See also Angell 1988.  
38 The prices for ARVS have significantly fallen partly as a consequence of the failure of the court case 
against South Africa’s use of generic products. ARVs in developing countries are now accessible because 
of the availability of generic drugs and increasing competition among generic producers complementing 
philanthropic donations (See Medicins Sans Frontieres – Access Campaign 2014). 
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available to some interactors but are not considered exploitative on this basis. For 
example, the exploitation of the workers in cocoa fields in Ghana or gold mine workers 
in South Africa is not in that they cannot afford the products they produce. Moreover, it 
is hard to decide when a product is reasonably available to the subjects considering that 
there may be a conflict between researchers’ financial interests and the subjects’ welfare 
interests. We also run into the problem of establishing when the exploitation occurs: 
whether it is when subjects participate in the trials or after the trial. Thus while the 
reasonable availability argument intends to protect the welfare interests of the 
participants, it fails to adequately account for exploitation, in the same way views that 
focus on the lack of benefit alone fail to determine the occurrence of exploitation.   
 A similar view to the lack of benefit-based view of exploitation above is the view 
that clinical trials are exploitative because they involve unequal distribution of benefits 
and burdens between the interactors. That is, unlike the research subjects, pharmaceutical 
companies amass huge profits from the knowledge gained from the research. The subjects 
and their communities, plagued by illnesses and poverty, are often in a weak position to 
bargain with the researchers. As the pharmacolonial argument mentioned earlier holds, 
the benefit that researchers make in the form of drugs or knowledge and the profits made 
thereof resembles colonial arrangements as instances of extracting resources (data from 
subjects’ bodies) from developing countries for the benefit of those already unjustly 
privileged in the developed countries (Carse & Little 2008: 218).  The argument is thus 
that there is unfair distribution of the benefits of clinical research between pharmaceutical 
corporations and their subjects and their communities. However, as argued in the previous 
chapter on surrogacy, unequal distribution is not an adequate basis for exploitation 




Exploiting the vulnerability and dependence of research subjects in 
developing countries 
 The weakness of the exploitation views in clinical research explained above is that 
they are limited to account for other forms of exploitation in clinical research. For 
example, some views hold that clinical trials are exploitative when they harm or expose 
subjects to excessive risks as in the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis and Willowbrook 
Hepatitis Experiments. David Buchanan and  Franklin Miller (2006: 730) associate 
exploitation in clinical trials with excessive risks arguing that exploitation in clinical trials 
does not occur if the subjects are not exposed to excessive risks. In other words, exposure 
to excessive risks or harms is a condition for exploitation. Miller and Brody (2002: 5) 
similarly hold informed consent and non-exposure to excessive risks as conditions for 
non-exploitation. However, using harm as the basis of exploitation is problematic because 
of the difficulty in determining what constitutes harm in clinical trials. Harm may remain 
unknown in some cases or may not be instantly established, as it might be the case in the 
trials of new drugs and for new illnesses. Moreover, harm seems to be restricted to what 
the trial has directly caused such excessive risk in terms of such things as side effects as 
advocates view that withholding treatment from subjects does not cause harm since the 
subjects would face the same outcome if they do not participate in the trial. Some may 
even argue that the subjects can be compensated for the additional risk that is caused by 
the trial (EUPATI 2015). This may suggest that where visible harm cannot be identified 
exploitation does not occur in a clinical trial.  
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 Moreover, since establishing excessive risks are measured against the benefits of 
the research, we risk sacrificing subjects at the altar of biomedical progress by considering 
the benefits that may go to other people rather than the research subjects, which is 
controversial. That is, since the view is that exploitation does not occur if the potential 
benefits of the research outweigh the risks, the burdens to the subjects may be outweighed 
by the benefits to be enjoyed by future patients (Malmqvist 2011). Furthermore, the 
implication of this is rather odd in that while it is sensible to say exploitation in clinical 
research can be avoided by reducing the risks to the subjects, it is not sensible to say that 
exploitation can be avoided by increasing benefits to the future patients to outweigh the 
risks (Malmqvist 2011). However, as we have shown earlier, harm is not a necessary 
condition for exploitation in clinical trials. As Wertheimer (1996: 14) notes, some 
exploitation is mutually beneficial rather than harmful. In the given examples of clinical 
trials, except in the Meningitis trial, it appears no harm is caused by the research itself but 
the threat of harm to the subjects comes from the illness or condition. Thus, we need a 
theory such as the vulnerability theory of exploitation that is not narrow or rigid in its 
applications to account for different forms exploitation in clinical research.  
 Contrary to views such as above, the vulnerability theory argues that clinical 
research in developing countries is exploitative when researchers derive benefit by taking 
advantage of the vulnerability and dependence on the part of the subjects. The argument 
is that clinical trials in developing countries are more likely to be exploitative because of 
the prevalence of conditions of vulnerability and the likelihood of relationships of 
dependence. Clinical trials conducted in developing countries are likely to be exploitative 
because the research subjects are vulnerable (have threats to their welfare interests) due 
to their socioeconomic circumstances. That is, in developing countries vulnerability is 
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high because of multiple factors present in these contexts such as extreme poverty, dire 
need of healthcare and nutrition, lack of political power, and lack of education or high 
illiteracy levels. The threats to welfare interests make the patients in developing countries 
appropriate subjects for research (Glantz et al. 1998: 2). For example, the subjects in the 
HIV/AIDS trial as well as in the other cases have illnesses that threaten their welfare 
interests in health and life. In the AZT trial, the threat is to the well-being of both the 
mother and the unborn child. The researcher takes advantage of this threat to the mother 
and child to enrol the mother as a subject. In other words, the threat to the subject works 
to the advantage of the researcher in the bargaining situation. The conditions for the 
research subjects in developing countries are similar to those of the surrogate mothers in 
India even though the threat to the subjects’ welfare interests is more serious in clinical 
trials, as it specifically threatens life. These research subjects also operate under 
conditions of limited possibilities of self-expression and development; unemployment; 
lack of financial resources; and low education levels among others. The research subjects’ 
situation thus resembles that of the man trapped in the pit example where B’s life is 
threatened by mudslides (illness) and can only hope for A’s rope (the drug or treatment) 
for survival or relief.  
 Further, exploitation is more likely in these clinical trials because the trials often 
represent the best available options for the subjects to secure their welfare interests hence 
making the subjects dependent on their transactors. For instance, AZT as a proven life 
prolonging and PMTCT drug or the unproven drug that is under investigation is the only 
chance available to most infected women in developing countries to prolong life of the 
mother and prevent vertical transmission. In other words, the clinical trial represents the 
best option available to the subjects for securing their wellbeing. Research subjects in the 
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clinical trial examples lack the capacity and alternatives for protecting their welfare 
interests due to a variety of reasons as indicated above but mostly because of poverty as 
suggested by examples of low annual healthcare allocations in developing countries. The 
lack of options for securing their welfare interests makes the subjects depend on the 
researchers through the trial to secure the threatened interests. The subjects are dependent 
on the researchers because the cost of exiting or refusing a relationship or transaction with 
the researchers is high. Specifically because the subjects’ health and life relies on goods 
or resources provided by the researchers through the trials. This lack of options for 
securing the subjects’ wellbeing that gives researchers the opportunity to insist on terms 
for research trials that are not as favourable to the subjects such as terms and conditions 
that do not sufficiently safeguard their interests.  
 To clarify on the conditions for exploitation, we need to compare the conditions 
for research subjects in developed and developing countries in the same way as Panitch 
(2013: 333) makes inter-contractual comparisons in surrogacy contracts comparing B to 
another B in similar arrangement rather than any other B. This comparison shows that 
research subjects in wealthy countries are not as vulnerable compared to their 
counterparts in the developing world. The evidence to the difference in vulnerability 
manifest in the retention rates of subjects, which are low in developed countries compared 
to developing countries (Shah 2006: 9). Laws and policies protect the subjects in the 
developed countries from such things as placebo-controlled trials, unlike those in the 
developing countries, and the subjects have options in terms of access to healthcare. The 
subjects in developing countries are not given the same entitlements as their counterparts 
in developed countries including dropping out when they so wish. As shown in the two 
AZT trials that were conducted in the United States, the participants had access to the 
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standard care or alternative drugs. Both sets of subjects in the AZT trials have welfare 
interests in both prolonging their existence and securing an HIV-free status for the unborn 
baby, which is equally threatened by the disease. However, under the circumstances that 
the subjects in developing countries are more vulnerable and in various ways, their lack 
of options make them depend on the researchers as they represent the only best option 
available for securing their wellbeing. The subjects in the developing countries do not 
have access to the preventive drug like their counterparts in developed countries, or 
cannot access it because it is not affordable, hence the subjects’ dependence on their 
transactors (researchers) for the protection of their welfare interests. Borrowing Goodin’s 
characterization, research subjects resemble the workers in the Pacific Rim country 
example, situated as a subordinate party that is in need of a resource (drugs) that only the 
researchers (superordinates) supply, causing an asymmetrical relationship (Goodin 1988: 
175). In short, by comparison, research subjects in developing countries enrol into clinical 
trials under conditions of increased vulnerability because of their socioeconomic 
conditions and are consequently treated differently. For example in the same study as 
shown by the AZT trial, a study in the developing countries is justified by contextual 
conditions of increased lack of resources and options rather than those conducted in 
developed countries which are conducted with reference to specific guidelines that aim 
to protect the wellbeing of the subjects. This forms the basis for ethical issues surrounding 
the use of double standards in clinical trials in developing countries (Macklin 2004).  
 In the dependence relationship between the researchers and the subjects, the 
researchers have discretionary power over the much-needed drugs in the developing 
countries in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia (Guenter, Esparza & Macklin 
2000). A’s control over a resource that B requires for her well-being gives A an advantage 
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in a bargaining situation with B. B’s lack of options for the protection of her wellbeing is 
also to the advantage of A who can now insist on terms that B only has to put up with. In 
this relationship of dependence, there is conflict between the financial interests of the 
researchers and the clinical needs of the research subjects and their communities. The 
pursuit of financial interests involve coping with increased competition for inventing new 
drugs and for new markets demands by reducing time and costs in conducting the trial 
(Shah 2006: 4). The presence of a large population of patients that is readily available in 
developing countries in need of drugs or interventions and without options for securing 
these clinical needs is conducive for relationships of dependence. A relationship of 
dependence entails that B has no other options but to transact A to secure his or her 
welfare interests such that the cost of exiting the relationship with A is high for B. The 
lack of options for B makes it impossible to refuse to enter into or exit a relationship with 
A. A is under the circumstances the only one that can best secure B’s wellbeing.  
Noteworthy here is the fact that for B both no interaction and exiting the 
arrangement are not options because the risk of doing so is very high since life itself is 
threatened. Using Lovett’s theory of domination to describe the relationship between 
researchers and research subjects, it is a relationship of dependence in which the cost of 
opting out of the relationship is greater for the research subjects that the researcher (Lovett 
2010: 50). In other words, the cost for exiting is greater than zero. In the context of clinical 
research, lack of options for the subjects tips the balance of the cost of not entering into 
or exiting the relationship against the subjects rather than the researchers. Thus, the 
subjects would rather participate in a clinical trial than not as this is the only opportunity 
to secure their wellbeing. The existence of a vast pool of people with HIV in developing 
countries, on the other hand, makes it is easy for researchers to recruit research subjects 
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without much cost to their financial interests than for the subjects to find an alternative to 
the research trials as an opportunity for medical intervention.39 In other words, the cost 
for not enrolling these research subjects or opting out of this relationship is on the part of 
researchers is low and less threatening as their financial interests can be met by recruiting 
other research subjects elsewhere. This in my view explains Goodin’s view that the A’s 
actions and choices have a have a great impact on B’s interests (Goodin 1985b: 779). A 
has more impact on B’s wellbeing rather than vice versa when A represents the best option 
for B to secure his or her wellbeing. As is the case in these clinical trials, researchers can 
discontinue their trials at any point when there is a threat to their interests to the detriment 
of the research subjects. The subjects’ decision to discontinue participation in the research 
on the other hand also has a great impact on the subjects’ wellbeing rather than the 
researchers who may have options for securing their interests. Due to the relationships of 
dependence, the interests of the subject can be sacrificed on the altar of biomedical 
progress. Pfizer’s infamous clinical trial of a meningitis drug in Nigeria in 1996 illustrates 
this point as Pfizer left town after conducting the trials while the epidemic was still going 
on (Okonta 2014: 189).40 These kinds of clinical trials are not any different from business 
investments such as sweatshop factories in developing countries that can fold up when 
there are obstacles to the interests of the investors without regard to the welfare interests 
of the workers and their communities. 
 The other issue about clinical trials in developing countries is whether they benefit 
the subjects. The argument that trials are exploitative because they do not make drugs or 
                                                             
39 According to the U.S. National Library of Medicine (2018), about 48% of clinical trials are being 
conducted outside the United States, mostly in developing countries. See 
https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/resources/trends  
40 Pfizer settled a legal suit for a conducting a trial for a meningitis drug in Kano, Nigeria which faced the 




interventions developed from the trial reasonably available points to the view that these 
trials do not benefit the subjects and/or their communities. While subjects in developing 
countries are exposed to the risks of research, access to the benefits of new, effective 
drugs or interventions goes to the people in developed countries and profits goes to the 
pharmaceutical corporations. These trials fail to provide fair benefit to the subjects 
because the knowledge, inventions and finances go to others rather than the subjects 
and/or their communities. However, some argue that clinical trials are mutually beneficial 
as research sites in developing countries benefit from increased capacity development and 
investment. That is, developing countries benefit by training healthcare and research 
personnel, access to modern medical equipment, construction of health care facilities and 
other physical infrastructure (Participants in the Conference on Ethical Aspects of 
Research in Developing Countries 2002). Advocates for clinical trials argue that 
reasonable availability of the research products embodies a narrow conception of benefit 
that overlooks the mentioned benefits and insisting on reasonable availability precludes 
the community’s deciding which benefits it prefers (Ibid). On the vulnerability account, 
the amount or type of benefit to B is not necessary for the determination of the occurrence 
of exploitation. That is, while communities may benefit as clinical trials raise research 
standards, bring health improvements, and badly needed investment, they are still 
exploitative insofar as the benefit accruing to A is derived by taking advantage of the 
vulnerability and dependence of the subjects. That is in fact the essence of mutually 
beneficial exploitation. The vulnerability account looks at how the benefit to A is derived. 
If the conditions of vulnerability and dependence have been used to derive that benefit 
then the transaction is exploitative. 
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 The implication of the benefits view in the preceding paragraph is that exploitation 
in these clinical trials can be avoided by giving adequate consideration to the subjects’ 
welfare interests. That is, adequately securing the welfare interests of the subjects by 
making available a resource – a drug or intervention, which is essential to the protection 
of the welfare interests that are threatened. The failure to protect the welfare interest of 
vulnerable and dependent subjects can be established counterfactually, by the existence 
of the possibility to interact with the exploited under better terms and conditions that can 
adequately protect their wellbeing. Focusing on the other benefits such as those that 
accrue to the community, in general, only prevent us from seeing the exploitation in the 
trial, which is not seeing how the trials are benefitting the researchers without by 
inadequately benefiting the subjects because of their vulnerability and dependence. For 
example, the Pfizer’s meningitis trial in Nigeria may have benefitted the society through 
capacity building or training of research personnel, but the results of the trial did not 
benefit the subjects. That is, in addition to the fact that the subjects were exposed to a 
bigger risk of taking meningitis treatment orally rather than the standard and effective 
intravenous means.  Furthermore, the fact that in most of these trials the subjects receive 
medication only during the trial and posttrial access is not guaranteed, their welfare 
interests remain threatened as they cannot access or afford a drug that they took part in 
developing. In the case of HIV/AIDS, it implies that the subjects’ welfare interests have 
not been secured as infection and transmission rates will increase after the trial. By the 
vulnerability theory, benefitting the subjects means securing the welfare interests that are 
threatened. Thus, researchers in clinical trials can avoid exploiting the subjects and their 
communities by adequately securing their welfare needs in the best way possible rather 
than taking advantage of the vulnerability and dependence to benefit themselves.  
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 The view that research subjects’ welfare interests should be adequately addressed 
resonates with Siegel’s theory of exploitation that is guided by Kantian ethics. Siegel 
argues that clinical trials exploit subjects in developing countries when they do not benefit 
the subjects. In his view, not benefiting the subjects violates the duty of beneficence and 
therefore reflects an agent’s indifference to the needs of another qua human agent. 
Subsequently, acting with such disregard fails to recognise the other agent as an end in 
herself. On Siegel’s account: 
“A exploits B when A secures benefit from B by acting toward B on a maxim that 
(1) subverts the conditions for B’s rational agency, (2) fails to acknowledge needs 
that are essential to B qua rational agent, or (3) demeans or degrades B despite the 
fact that preservation of B’s agency is not at issue” (Siegel 2008: 181)  
 Siegel points out two modes of exploitation discussed in clinical research. First, 
exploitation involving subversion of the rational agency where researchers subvert 
rational agency when they do not obtain informed consent from the subjects. Second, 
exploitation involving degradation when researchers advance their interests at the 
expense of the subjects’ interests (Siegel 2008: 182). The importance of informed consent 
in clinical research is consistent with the Kantian imperative that we ought not to act in 
ways that subvert rational agency. For example, employing deceit, coercion or any forms 
of manipulation of a person’s will to enrol in trials violate this Kantian maxim (Siegel 
2008: 182). Illiteracy, unfamiliarity with medical concepts, or unfamiliarity with 
procedures typical of informed consent are also barriers to satisfying the requirement of 
informed consent (CIOMS 1993 Guideline 8). In other words, proceeding to conduct 
research where such obstacles are not dealt with subverts rational agency since the 
subjects cannot give valid consent. Another obstacle to informed consent as identified by 
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Annas and Grodin (1998: 562) is the absence of healthcare in developing countries, which 
makes any offer of medical assistance acceptable since it is better than nothing. The 
argument is that research subjects are induced by the prospect of having access to health 
care through participation, which in essence compromises their consent. However, as 
argued elsewhere, informed consent is not enough a condition for a charge of exploitation 
as individuals can be exploited consensually. That is, subjects can make an informed 
choice even under harsh circumstances in the same way a stranded motorist can make a 
rational and informed decision in choosing to pay the tow truck driver than to remain 
stranded. By the vulnerability account, exploitation is not about the lack of informed 
consent, or in the failure to acknowledge the needs of a person qua human being but the 
conditions of vulnerability and dependence that make subjects consent and the exploiter 
not to consider the needs of the subjects. The stranded motorist or Pogge’s sinking boat 
crew consent to transacting with the tow truck driver and the filmmaker, respectively, but 
they are exploited. The tow truck driver and the filmmaker take the vulnerability and 
dependence of their interactors as an opportunity to derive benefit without fair 
consideration of their interactors’ welfare interests.  
 Siegel’s second limb of the argument of exploitation resembles Wood and 
Sample’s views that benefits derived through inequalities in bargaining power are 
degrading to the weaker party (Siegel 2008: 184). Both views hold that treating another 
person without regard to their moral worth is degrading. Wood’s exploitation account 
holds the view that we violate the proper respect due to persons when we treat their 
vulnerabilities as opportunities to advance our interests or projects (Wood 1997: 15). In 
Siegel’s view, we disrespect human dignity when we display indifference to B’s needs 
by withholding help or aid in the absence of legitimate reasons for doing so. According 
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to Siegel (2008: 189), the only valid reason for withholding support or aid is when doing 
so would make oneself in need of the beneficence of others or that when doing so would 
jeopardise one’s own status as an agent. This reasoning also spells our responsibility and 
its limits to vulnerable others similar to Peter Singer’s (1972) suggestions on the limits of 
our responsibilities to the global poor. Now considering the disparity between researchers 
and their subjects with respect to resources, the researchers withhold drugs to the subjects 
in developing countries without legitimate reasons. It is clear that in Siegel’s (as well as 
Wood’s) view, researchers are seen to be advancing their interests by taking advantage 
of the vulnerability and dependence of the subjects. The union of illness and poverty 
serves as an ideal opportunity for inexpensive and efficient testing of drugs for the market 
(Siegel 2008: 184). In the context of clinical research, conducting research on subjects 
that are vulnerable and dependent when they cannot access or afford the results of the 
trials is by Siegel’s account being indifferent to the needs of human beings. Then again, 
exploitation is not in this indifference to the needs of others since exploitation can occur 
even where the needs of others have been considered. For example, in the surrogacy 
example, the needs of the surrogates are protected yet remains exploitative.   
 The role of dependence in exploitation in clinical research is clear in how 
researchers can insist on using standards lower than internationally set standards. 
Dependence makes it possible for researchers to use for instance, placebos even when a 
proven drug is available or abandon standard and effective methods of administering 
drugs as in the Pfizer trial in Nigeria. This is comparable to the tow truck driver’s ability 
to charge the motorist above the standard towing price or the factory owner’s ability to 
offer anything to the workers as long as it is in the factory’s interests.  The possibility to 
use placebos in clinical trials in developing countries, or abandoning international 
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guidelines for clinical research such as guaranteeing reasonable availability of drugs and 
interventions posttrial, or the ability to discontinue a trial at the discretion of the 
researcher, is only possible because the relationship between parties to this is not properly 
of interdependence. It is a relationship of dependence because the subjects interact with 
the researchers to secure their wellbeing and the cost of not transacting with the 
researchers is too high. On the other hand, the researchers do not necessarily have to 
transact with these subjects as they have other options available to them for the protection 
of their financial interests. Borrowing Marx’s (2013: 440) description, there is a 
disposable reserve army, which in this case is the availability of a surplus population of 
potential research subjects probably ready and willing to transact with A giving 
bargaining advantage to A.  In other words, the researcher acts in such ways that do not 
adequately protect the welfare interests of the subjects because the subjects do not have 
better options available to them to protect their interests. The advantage to the researcher 
includes room for suspending or terminating the trials without considering the wellbeing 
of the subjects as well as not guaranteeing the availability of the drugs such as AZT 
posttrial. The situation for the subjects is the same as that of a drowning man whose safety 
or wellbeing is in the hands of a rescuer who will rescue the drowning man only when 
the rescuer’s interests are met. Like many other trials that have been charged as 
exploitative because the research product is designed for or can only be afforded in 
developed countries, the welfare interests in health and life of the subjects come second 
to the financial interests of the researchers. For example, concluding clinical studies 
without guaranteeing the availability of the drugs such as in Pfizer’s meningitis and AZT 
trial indicate a disregard of the welfare interests of the subjects. In some cases of 
HIV/AIDS drug trials where an experimental drug is perceived to be better than the 
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available ones, at the conclusion of the trial, subjects have to revert to an old drug, usually 
less potent, if they were on medication. This means the subjects are more at risk now than 
before. Where the welfare interests of the research subjects are not secured posttrial as 
described, the charge of degradation is warranted as they are treated as of less moral 
wealth, treated as means, or that the welfare interests of subjects and communities in the 
developing countries are less important than those of the developed countries are. While 
agreeing that by the Kantian standards benefiting from transactions with vulnerable 
subjects without adequate regard to their welfare interests may be degrading, clinical trials 
are not exploitative because they are degrading or fail to protect the interests of the 
subjects. Clinical trials are exploitative when researchers advance their interests by taking 
advantage of the availability of the vulnerability and dependence of the research subjects.  
  
Conclusion 
 Since contemporary medical research is a multi-billion industry, it operates to 
maximise profit making. Achieving such profit margins requires strategies to minimise 
operational costs such as offshoring clinical trials to developing countries. As Ronald 
Bayer (1998: 568) observes, the logic of business has replaced the logic of research, “one 
that is driven by considerations of efficiency above all else.” Thus, like conventional 
trade, clinical research also sometimes thrives on the injustices that discriminate against 
the poor and weak subjects found in the developing countries. In these situations, 
researchers pursue their financial interests because of the vulnerability and dependence 
of the subjects without adequately addressing the needs of their subjects and host 
communities. Researchers achieve these profits because they command a position of 
power and advantage unlike the subjects who lack bargaining power and options for 
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securing their welfare interests. In other words, because the researchers wield enormous 
economic power, the subjects are only as valuable as they can contribute to the interests 
of the researchers. Otherwise, vulnerable and dependent subjects are replaceable when 
their interests compete with those of the researchers. Described in this way, clinical trials 
in the developing world are not very different from the trials such as the Tuskegee trial in 
the way they are conducted and in their fundamental failure to protect the welfare of 
human subjects (Angell 1997). The conditions of vulnerability and relationships of 
dependence provide fertile grounds for exploitative transactions where the welfare 
interests of research subjects are not as paramount as is required by international clinical 
standards. As described here, exploitation is on this vulnerability theory “a function of 
roles or relationships occupied in a given context, of the practice in which the transaction 
takes place” (Carse & Little 2008: 221 – 222). 
 The major similarity between the past clinical research scandals such as the 
Tuskegee trial and those happening in the developing world is that the subjects are 
primarily affected by some other condition(s) on top of the illness or condition that is 
under investigation. That is, both sets of subjects have increased threats to their welfare 
interests in life and health. In addition, both sets of subjects lack better options for 
securing their wellbeing compared to what is offered by these clinical trials. Generally, 
the lack of capacity to protect the welfare interests is due to their socio-economic position, 
disadvantages the subjects in the bargaining process with their transactors. In other words, 
the subjects cannot contain the illness or condition that threatens their life or wellbeing 
largely because of poverty as suggested by the annual health budget figures in the 
developing countries. The other similarity is in that the subjects lack better options for 
securing their wellbeing. At best, they can only chose between the very limited access to 
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treatment and nothing. The promise of treatment through a clinical trial thus represent the 
best option available to them even when the trial may involve unproven interventions 
which in Snyder’s (2017) words constitute the exploitation of hope. The subjects are thus 
on this understanding dependent on the researchers as the trial is the best option available 
for securing welfare interests. The disparity between the interactors in the research 
examples can be taken advantage of to secure some benefit for the researchers rather than 
the subjects, which is one of the reasons why cases such as the Tuskegee trial and others 
are deemed exploitative. That is, the researchers stand to benefit from the study, the 
subjects do not benefit in a way that adequately protects welfare interests.  
 The continued existence of trials similar to the outlined cases demonstrate that 
research “has not come very far from” (Angell 1997: 849). Using subjects’ vulnerability 
and dependence for the benefit of others rather than themselves, is exploitative. For 
example, the possibility that subjects will receive placebos in HIV/AIDS trials rather than 
a proven effective drug is comparable to purposeful withholding of treatment in the 
Tuskegee syphilis trials among the African American men. The concern, in general, is 
that the reforms initiated by the lessons from historical medical tragedies to address the 
problem such the exploitation of subjects among other ethical concerns, do not extend to 
clinical research conduct in the developing world as indicated by the examples. I argue 
that, exploitation in these clinical trials may not be seen because the understanding of 
exploitation is wrong such as when exploitation is determined by the lack of informed 
consent or excessive harm to the subjects. The vulnerability account therefore highlights 
the correct necessary conditions (vulnerability and dependence) with which we can 
determine the occurrence of exploitation. As Shah (2006: xi) observes, “if the history of 
human experimentation tells us anything, from the bloody vivisections of the first 
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millennium to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, it is that the potential for abuse will fall 







What is wrong with exploitation in international 




 Earlier in the thesis I argued that exploitation in general is wrong because it 
involves taking advantage of vulnerable and dependent others. In this chapter, I argue that 
exploitation occurring at the international level might be distinctively wrong, for reasons 
that generally do not apply to exploitative exchanges between compatriots. These reasons 
have to do with the employment of double standards concerning the promotion and 
protection of people’s basic welfare interest. The application of double standards to 
arrangements such as commercial surrogacy and clinical trials among others at the 
international level, constitute a failure to protect adequately the welfare interests of 
individuals in developing countries. I argue that the practice of double standards at the 
international level represents a form of hypocrisy that violates the belief in the equality 
of people as it involves subjecting international interactions with people from developing 
countries to weaker moral demands while demanding stronger ones in similar transactions 
involving people within or among developed countries. I maintain that the prevalence of 
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conditions of vulnerability and the likelihood of dependence create many opportunities 
for exploitation at the international level. Further, these exploitable conditions in the 
developing world have further ethical implications that may not arise domestically 
because the conditions to some extent originate from historical, political and economic 
arrangements that are morally wrong, invented by and/or in favour of the developed 
world.  
 First, I maintain that the application of double standards in international 
arrangements such as clinical trials and surrogacy involve some form of discrimination 
that in some cases signal racial injustice. This is because most of the developing countries 
are former colonies of developed countries and they continue to interact in a framework 
that is skewed towards the developed countries. As noted by Thomas McCarthy (2004: 
148), “there is a constant interplay between colonialism and racism, between the 
establishment of imperial domination and the formation of racial ideologies”. In short, 
these arrangements may pass as racist because they involve improper differential 
treatment of people – attaching less importance to the wellbeing for individuals from 
developing countries therefore treating them as of less moral worth. Secondly, I argue 
that exploitation at the international domain suggests and sustains colonial attitudes 
influenced by the associations that exist between developed and developing nations that 
are disproportionate due to variations in wealth and supremacy. 
 The chapter first explains some instances of double standards in international 
clinical trials, surrogacy and other comparable arrangements as the basis for a charge of 
hypocrisy. The second part of the chapter explains the two ethical implications of double 
standards in international exploitative arrangements. I conclude that the application of 
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doubles standards international exchanges contravenes the ideal of equality of human 
beings and therefore challenges the idea of global justice.  
 
Double Standards in International Arrangements 
 The current practice of double standards in international gestational surrogacy, 
clinical research trials and other comparable arrangements involve the application of 
different standards to similar contracts in developing and developed countries. According 
to the Merriam Webster Dictionary (2018), double standards refer to the use of different 
rules or values for the same/similar situation; or the rigorous application of those rules to 
one group of people or circumstances than to another. In the two examples of international 
arrangements in surrogacy and clinical trials, double standards may for instance involve 
administering bad contracts in developing countries while meticulously administering 
surrogacy contracts and clinical trials in developed countries. Abandoning or not applying 
international standards in arrangements occurring in or involving people in developing 
countries also qualifies as a practice of double standards.   Applying different standards 
rather than the established standards such as those established under international 
guidelines in developing countries, or not applying the established standards altogether 
where developed countries and/or their agents are sponsoring or conducting research may 
also suggest some form ‘ethical imperialism’. Macklin (2004: 4) describes ethical 
imperialism as when a developed country impose its own standards on a developing 
country where it is conducting or sponsoring research. I add here to Macklin’s view that 
this imposing of standards includes interacting with people in the developing countries 
without regard to the standards applied in developed countries with respect to certain 
interactions, or those standards required by international guidelines in arrangements such 
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as surrogacy and clinical trials. That is, heavily regulating or pronouncing certain 
arrangements in surrogacy and clinical trials as impermissible and/or illegal in developed 
countries while permitting or encouraging similar arrangements in developing countries 
such as India and many parts of sub-Saharan Africa is a practice of double standards and 
ethical imperialism. For example, conducting AZT trials in the developing world exposed 
the practice of a morally treacherous double standard because the trials among other 
things used placebo controls notwithstanding the fact that it would not be permissible to 
carry out a placebo trial of AZT in the developed nations (Lurie & Wolfe 1997: 853). 
After 1994, AZT was the standard of care in developed nations. This meant that the use 
of placebo controls in the mother to child transmission prevention research (e.g. in the 
United States) would be illegal or immoral. Most international ethical guidelines and 
bodies direct that trial participants receive the best-proven therapy as a comparator in 
clinical trials or that placebo controls should not be carried out once a form of effective 
treatment is existent for the condition being researched. This is a critical standard in 
human research promoted in international guidelines such as the Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), World Medical Association’s Declaration 
of Helsinki (DoH), European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, and National Bioethics Advisory Committee (USA). 
Some of these guidelines such as those of the EGE include specific directions on 
conducting research in developing countries (EGE 2003 Opinion 17).  However, against 
these existing guidelines, in Uganda, hundreds of people were observed in an HIV 
transmission and progression study for up to 30 months without treatment as well as 
giving them imprecise and incomplete information (Angell 2000: 967). These guidelines 
also suffer another limitation resulting from the problem of interpretation and 
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consequently the application of double standards thereby not protecting individuals from 
such things as exploitation.41  
 The selection of AZT placebo controls for developing countries exposes a 
lowering of ethical standards, which consequently demonstrates a lack of proper 
consideration for the well-being of the subjects in the developing countries. In other 
words, applying one standard for developed countries and another for developing 
countries is against the idea of fairness and tears apart the belief that recognizes the 
equality of individuals. Applying such double standards is unacceptable because it 
constitutes the failure to protect basic welfare interests of individuals and is incompatible 
with the idea of human rights. This is a cause of concern that while certain minimums, 
usually high standards, apply for some arrangements in the developed world lower or no 
standards apply to similar arrangements in developing nations. Applying a single 
standard, not double standards, in these arrangements by use of established ethical 
standards or guidelines would ensure the respect for the equality of people for the 
protection and promotion of welfare interests for all subjects. That is if, for example, 
placebo controls are unacceptable and therefore impermissible in developed nations like 
Canada, United States, or the states of Western Europe, then they should as well be 
unacceptable in developing countries such as Kenya and Thailand (Angell 1997: 850).  
 Lessons learnt from cases such as the Tuskegee Syphilis study have been 
instrumental in the development of standard ethical principles to safeguard human 
                                                             
41 For example, the Declaration of Helsinki has been condemned for being too ambiguous and susceptible 
to interpretations. It has no clarifying notes and no points for discussion hence making its interpretation 
continually somewhat contentious. Article 33, for instance, is meant to cover the subject of standard of care, 
which can be very dissimilar between nations and the control of treatment received by groups in a study. 
See Mastroleo, I. (2015).  
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subjects including in international research. For example, the European Group on Ethics 
more generally recommends that “the fundamental ethical rules applied to clinical trials 
in industrialised countries are to be applicable everywhere” (EGE 2003). Article 33 of the 
Declaration of Helsinki upholds a similar value when it states that the use of placebos 
should be limited to only where no proven intervention exists. However, the frameworks 
and principles for research remain open to interpretation and debate. For instance, there 
are disagreements on how to apply established ethical standards as noted in the use of 
placebos in the AZT and the use of non-proven drugs in the Pfizer’s meningitis trials in 
Nigeria despite the existence of proven standard of care. In addition, there are 
disagreements on whether the proven intervention is one that exists anywhere in the globe 
or in the nation where the clinical trial is being conducted. The interpretation has often 
shifted from the best standard of care to local standard of care to justify the use of placebos 
in developing countries where there is often no treatment available. This lowering of 
standard of care indicates the use of double standards by the sponsors of such trials.  
 Double standards also show in the conditions under which research is conducted 
and research products are produced in developing countries that are not permissible in 
developed countries. These conditions are such that they usually violate the principles of 
biomedical ethics such as autonomy, beneficence, justice, and non-maleficence. Most of 
the violations occurring at the international level are justified by the contextual 
considerations. For example, conditions of lack of medical interventions and the scarcity 
of healthcare resources in developing countries are used to justify conducting unethical 
research such as those that include unwarranted use of placebos or unproven 
interventions. The conditions of most of these trial arrangements do not protect the 
subjects’ wellbeing from the risks of the research. Pfizer’s meningitis trials and the 
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Surfaxin trials exemplify the violation of these principles of bioethics as they disregard 
the rules and procedures for clinical research. Noteworthy here is the point that the 
majority of such research in developing nations is piloted or funded by the developed 
countries such as the United States or by pharmaceutical corporations or agencies looking 
for product authorization in developed countries where such research is prohibited. For 
instance, the Surfaxin Trial was shipped to Bolivia because the United States Food and 
Drug Administration could not allow it in the United States confirming the nature of 
moral and legal demands on clinical trials in developed countries yet the results were 
accepted and approved by the same body (Rothman 2000).  
 The distribution of the benefits and burdens of these arrangements also signify the 
practice of double standards. Several reports indicate that clinical trials conducted in 
developing countries are more beneficial to individuals in developed countries rather than 
the host communities. As stated earlier, for pharmaceutical establishments, it is less costly 
to carry out research in developing nations than it is to conduct the same studies in the 
developed world. The cost of production is usually high in the developed world in part 
because of the strict regulations and controls of such arrangements while such regulations 
are not in place or weak in certain developing countries. The observation is that while 
clinical trials should be encouraged in developing countries for new drugs for diseases 
that are endemic to those countries, they are hardly beneficial to protect and secure their 
welfare interests (Fahsi 2013). For example, as Nundy and Gulhati (2005: 1635) observe, 
“only 1 percent of the new drugs discovered in the past 25 years have been for tropical 
diseases.” In addition, most trials conducted in developing countries do not emphasize 
post-trial access. Failure to benefit the subjects is of particular concern in the developing 
countries because such failure suggest that the poor subjects only serve as guinea pigs to 
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establish the safety and efficacy of products that are not available to them. For example, 
in Zambia, the children (subjects) shouldered the burden for the development of 
Nitazoxanide as a treatment for Cryptosporidium and Giardia, but they were hardly 
beneficiaries of the advantages of the drugs and the drug was not licensed for use in the 
country (Shah 2006: 35). As other critics argue, “It is common for research performed in 
developing countries to be guided exclusively by the logic of the market, with the aim of 
developing medicine which may not be available in local public health systems in the 
future” (Garrafa & Lorenzo 2008: 2220). These practices contravene articles 19 and 30 
of Declaration of the Helsinki stating that research should benefit host communities; and 
that sponsors and researchers of clinical trials (and host country governments) should 
make provisions for post-trial access for all participants who still need an intervention 
identified as beneficial in the trial, respectively. Failure to make this provision is a clear 
violation of the principle of justice in biomedical ethics, which ensures that those who 
bear the burden of research risk will ultimately receive the benefits of the research. Failure 
to benefit the subjects adequately may seem to be a case of simply targeting specific 
populations because of their availability or compromised positions as vulnerable and 
dependent individuals.  
 Similar double standards manifest in international gestational surrogacy 
arrangements. In most developed countries, there is either an outright prohibition or strict 
regulation of surrogacy contracts. For example, in Britain, there is clear regulation of 
surrogacy by restrictive rules. In the United States, surrogacy ranges from regulated 
contracts to complete ban depending on the state (Armour 2012: 234). Until recently, 
surrogacy has been unregulated in most parts of the developing world leaving a concern 
of a regulation gap that provides an avenue for taking advantage of vulnerable individuals. 
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This regulation gap gives room for advantage taking to people who have the capacity to 
protect and/or promote the welfare interests of the surrogates in developing countries. 
Unlike their counterparts in developed countries, surrogates in places like India do not 
enjoy conditions such as having a grace period following the birth of the child within 
which surrogates can change their mind; entitlement to legal representation and rights; 
and guarantee for payment should they fail to produce a child (Panitch 2013: 332). These 
conditions are only attainable when there are strict regulations of such contracts. 
Secondly, the contractual conditions in developed countries where surrogacy is 
permissible compared to the conditions in developing countries demonstrate the double 
standards in gestational surrogacy. The conditions available for surrogates in developed 
countries are not available or, are less comparable to those in developing countries. For 
example, the safety of surrogates ought to be paramount in all arrangements to preclude 
subjecting surrogates in developing countries to conditions that are harsh such as being 
housed and restricted in hostel. Sometimes surrogates deliver their babies through 
caesarian section than natural delivery to accommodate the scheduling needs of the 
intended parents and the clinic (Pande 2014: 122). The view here is that certain conditions 
ought to be constantly present in all contracts including those performed in developing 
countries because these conditions touch on the basic welfare interests of all surrogates. 
In other words, similar standards should apply where similar threats exist to the wellbeing 
of individuals. 
 When double standards are unjustifiable as in our cases, they are morally wrong 
because they involve hypocrisy. The hypocricy is in demanding strict adherence to rules 
and regulations in arrangements such as clinical trials and surrogacy in or among 
developed countries and weaken or remove the rules in developing countries. As stated 
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above, the weakening or suspension of the ethical guidelines is often justified by the 
context of the arrangements. The hypocrisy in employing double standards in such 
arrangements lies in targeting to benefit from the absence of or weak regulation for such 
arrangements involving vulnerable and dependent individuals and their communities 
instead of including the context as a corrective to traditional ethics (Landes 2005: 11).  
 
Hypocrisy  
 The rigorous application of moral demands (guidelines and regulations) to 
surrogacy and clinical trials contracts in developed countries serve to protect and/or 
promote the welfare interests of the subjects. Weakening these demands by using a 
different or compromised set of rules exposes subjects to violations including 
exploitation. Thus, if the purpose for strict regulation and prohibition of arrangements 
such as surrogacy and clinical research is to protect individuals’ welfare interests based 
on certain values, then that purpose should similarly extend to individuals in developing 
countries as a matter of justice and fairness. In other words, using less rigorous standards 
in developing countries lacks justification particularly when the subjects face similar or 
more threats to their welfare interests. Hypocrisy generally describes a mismatch between 
judgements and actions essentially undermining one’s moral authority understood as a 
kind of standing that they occupy within a particular moral community (Isserow & Klein 
2017 :193). That is, in the context of international arrangements, the mismatch is in 
advocating for some set of values or standards such as those outlined in a range of 
international guidelines and the action of only applying the ethical guidelines in some 
situations and reason differently in similar situations where similar or equal threats to 
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welfare interests exist. Our concern with the mismatch between judgements and actions 
is based on the notion of moral authority, which refers to a certain kind of social status 
that A enjoys within a particular moral community (Isserow & Klein 2017: 194). The 
basis on A’s moral authority is found in his or her active investment in moral issues, an 
investment that A exhibits by moralizing through moral criticism, deliverance of blame 
and praise etc. (Ibid 2017: 197). When A exhibit investment in moral issues we expect A 
to follow through on their commitments, perhaps especially when it does not suit them 
(Ibid 2017: 206). In our cases of surrogacy and clinical trials, the hypocrisy is when A 
from developed countries cannot transact with B from developed countries because of 
certain moral pronouncements on these arrangements ranging from complete banning to 
setting out basic minimums for such arrangements set in ethical guidelines to ensure 
things such as minimum wage and other terms and conditions. Yet, A can transact with 
B from developing countries in similar arrangements without regard to the moral 
pronouncements that guide the same arrangements in developed countries. In other 
words, hypocrisy is when A fails to live up to his or her own lofty standards or engage in 
the arrangements in such ways that A criticizes elsewhere which therefore undermines 
A’s moral authority. This mismatch between judgement and action is evident in the 
surrogacy and clinical trials arrangements conducted in the developing world because A 
from the developing world transact with B from the developing world by neglecting the 
lofty standards of interactions that established in international guidelines, to which most 
countries in the developed world are signatories. Neglecting the standards set in 
international guidelines when dealing with individuals in developing countries in essence 
violate the values justice and equality, and constitutes a failure to adequately protect the 
welfare interests of vulnerable and dependent individuals in developing countries. 
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 The disregard of these values when dealing with subjects from developing 
countries points out the hypocrisy on the part of A as “the failure to properly value one’s 
own values” (Doucet 2009: 112). Individuals, pharmaceutical companies and authorising 
bodies are all implicated in this failure, as they no longer champion the values that guide 
and bind interactions in developed countries as they seek to benefit from similar 
arrangements in developing countries. That is, their actions or the arrangements they 
initiate, invest in or support in developing countries do not match their own standards 
indicating a failure to follow through on their moral commitments.  For example, 
supporting the use of placebo trials in developing countries is contrary to the international 
commitment of saving lives with the best available drugs or healthcare procedures as 
required by the Declaration of Helsinki. The AZT trials in the developing countries and 
Pfizer’s 1996 meningitis drug trial in Nigeria, for instance, demonstrate how 
pharmaceutical corporations can use a non-proven drug when standard and proven 
treatment is available. The Pfizer case also shows how researchers can use unconventional 
procedures as the research administered oral drugs instead of the proven fast-acting 
intravenous method (Valdova 2012: 133). This is a clear violation of international 
protocols governing research as guided, for instance, by the CIOMS: “the ethical 
standards applied should be no less exacting than they would be in the case of research 
carried out in the sponsoring country”.  
 The practice of double standards is also hypocritical because it shows the 
inconsistency between values or standards and practice. This form of hypocrisy is morally 
wrong because it “offends against the commitment to the equality of persons that is 
constitutive of moral relations” (Wallace 2010: 308). Hypocrisy in international clinical 
trials and surrogacy offends against the commitment to the equality of persons when we 
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treat B in developing countries different from B in developed countries. In particular, the 
moral wrong of international exploitation is in this kind of differential treatment of 
persons that appears to attach more importance to the interests of individuals in the 
developed than individuals from developing world.  
 Hypocrisy exposes this inconsistency on the part of developed countries’ attitudes 
or convictions to protect individuals in developed countries rather than individuals from 
the developing world. The developed world is implicated in wrongdoing in that while 
they condemn some clinical trials and surrogacy arrangements in their countries, they 
sponsor and/or benefit from, similar trials and unregulated and a morally problematic 
surrogacy industry in developing world. For example, while such arrangements are 
regulated or completely banned in the developed world, they are supported in the 
developing countries by sponsoring research or benefiting from the surrogacy industry.  
In Wallace’s (2010: 309) words, the developed world seem to be saying that such clinical 
trials and surrogacy agreements “are both impermissible and not impermissible”. This 
comparable to how we can call a homophobic senator caught pants down in the men’s 
room or a vocal PETA advocate who occasionally sneaks in some bacon as hypocrites 
because we expect persons making such pronouncements to perform those acts they lend 
praise and refrain from the sorts of behaviour that they criticize (Isserow & Klein 2017: 
198). Thus, conducting surrogacy and clinical trials in developing countries in ways that 
do uphold international ethical guidelines falls within the structure of hypocrisy where A 
condemns some behaviour that at the same time he or she engages in. This is the case 
with our exploitative cases that certain activities are permissible when engaging with 
people from the developing world but are not permissible when engaging with the people 
from the developed countries. Benefiting from transactions that we elsewhere hold 
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deplorable indicate the inconsistency between the beliefs and behaviour. The 
inconsistency is in holding some transactions impermissible in a bid to protect the welfare 
interests of the individuals as human beings while at the same time allowing similar 
transactions occur elsewhere by either sponsoring and/or benefitting from such 
transactions.  
 The application of double standards to suit certain interests when similar welfare 
interests are similarly threatened shows that there is differential treatment of individuals. 
That is, other people’s wellbeing are given more importance than others. The one 
practicing double standards and therefore hypocrisy attaches less importance to the 
wellbeing of the person they do not regard as equal by taking advantage of her 
vulnerability and dependence. As Wallace (2010: 328) argues, this offends against a 
presumption in favour of equal standing of persons that should be fundamental to moral 
thought. By employing different standards of interactions in developing countries shows 
that B’s welfare interests are of less importance and we ascribe a less moral standing to 
B in the developing world.  
 Similar differential treatment are also clear in the distribution of benefits and 
burdens of these international arrangements. Unfair distribution of benefits and burdens 
in similar arrangements indicates unequal consideration of welfare interests. The use of 
double standards benefits the developed countries more than the developing countries. 
Giving more benefits translates to more protection for the welfare interests of subjects 
from developed countries than those from developing world in a biased and unjustified 
manner since similar welfare interests are equally threatened. To be concerned with the 
protection of one subject rather than another under same or similar circumstances without 
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a good reason as noted above is hypocritical as it allows more consideration of welfare 
interests of individuals from developed countries by adequately securing and protecting 
their wellbeing rather than wellbeing of their counterparts from developing countries. In 
short, unfair distribution of benefits and burdens fails to protect the welfare interests of 
the individuals from developing countries consequently suggesting that their wellbeing 
does not have the same importance or equal standing.  
 Unfair distribution of benefits shows in the failure to provide research outputs to 
the subjects and host communities. This amounts to hypocrisy as it is inconsistent with a 
paramount principle that justifies conducting research. In some cases, such as in the AZT 
trials, the research results are much needed in the host communities as suggested by the 
numbers of subjects that are available for a clinical trial. This failure is not essentially or 
entirely about technical or economic reasons but an abandonment of an integral value at 
the core of medical research albeit only in developed countries. Article 34 of the 
Declaration of Helsinki states that: 
“In advance of a clinical trial, sponsors, researchers and host country governments 
should make provisions for post-trial access for all participants who still need an 
intervention identified as beneficial in the trial. This information must also be 
disclosed to participants during the informed consent process” (WMA 2017). 
 
This article intends to protect subjects’ right to accessing post-trial treatment despite not 
stating the length for the provision of treatment and whom should be responsible for the 
care financial needs. The article does not state if it is permissible that subjects in a study 
carried out in a developing nation obtain less or no access at all to the researched treatment 
when the trial is over than subjects in the developed world would receive. A note on 
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Article 11 of the CIOMS addresses in apart that trials should aim to make new treatment 
realistically accessible to the subjects and the host nation when the clinical trial for the 
study to be considered ethical, but what might be measured as realistically accessible is 
not clear (Shamoo & Resnik 2009: 333). In terms of application of such a requirement, 
there is a shift similar to that of providing the best standard of care to providing the local 
standard of care noted by Angell (1997) as mentioned earlier. In light of the above 
requirement as articulated in both the CIOMS and Declaration of Helsinki among other 
guidelines, it is clear that the sponsors of AZT trials did not give assurance to the 
populations of the host nations of the availability of AZT posttrial, even though it was 
verified as effective. As other critics argue, while the examination questions may have 
been outlined with the health needs of developing nations in mind, not enough had been 
done to ensure that these inhabitants would get the drugs essentially being tried if they 
were ascertained to be effective (Varmus & Satcher 1997). That is, while the trials tested 
a cheaper dosage which would benefit developing countries, there was no pre-trial plan 
contracted to all the involved subjects that put out how a prosperous treatment should be 
established or would be employed in the host nations. There was no binding agreement 
from the developer of AZT to make it accessible at reasonable prices, and in many cases, 
the $50 cost of the short-course AZT treatment would still be exorbitant in those 
countries. The lack of clarity in this guideline seem to encourage practices of double 
standards by developed nations and their agents towards developing countries thereby 
giving room for advantage taking. It is also hypocritical as it moves away from the 
commitment of making new discoveries practically availability and providing non-
discriminatory benefits. In other words, guaranteeing post-trial access to treatment to 
subjects in developed countries than developing countries is not only a practice of double 
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standards but also a case of hypocrisy because it is a failure to act on the values that guide 
medical research conduct.  
 
Further ethical implications of double standards in international exploitation 
 The use of double standards in international exchanges such as clinical trials and 
gestational surrogacy has further moral concerns in particular because of the violation of 
the commitment to the ideal of equality. As earlier presented, these double standards 
consist unjustifiable differential treatment of individuals and/or unequal consideration of 
welfare interests, which can form a basis for the charges of racial injustice and colonialism 
in international exploitation as argued in the following sections.    
 
Racial Injustice 
 Racial injustice remains both explicit and implicit component of most 
international relationships even well after the end of slavery and colonialism. There is a 
widespread agreement that the legacy of institutionalised racism still exist and manifest 
in both local and global relations of wealth and power, which are structured along racial 
lines (McCarthy 2004: 148). The world remains, in some considerable measure, a legacy 
of the preceding centuries of colonialism and imperialism both of which are premised on 
the ideas of race and racism. As Lawrie Balfour (2011) states, “the modern world is 
begotten through racial slavery and colonial conquest” (Cited in Mills 2015: 27). The 
advantage or edge that the developed countries have over developing countries is an 
outcome of several hundred years of unfair distribution of wealth that accrued to most of 
the developed countries that are disproportionately former colonial powers that form the 
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central racial group. This distribution of wealth translates into power that has influenced 
the development of national and transnational structures that favour the dominant and 
‘racially superior’ group of the whites. As Balfour (2011) further argues, “the racialized 
forms of power have defined the modern experience” (Cited in Mills 2015: 27). 
Considering that there are a variety of definitions and theories of racism, I agree with 
Alain de Benoist that racism is fundamentally “a theory of racial hierarchy and inequality” 
(1999: 14). Racism is about value judgement that tend to be more instrumental rather than 
merely descriptive as it implies denying others equality of personhood. Racism (like 
sexism) is a social relation of domination, which essentially structures social inequality 
(Juteau-Lee 1995: 1). Understood in this way, racism is a symbol of oppression and “an 
attitude always directed at the vanquished not the powerful” (Maduka 2004). As much as 
it is now widely agreed that race is not real but a socially invented category, “it is quite 
real in its effects of privileging, whites, disadvantaging people of colour, shaping 
opportunities, affecting public policy, determining life chances, impacting how nominally 
inclusive rights and freedoms are actually differentially operationalised” (Mills 2015: 7 – 
8). These effects are not only domestic but are also quite real at the international level 
where they have their deep roots in the history of slavery and colonialism.  
 The double standards practiced in international arrangements such as clinical trials 
and surrogacy; operate within racially defined structures of social relations. Such 
arrangements, therefore, manifest racist attitudes and/or have racist effects insofar as they 
operate within the same structures that privilege one party rather than the other. These 
arrangements remain racist because of the differential treatment of the welfare interests 
of individuals where less importance is attached to the welfare interests of those from the 
developing countries. By the description of cases of international exploitation, subjecting 
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individuals from developing countries to conditions that do not secure and promote their 
welfare interests reveals differential treatment suggesting they are of less moral worth. 
Applying double standards where equal or similar welfare interests are threatened violates 
the belief in the equal moral worth of human beings. In other words, the application of 
double standards in international exchanges follows some hierarchical ordering of groups 
of individuals and consequently their welfare interests. In this case, the welfare interests 
of B from developing countries are given less significance unlike those of B from 
developed countries regardless of the fact that the welfare interests are the same. One can 
possibly argue that this is only a matter of taking advantage of the opportunity for 
exploitation, as it would occur anywhere. That notwithstanding, opportunities for 
exploitation at the international domain have historically occurred where racial 
hierarchies have existed and produced inequality. That is, the vulnerable group has often 
been the ‘inferior’ in a variety of ways mostly because of the racial distribution of wealth 
and its consequences. In other words, these opportunities for international exploitation 
are measurably created by the power emanating from the racial distribution of wealth. 
Considering this history of the development of the international order, the international 
structures and/or agreements continue to identify who is included, or who benefits, and 
to what extent. As McCarthy (2004: 148) argues, “race has functioned as a maker of 
inclusion and exclusion, equality and inequality, freedom and unfreedom throughout the 
modern period, locally and globally”.  
 I argue that a charge of racial injustice in international surrogacy and clinical trials 
is comparable to the charge of environmental racism. That is, like in environmental 
racism, subjects in surrogacy and clinical trials in developing countries bear the burden 
of these arrangements mostly to the benefit of people from developed countries. 
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Environmental racism refers to the disproportionate impact of environmental hazards on 
the people of colour (Westra and Lawson 2001: xvii). Environmental racism particularly 
involves the unequal distribution of environmental risks, known or potential, across 
demographic groups (Anderton et al. 1994: 229). Proponents of environmental justice 
argue that environmental racism is an injustice that is still practiced by developed 
countries and remains the unwritten canon behind many processes of development 
(Westra & Lawson 2001: xviii). These environmental risks may include waste treatment, 
storage and disposal facilities, chemical and manufacturing plants, and unregulated toxic 
waste sites. In other words, the environments of these populations are used for disposal 
of waste or other hazardous activities (Adeola 2000: 688).  
 At the international level, a sizeable amount of harmful waste produced in 
developed countries has ended up in developing nations since the 1980s facilitated by 
both legal and illegal agreements to receive waste in exchange for money. For example, 
through a contract with a businessperson, in 1987, four thousand tons of harmful 
biochemical waste from Europe ended up in Nigeria, at the port of Koko. The owner of 
the land received $250 monthly to store the waste. Individuals living proximate to the 
dump site got sick, and investigators discovered leaking cylinders of the waste on the 
location (The Third World Network 1989). During the same year, the Mexican marine 
forces thwarted using force, unauthorised dumping by an American barge in Mexico. One 
response to this event was that it mirrored the contempt toward Mexico as a dumpsite by 
some in the United States (Mandel 1999: 317). Dumping toxic wastes elsewhere when 
the developed countries have the capability to contain the wastes they produce within 
their home soil compared to their developing counterparts suggests that the welfare 
interests of the developing countries is less important. This double standard practice 
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cements a ‘not-in-my-backyard’ mentality that exposes the hosts to the threats of the toxic 
materials while protecting those producing and benefiting from the production of such 
waste. Developed countries or their agents take advantage of lax environmental and toxic 
waste management rules and regulations when transacting with developing countries. 
Sometimes developed countries or their agents influence this laxity with promise of 
investment, for example, in natural resource extraction. However, it is vulnerability and 
dependence that put these developed countries in this position of less influence and 
therefore at the receiving end of bad agreements that do not adequately protect and 
promote their welfare interests. The offshoring of morally problematic or unacceptable 
clinical trials and surrogacy services is similar to dumping toxic wastes in the developing 
countries. The practice underlines the same attitude that developed countries seek to 
benefit from agreements that are not permissible in their own countries or among 
themselves.  
 The charge of racial injustice in these arrangements is fundamentally about 
unequal treatment or concern for people because of the hierarchical ordering of groups of 
people. Abandoning international regulations or applying low standards when dealing 
with individuals from developing countries amounts to treating them as of less moral 
worth. In both environmental and medical research arrangements, there is a deliberate 
targeting of vulnerable and dependent individuals to benefit A even when these 
arrangements fail to adequately protect B’s welfare interests in the developing countries. 
These arrangements do not give proper regard to the welfare interests of the people who 
face both real and potential existential threats. Instead of paying proper attention to their 
welfare interests, the threats to their welfare interests are turned into opportunities for 
advantage taking. Unequal consideration of the same or similar welfare interests suggests 
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some disregard of the moral worth of individuals. Benefiting by taking advantage of the 
vulnerability and dependence of others suggest lack of respect due to all human beings as 
suggested by Wood’s  theory of exploitation among others. Viewed this way, these 
arrangements exhibit some racist attitudes by developed countries and their agents 
towards developing countries. Such treatment of individuals in developing countries 
forms the foundation of opinions such as those made by a Third World research 
investigation group, Centre Europe – Tiers Monde (CETIM), which observed that there 
is less appreciation for Africa and African people amongst Western business people 
(Myint 2003).  
 The practice of double standards denies individuals in developing countries 
contracts with conditions that adequately secure their welfare interests. When we treat 
other people’s welfare interests as exchangeable or disposable, we treat them as of less 
moral worth. Such treatment of others, and considering how conditions of vulnerability 
and dependence have emerged, can be viewed as a manifestation of racial injustice 
because we lack any moral justification for such lack of equal respect and consideration. 
Exporting activities to developing countries because they are unacceptable and/or because 
they pose a threat to populations in developed countries, and handling the same activities 
in ways that would not be permissible in developed countries clearly suggest unequal 
regard of the populations in developing countries. In our cases, the subjects’ position of 
vulnerability and dependence is in part, created by a system that has developed by unequal 
treatment and distribution of resources. Continuing to interact with these populations in 
ways that fail to address adequately their welfare interests perpetrate and maintain racial 
injustice through hierarchical ordering of individuals and their subsequent treatment.  
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 Conducting clinical trials such as placebo-controlled trials in the efforts to 
moderate additional vertical transmission in the wake of the research trial of AZT can 
thus be constituting racial injustice because that suggests unequal consideration as it 
consists a failure to adequately protect the subjects and their communities. The moral 
concern is with the justification or motivation for conducting or sponsoring clinical trials 
or surrogacy using different standards or values in developing nations. That is, subjecting 
individuals in developing countries to standards that contravene established research 
guidelines such as the Declaration of Helsinki and others that seek to protect individuals. 
As mentioned earlier, the interpretetion of such guidelines is often fluid such that 
researchers justify the use of placebos in developing countries, for example, by positing 
that the best existing therapy is the one available where the research is being conducted, 
which in the case of developing countries is usually nothing (Angell 1997: 848). The fact 
that healthcare accessible in most developing countries offers nothing near the healthcare 
available in developed countries is irrelevant to the justification of placebo trials when 
proven treatment exist. Angell (1997: 849) points out that doing so “is merely a self-
serving justification” which shows lack of equal concern for the subjects in the developing 
world. In effect, such interpretations result in treating the welfare interests of these 
subjects as of less importance and therefore racist. Moreover, the vulnerability and 
dependence of individuals in developing countries are an outcome of initial racial 
distribution of wealth that structures the circumstances of these arrangements. Angell also 
hold a similar view that recent clinical studies involve racism as they resemble the 
infamous Tuskegee syphilis study which targeted Afro-American poor men for years to 
study the consequences of the untreated venereal syndrome continuing even after 
inexpensive and effective therapy had been developed. Angell (1997: 848) maintains that 
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the justifications used for the recent trials are indicative of the validations utilized for the 
Tuskegee trials. The Tuskegee study was both harsh and hypocritical: subjects were not 
even offered the pretense of informed consent, and eventually, the poor Afro-American 
men were deliberately deprived of generally inexpensive therapy for the cure of their 
syphilis. The sponsors made every effort through dissimulation to make sure the subjects 
would not obtain access to the effective therapy. Worth noting is that only a specific type 
of subjects would be subjected to such kind of treatment. The subjects were hierarchically 
inferior and their opportunities were equally inferior. Secondly, modern interventions are 
not readily available or accessible to individuals from developing countries in a manner 
that we can equate to the purposeful withholding of treatment in the Tuskegee study. Thus 
the catastrophe of the international arrangements such as clinical trials and surrogacy is 
that they embrace a moral taint of a world financial order founded on racial abuse and 
continue to make such things such as effective therapies or interventions available but 
unaffordable for many in the developing world. As Jean-Philippe Chippaux (2005) notes, 
the mismatch between the poverty of developing countries and the power of the medical 
industry exacerbate the conflict between scientific and commercial interests in modern 
medical research.  
 International arrangements such as clinical trials and surrogacy in essence 
outsource subjects and operate in satellite establishments controlled by individuals or 
agencies from the developed world like in the manufacturing industry. Transacting with 
B in the examples on values and standards that are not acceptable in developed countries 
denies these interactors respect as equals and more importantly makes it a racial 
phenomenon as it targets a class and type of individuals in developing rather than in 
developed countries. For example, international gestational surrogacy reinforces the view 
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that vulnerable women in developing countries are disposable and for a price different 
from their counterparts in the developing world when or where surrogacy is permissible. 
The differences that manifest in the conditions for surrogacy contracts and benefits that 
accrue to the surrogates in these different worlds also deny these women equal moral 
worth because unlike the women in the developed world, the surrogates’ welfare interests 
are not properly secured. Thus, treating the surrogates without adequately addressing their 
welfare interests is treating them as of unequal moral worth and particularly  racist when 
their counterparts in developing countries are protected by ethical guidelines to ensure 
that they are not exploited or get better benefits under better conditions that adequately 
address their welfare interests. 
 
Colonialism 
 The practice of double standards in the cases of international surrogacy and 
clinical trials exemplify some power relation. Considering the social history and attitudes 
in the relationship between developed and developing countries, the power involved in 
practicing double standards is similar to colonial and imperial power. However, the 
exercise of this power does not require the occupation of the whole country but is dictating 
enough to empower the extraction of resources including knowledge, which are equally 
essential to individuals in the developing countries. More precisely, the exercise of power 
in these international arrangements is indirect, not requiring formal political control but 
relying on economic or monetary influences. In other words, these arrangements are 
instances of what critics of international arrangements call neo-colonialism to refer to the 
subordination of internal policy in developing countries to the demands of foreign 
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developed countries’ needs using finance or capital (Nkrumah 1965). 42  I argue that 
practising double standards as described depends on one’s hold of power over another 
based on wealth and income inequalities. The use of double standards in transactions in 
developing countries is possible because a party from a developed country has an 
advantage over B from a developing country owing to her vulnerability and dependence. 
By the vulnerability account, A can apply double standards when transacting with B 
because B has threats to his or her welfare interests and B does not have any better options 
for securing her welfare interests other than interacting with A.    
 The history between developing and developed countries is marked by 
exploitation through colonization, military dominance, and biased trading practices. After 
the eras of foreign rule which saw the extraction of natural resources, the resources of 
developing nations are, once more, being extracted and this time round by their own 
governments in a bid to promote and protect the welfare interests of their citizens and also 
in part, to facilitate the debt accumulated to the colonialists. Over-extraction of coal, 
mineral wealth and oil becomes necessary to survive domestic problems such as food 
shortages and economic commitments to the developed nations (Rivera 2011). Debt 
servicing is inflicting destruction to the environment of these nations as they are obligated 
to utilise their natural wealth to the fullest to circumvent payment of arrears that might 
lead to endorsement of monetary sanctions against them. The Debt burden has re-emerged 
in most developing countries despite the debt cancellation initiative at the turn of the 
millennium. The debt levels continue to rise countries and from the present-day trend, 
                                                             
42 In any particular case, the failure of a state to protect the welfare interests of its citizens, for instance by 
failing to enforce adequate legal and regulatory protections, will no doubt have many complex causes. For 
example, with regard to the two cases examined in this thesis, lax regulatory standards could conceivably 
result from successful lobbying on the part of local pharmaceutical research firms or providers of surrogacy 
services. Here, however, I hone in on a more general phenomenon, namely the neo-colonialist complicity 
of wealthy states in maintaining double standards. 
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there is a possibility for the burden to continue rising and flowing to the future generations 
in developing nations.43 Environmental dilapidation and pollution might turn out to be a 
long-term effect for the future generations in these nations, a legacy to which the 
developed world has considerably contributed through colonial practices and policies. As 
Thomas Pogge (2005: 69) underlines, the condition of developing nations was not 
instigated by ordinary situations but arose historically through political and economic 
arrangements. While these cases exploitation through coercion have disappeared, the 
contemporary arrangements are still exploitative as they continue to benefit developed 
countries as shown in the clinical trial examples. The ability to benefit depends on the 
wealth and income advantage that perpetrators of these arrangements have and, the 
vulnerability and dependence of the populations on the developing countries. Developed 
countries through their agents derive benefit by taking advantage of the vulnerability and 
dependence of the individuals.   
 Developed nations have been advantageously using their relationship with 
developing countries for their own well-being for centuries under changing garbs - from 
colonialism to tied aid and nowadays ‘eco-imperialism’44. Developed countries as driven 
by the economic logic find it prudent for them to acquire merchandises and amenities 
from developing nations whenever it is more costly or destructive to produce them in their 
own states. However, current arrangements are similar to the extraction of wealth and 
resources that occurred during the colonial period albeit under different conditions. That 
                                                             
43 Evidence shows that despite the debt relief under Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, 
debt levels are rising. For example, the debt stock for Malawi has exceeded the debt stock before the 
Enhanced HIPC Initiative. The debt stock for Malawi was at MK121, 213.5 in 1999 and MK1, 569,794.215 
in 2018 (See Reserve Bank of Malawi 2019). We safely conclude a similar increase in debt stock for other 
countries since not many have achieved significant development or even moved to middle income rankings.   
44 See. Driessen (2007). Eco-imperialism refers to the forceful imposition of Western environmental views 
on developing countries that may include stopping developing countries from using certain resources 
because of environmental risks to recommending use of certain technologies that are not available to 
developing countries.  
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is, the fact remains that by the approach more wealth and resource flow out from 
developing countries such as those in Africa than what is flowing in. A recent study into 
total monetary flows into and out of Africa explains this phenomenon reporting that 
Africa loses more than what it receives predominantly through loans (Sharples et al 2014). 
This report shows how developed nations and their agents use colonial powers on 
autonomous developing countries to extract wealth through profits and tax dodging. The 
lack of devotion to international regulations show the lack of concern in protecting 
developing countries from multinational corporation’s exploitative propensities and this 
displays the application of double standards in international interactions. This failure to 
protect the vulnerable and dependent ‘others’ in Pogge’s language constitutes ‘a failure 
of respecting their negative rights’ by denying them equal existence (Pogge 2005: 69). 
This denial of equal existence similarly holds for the cases of clinical trial and surrogacy 
arrangements. Those conducting, financing, and benefiting more from these clinical trials, 
surrogacy and other comparable arrangements are therefore responsible for maintaining 
or sustain the conditions that give them power and therefore control over their interactors. 
By initiating morally questionable relationships with developing countries and by 
withholding conditions that may work in favour of the developing countries, developed 
countries and their agents exercise colonial-like power over their interactors. Developed 
countries and their agents therefore practice of doubles standards because they have 
power and they seek to maintain that power over the developing countries. As Pogge 
(2005) earlier states, the conditions of the developing countries were instigated 
historically through political and economic arrangements rather than ordinary situations, 
developed countries seek to maintain the power and advantage realised from these 
historical arrangements.  
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 Notably, clinical trials and surrogacy arrangements operate on the same principles 
operational in typical international trade agreements, which advance the neocolonial 
agenda. In other words, the same economic or trade logic applies to clinical trials, 
surrogacy, and environmental arrangements among others. The biasness of this economic 
logic against developing countries is for instance visible when we look at what defines 
the global environment agenda. For example, the vigorously contested conventions are 
those that attempt to promote and/or secure the welfare interests of inhabitants of 
developed nations or those directly affecting them. Concerns like damage of ozone layer, 
global warming, conservation of dolphins and whales are the urgent universal 
environmental problems attracting a high percentage of global funds. On the other hand, 
environmental problems affecting developing countries are repeatedly left on the back 
burner owing to the lack interest among the developed nations (Nath 2001: 10). For 
instance, the convention on fighting desertification and the agreement on habitation and 
settlements are diminutively discussed and less financed as they have directly to do with 
ecological problems facing developing nations (Nath 2001: 10). Likewise, clinical trial 
and surrogacy issues arising in developing countries do not attract much attention on the 
global level even though the same issues are aptly dealt with when they arise in developed 
countries. These issues mirror the double standards and, as Nath (2001: 10) further 
observes the domination of western countries in determining which issues are of 
importance or of international nature and which only directly concern developing 
countries. In other words, the power possessed by developed countries over their 
developing counterparts confers an enormous advantage and ability to set global agenda 
that benefits developed countries. Insofar the developed countries use their power and 
advantage, built from colonialism, to initiate or implement agreements that are skewed 
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and to their advantage, they use their power in a colonial-manner treating developing 
countries not as equals because they attach less importance to their welfare interests of 
the people in the developing world.  
 
Conclusion 
 The double standards practiced in international clinical trials and gestational 
surrogacy cases challenge the idea of global justice because the practice violates the 
commitment to the principles of equality of persons and fairness. The practice is morally 
wrong because it involves the application of values and standards in favour of developed 
rather than developing countries. Disregard of the existing guidelines and agreements 
leads to the failure to protect and/or promote the welfare interests of the inhabitants of 
developing world. In addition, disregarding these standards or applying lower standards 
when transacting with people from developing countries suggests that their welfare 
interests are of less importance and are thus of less moral worth. The application of double 
standards to interactions with persons from developing countries in arrangements such as 
surrogacy and clinical trials expose the hypocrisy as the mismatch between the exploiter’s 
moral pronouncements or commitments and their behaviour. That is, the exploiter’s moral 
authority that is shown through investment of efforts and resources to come up with 
ethical guidelines is undermined when the exploiter cannot follow through with actions. 
Further, the lack of equal respect and concern for human beings in these international 
transactions suggests other ethical concerns of racial injustice and colonialism. That is, 
when A treats B without equal concern and respect by disregarding guidelines meant to 
ensure treatment of B with equal concern and respect, and particularly where the history 
interactions between A and B is tainted by racial injustice and colonialism, charges of 
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racial injustice and colonialism are warranted. The conditions of vulnerability and 
dependence that affect individuals from developing countries should not make A treat B 
without respect or concern, or be used as opportunities for advantage-taking.  The 
understanding that vulnerability and dependence give power or advantage to A should 
caution A on how to treat B considering how these conditions come about. The 
vulnerability account of exploitation therefore affords us a starting point for addressing 
global injustices by highlighting the many opportunities for exploitation in international 











 This thesis demonstrates that the concept of exploitation is one of the overused 
yet misused concepts even in philosophy and other disciplinary fields. The concept of 
exploitation remains a misused concept because it is often confused with other concepts 
such as coercion, commodification and harm. Further, exploitation is used as a self-
explanatory term without explaining what they mean by the term. As Hill (1994: 699) 
observes, exploitation “has been a catchall term with as many meanings as to those who 
use it”. Confusing exploitation with other concepts, or when exploitation becomes 
synonymous with other concepts, it risks losing its normative force. The vulnerability 
theory proposes a conceptualisation of exploitation that avoids such confusion with other 
terms or concepts. 
 The analysis of philosophical theories of exploitation shows diverse specific 
conceptions of what constitutes exploitation and its wrongness. Theorists offer different 
explications of what constitutes unfair benefit and/or unfair advantage taking and the 
attendant wrongs of such behaviour. Despite the differences, the theories generally agree 
that exploitation involves benefiting from taking unfair advantage of another person 
(Veneziani & Yoshihara 2010: 2). Marx holds that exploitation involves the appropriation 
of the unpaid labour of others. Roemer thinks exploitation involves an unequal exchange 
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caused by differential ownership of productive assets. For Steiner, exploitation occurs 
when there is an unequal exchange caused by some rights violations of the exploitee or a 
third party. Miller and Wertheimer, albeit in different ways, view that exploitation 
involves exchanging at prices that deflect away from the counterfactual fair price because 
of special advantages due to asymmetries of information or bargaining power. For Wolff, 
exploitation involves benefiting by taking advantage of a person’s vulnerable 
circumstances and some improper use or treatment of this person (s). Such specifications 
determine the extent to which these individual theories can identify exploitation or the 
forms of exploitation they can or cannot explain. As noted through the examples, the 
above named theories only account for some forms of exploitation cases rather than 
others.  
 The source of the theories’ limitations is mainly in their failure to identify the 
correct conditions for exploitation. In other words, they mistake characteristics of specific 
forms of exploitation for what constitutes exploitation. However, as Wolff (1985: 89) 
observes, the failure of these theories to account for other forms of exploitation does not 
mean that exploitation does not occur outside their domain. Wolff’s view that Marx’s 
theory of exploitation only applies to a specific model and applying outside the model 
leads to error is therefore insightful (Wolff 1999: 109). One can similarly employ this 
insight to Roemer’s theory of exploitation that it only applies where unequal exchange is 
occasioned by unjust initial distributions of productive assets or Steiner’s theory that it 
only accounts for exploitation where rights violations are involved. Outside the 
parameters set, the theories cannot account for exploitation. The five examples of 
exploitation and others demonstrate in different ways that we still have strong intuitions 
about exploitation where the theories fail to account for exploitation.     
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 The vulnerability theory addresses the problems of definition and the sources of 
the weaknesses of the other theories of exploitation notwithstanding building its 
foundation on insights from the other theories. The vulnerability theory identifies the 
correct conditions for exploitation making it broader, applying to a range of exploitative 
scenarios than the other theories. As seen from analysis, exploitation is a challenging 
concept that is used in different ways and in various contexts. Exploitation is also a 
complex phenomenon occurring almost everywhere, within economic or political 
institutions, between individuals or groups, as well as in personal relationships. While 
agreeing with Wood (1995: 143) that by using vulnerabilities “many dealings between 
human beings can be put in an exploitative light”, my vulnerability theory insists on 
clarifying the notion of vulnerability and when taking advantage of vulnerability is 
exploitative. In doing so, the theory accounts for various forms of exploitation at various 
levels more than the other theories of exploitation. Further, unlike other accounts of 
exploitation, this vulnerability theory has an advantage since it does not require 
explaining the source of vulnerability to determine the occurrence of exploitation. That 
is, the source of vulnerability such as unjust inequality or violations of rights do not matter 
to occurrence of exploitation.    
 Taking a lead from Wolff that exploitation involves benefiting by taking 
advantage of another’s vulnerability; the vulnerability theory broadens the understanding 
of exploitation by blending insights from the structural and individual approaches in the 
contemporary literature on exploitation. However, qualifying the notion of vulnerability 
with the idea of dependence is essential to capturing the relevant insights from both 
structural and individual theories to account for a range of exploitation cases. Thus, on 
my account, exploitation occurs when A benefits by simultaneously taking advantage of 
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the vulnerability and the dependence of B on A. The vulnerable person must also be 
dependent on the exploiter for exploitation to occur. Put differently, B is exploitable only 
when he or she is vulnerable and dependent on A. Vulnerability and dependence are 
therefore necessary conditions for the occurrence of exploitation. Vulnerability denotes a 
condition in which B’s welfare interests or wellbeing is threatened and dependence 
denotes a relationship between interactors where B’s cost for exiting a relationship with 
A is greater than zero. Vulnerability explains the conditions that disadvantage the 
exploited in bargaining situations and give rise to asymmetrical relations between 
interactors. Dependence describes the nature of relationship between interactors for 
exploitation to occur: where the cost of exiting the relationship with A are high because 
the interaction with A is the best option available for B to secure his or her welfare 
interests. As argued earlier, dependence is the better depiction of the relationship in 
exploitation that avoids the conceptual confusion that faces r-vulnerability employed in 
by Goodin and Wood’s theories.  
 The vulnerability theory as argued is an adequate theory to account for a range of 
exploitation cases without being limited as other theories of exploitation. The success of 
the vulnerability theory can be measured using Lovett’s formula that he uses to assess the 
success of his theory of domination (Lovett 2010: 4 -6). First, the vulnerability theory is 
more general that it is able to account for a range of exploitation compared to how other 
theories are rigid and therefore limited to accounting only for a few or particular forms of 
exploitation. Thus, since the theory is not limited to a finite set of cases, it is conceptually 
adequate to say what is exploitative about different scenarios including whether new 
situations count as exploitative or not. Secondly, the vulnerability theory is both 
descriptively and normatively useful. A theory of exploitation should characterise 
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exploitation by pointing out the correct necessary conditions and use precise concepts so 
that the theory is neither too broad nor too narrow. The vulnerability theory gives a better 
understanding of what constitutes exploitation, which is also vital for normative aims 
required to guide human relationships and interactions. For instance, however we think 
exploitation is wrong we at least know that reducing or eliminating exploitation requires 
reducing the conditions of vulnerability and relationships of dependence. The aim of 
reducing the conditions of vulnerability and relationships of dependence is to ensure that 
individuals’ welfare interests are adequately secured through interactions such as 
surrogacy and clinical trials. 
 By highlighting the conditions of vulnerability and dependence as necessary for 
benefiting by advantage taking, the theory further alerts us about the occurrence of 
exploitation on the international arena where the theorization of exploitation has been 
minimal or absent. We can argue that the lack of theorization at this level in part allows 
for occurrence of exploitation since exploitation is not recognized and therefore not given 
due attention. Through the analysis of surrogacy and clinical trials, we have established 
that certain practices depend on and perpetuate conditions of vulnerability and 
dependence consequently failing address exploitation.  
 Further, the under theorization or lack of theorization at the international level 
indicates some inadequacy in the existing theories of exploitation to readily account for 
exploitation at the level where the necessary conditions for exploitation are more 
prevalent. However, this lack of theorization is not very surprising as political theories at 
the international level remain work in progress compared to domestic political theory that 
contain “highly developed theories offering alternative solutions to well-defined 
problems” (Nagel 2005: 113). First, this inadequate theorization suggests that the existing 
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theories do not recognize exploitation occurring in the international arena. Secondly, 
inadequate theorization consequently implies failure to interrogate and address the ills of 
exploitation. That is, while we may recognize and address exploitation at domestic levels 
for some normative aims such as to protecting the vulnerable, we fail to extend such 
normative projects to the international arenas where the likelihood of exploitation is even 
high because of increased conditions of vulnerability and dependence especially in 
developing countries. As demonstrated through the surrogacy and clinical trial 
arrangements, seeking and promoting these arrangements in developing countries 
including at lower standards, questions our commitments to the values that inform our 
decisions to heavily regulate or prohibit these arrangements in developed countries. At 
one level, engaging in these arrangements at the international level exposes the unjustified 
practice of double standards that we can classify as form of hypocrisy because it reveals 
the mismatch between values and actions or behaviour. At another level, because these 
double standards are hardly justifiable and only apply to developing countries, they 
appear to perpetrate historical racial injustice and carry on with colonial agenda, which 
only best serves the interests of the developed countries. One notable attempt to theorize 
exploitation at the international level by De-Shalit (1999) explaining when it is reasonable 
to talk about exploitation in international and transnational faces similar challenges to the 
other theories of exploitation that fail to identify the correct necessary conditions for 
exploitation. In addition, De-Shalit’s account of exploitation like other moralized views 
of exploitation fail to account for exploitation where the moral principle in question is not 




 On the vulnerability theory, exploitation is primarily wrong or unfair insofar as 
the exploiter fails to adequately protect the welfare interests of the exploited.  The failure 
to protect the welfare interest of vulnerable and dependent others can be established 
counterfactually, by the existence of the possibility to interact with the exploited under 
better terms and conditions that can adequately protect their wellbeing. However, the 
theory holds that exploitation is morally objectionable for various reasons. This means 
that the moral beliefs cited by other theories are only some of the reasons why exploitation 
could be wrong. That is, benefiting by taking advantage of others’ vulnerability and 
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